- From: Henri Sivonen <hsivonen@iki.fi>
- Date: Wed, 2 May 2007 14:49:16 +0300
- To: Henri Sivonen <hsivonen@iki.fi>
- Cc: Gareth Hay <gazhay@gmail.com>, Roger Johansson <roger@456bereastreet.com>, HTML WG <public-html@w3.org>
On May 2, 2007, at 14:42, Henri Sivonen wrote: > You might have more success with your argument if you showed using > Game Theory, why in a multiplayer "game" (i.e. market) none of the > "players" (i.e. vendors) have an incentive to be more permissive > towards the legacy baseline of permissiveness than the others. > > In addition, it would help to show an incentive for the first > vendor to move from the status quo towards less permissiveness > without all the vendors moving in lockstep. Just to elaborate: It seems to me that undefined error handling corresponds to no equilibrium, Draconian error handling corresponds to unstable equilibrium and defined error recovery corresponds to stable equilibrium. -- Henri Sivonen hsivonen@iki.fi http://hsivonen.iki.fi/
Received on Wednesday, 2 May 2007 11:49:23 UTC