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Re: Ideas about DID explanation

From: Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Dec 2018 14:20:11 -0800
Message-ID: <CAK2Cwb4rLBKJOdTjGo0fTz4F9VkAZkM9rM7ANN6i_xtzysFgoA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>
Cc: Lucas T├ętreault <lucas@vivvo.com>, daniel.hardman@evernym.com, "kim@learningmachine.com" <kim@learningmachine.com>, Credentials Community Group <public-credentials@w3.org>
Very bad idea to let the user chose date for breach. That would break any
possibility of using key for nonrepudiation. It is of no interest of the
resolver why the key is no longer valid

thx ..Tom (mobile)

On Tue, Dec 11, 2018, 7:00 AM Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com wrote:

> On 12/11/18 8:43 AM, Lucas T├ętreault wrote:
> > What I'm stuck on right now is keys that have been breached vs. keys
> >  that were rotated for some other reason?
> We are exploring the possibility of annotating the reason for the key
> rotation (expiration, revocation due to loss, etc.)
> > If a key was breached then presumably any and all credentials that
> > were signed with it should be revoked. Thoughts?
> If you can note when the key was breached in the DID Document (or
> elsewhere) when you revoke it, then you don't need to revoke all
> credentials that were signed with it.
> Also note that many high-stakes issuers are most likely going to use
> HSMs, so if there is a breach, they will only revoke credentials during
> when they thought their system was vulnerable due to the private keys
> being difficult/impossible to exfiltrate from their hardware-secured
> storage.
> -- manu
> --
> Manu Sporny (skype: msporny, twitter: manusporny, G+: +Manu Sporny)
> Founder/CEO - Digital Bazaar, Inc.
> blog: Veres One Decentralized Identifier Blockchain Launches
> https://tinyurl.com/veres-one-launches
Received on Monday, 24 December 2018 22:20:48 UTC

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