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Re: Ideas about DID explanation

From: Emmanuel Forche <forchee@hastlabs.com>
Date: Mon, 31 Dec 2018 18:33:18 +0000
Message-Id: <8e05429f9d0d6ec3b8251d6fee5e83db890a2720@webmail.eclipse.net.uk>
To: "David Chadwick" <D.W.Chadwick@kent.ac.uk>, "Adrian Gropper" <agropper@healthurl.com>
Cc: "W3C Credentials Community Group" <public-credentials@w3.org>
The observation below is not quite accurate. There are currently
systems that allow for a person to _signal _coercion. Some alarm or
door entry systems are good examples.  To allow for the coercion or
duress to be signaled  you have (usually) two  codes. One for
normal use/behaviour and one for use if under duress/coercion. (In
fact  in some designs the 'duress code'  is unknown to the person
but implemented anyway from behavioural studies of persons in duress
situations). I agree that this is not sufficient but it is one way to
log  (self-declared) coercion. Of course there must be ways, and
legal is one of them,  to establish if coercion did really occur

Happy New Year.
Regards
Emmanuel  

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----- Original Message -----
From: "David Chadwick" 
To:"Adrian Gropper" 
Cc:"W3C Credentials Community Group" 
Sent:Mon, 31 Dec 2018 13:43:54 +0000
Subject:Re: Ideas about DID explanation

 On 25/12/2018 13:34, Adrian Gropper wrote:
 > Non-repudiation depends on chain-of-custody, which is technology,
as
 > well as process. The interpretation may be up to courts but if the
tech
 > or process don't take chain of custody into account the court
can't do
 > much about it.
 > 
 > Different DID Methods will be more or less susceptible to
repudiation
 > and I hope our spec makes it easy for inspectors and courts to
decide
 > which methods are good enough.

 Technology does not take coercion into account. If someone forces me
to
 undertake a transaction, that I subsequently repudiate, the
technology
 may very well have a solid chain-of-custody in its logs, but the log
has
 no knowledge about the coercion, or what date it occurred. This is
why I
 said that ultimately non-repudiation is a legal issue. Technology is
 necessary but not sufficient (faulty technology will of course make
 non-repudiation impossible to achieve).

 Happy New Year

 David

 > 
 > Adrian
 > 
 > On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 8:08 AM David Chadwick  > wrote:
 > 
 > Non repudiation is legal issue, not a technical one. So it does
not
 > really matter if the user chooses the date or not. The courts will
 > decide the matter
 > 
 > David
 > 
 > On 24/12/2018 22:20, Tom Jones wrote:
 > > Very bad idea to let the user chose date for breach. That would
break
 > > any possibility of using key for nonrepudiation. It is of no
 > interest of
 > > the resolver why the key is no longer valid 
 > >
 > > thx ..Tom (mobile)
 > >
 > > On Tue, Dec 11, 2018, 7:00 AM Manu Sporny
 >  >  > wrote:
 > >
 > >     On 12/11/18 8:43 AM, Lucas Tétreault wrote:
 > >     > What I'm stuck on right now is keys that have been
breached
 > vs. keys
 > >     >  that were rotated for some other reason?
 > >
 > >     We are exploring the possibility of annotating the reason
for
 > the key
 > >     rotation (expiration, revocation due to loss, etc.)
 > >
 > >     > If a key was breached then presumably any and all
 > credentials that
 > >     > were signed with it should be revoked. Thoughts?
 > >
 > >     If you can note when the key was breached in the DID
Document (or
 > >     elsewhere) when you revoke it, then you don't need to
revoke all
 > >     credentials that were signed with it.
 > >
 > >     Also note that many high-stakes issuers are most likely
going
 > to use
 > >     HSMs, so if there is a breach, they will only revoke
 > credentials during
 > >     when they thought their system was vulnerable due to the
 > private keys
 > >     being difficult/impossible to exfiltrate from their
 > hardware-secured
 > >     storage.
 > >
 > >     -- manu
 > >
 > >     --
 > >     Manu Sporny (skype: msporny, twitter: manusporny, G+:
+Manu
 > Sporny)
 > >     Founder/CEO - Digital Bazaar, Inc.
 > >     blog: Veres One Decentralized Identifier Blockchain
Launches
 > >     https://tinyurl.com/veres-one-launches
 > >
 > 
 > 
 > 
 > -- 
 > 
 > Adrian Gropper MD
 > 
 > PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy!
 > HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data.
 > DONATE: https://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-3/
Received on Monday, 31 December 2018 18:37:07 UTC

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