- From: Pat Hayes <phayes@ihmc.us>
- Date: Thu, 28 May 2009 14:42:49 -0500
- To: Alan Ruttenberg <alanruttenberg@gmail.com>
- Cc: Jonathan Rees <jar@creativecommons.org>, AWWSW TF <public-awwsw@w3.org>
On May 28, 2009, at 12:40 PM, Alan Ruttenberg wrote: > Hi Pat, > > I don't see how switching from intent to artifact helps anything, > rather the opposite in my experience. First, "agency" seems to me to > be something equally of the mind, and second all practical efforts > that I've made in conjunction with OBI (Ontology of Biomedical > Investigation) haven't panned out. > > I think in the end we are going to have a mind involved What about websites created by autonomous software? > and if we are > we might as well deal with the source then trying to track down the > effects without reference to the locus. Seems like in practice that > there are going to be fewer things that are difficult to define in the > the end if we bite the bullet on "intent" being difficult to define, > accept it as a primitive for now, and work forward. Oh, I agree we shouldnt be trying to DEFINE any of these concepts. I'd be happy to just treat 'artifact' as a primitive and say that its obvious that numbers, abstract categories, etc. are clearly not artifacts, but that any website (howsoever it got created, even if it was by a cat walking on a keyboard somewhere) clearly is. There are always going to be possible-but-silly examples which break any proposed strict if&onlyif definition. Pat > > However, I will admit to not being a trained philosopher, and if you > think that there is a good document that makes it clear what artifact > and agency are, then I'm game for a read. > > That said, I will respond to the substance of Jonathan's message in a > separate email. > > Best, > Alan > > On Thu, May 28, 2009 at 9:46 AM, Pat Hayes <phayes@ihmc.us> wrote: >> Reading this, seems to me (provisionally) that "having intent" >> might be >> rephrased as "being an artifact"; that is, existing as the result >> of agency >> of some kind rather than a natural process. (?) If so, that might >> be a nice >> connection with some traditional philosophical distinctions that >> have stood >> the test of time; and it avoids having to say what intent "is". And >> it has >> the advantage, I'd suggest, of focusing on the thing rather than >> the innards >> of the mind of its creator, which is always going to be a black box/ >> hole. >> >> Pat >> >> On May 28, 2009, at 7:48 AM, Jonathan Rees wrote: >> >>> I've been puzzling over the question of how two generic-resources >>> can >>> have the same trace by virtue of a difference in meaning, e.g. the >>> use >>> case Tim gives where he and I both work at Burger King for a week >>> and >>> end up with identical-looking time sheets (same trace), that are >>> really distinct generic-resources simply because of properties not >>> reflected in the traces. >>> >>> Allow me to call this difference "intent" - I won't define this but >>> Alan, don't jump all over me, build on what I say. It is the missing >>> dimension, the resource's "essential characteristic" that is not >>> conveyed in any wa-representation. >>> >>> I don't know what "intent" is ontologically; I use the word as a >>> placeholder. It has to be quite broad, so that it allows me to say >>> that the GR named by >>> >>> http://random.org/integers/?num=100&min=1&max=100&col=5&base=10&format=html&rnd=new >>> has "intent" - namely the web site author's intent to satisfy the >>> world's hunger for white noise. Generally, we have grandfathered all >>> "web pages" just by saying that none of them are accidental >>> (unintentional) - someone went to the trouble of registering a >>> domain >>> name, setting up a server, and deploying content. We also get Moby >>> Dick, since someone went to the trouble of writing it - it didn't >>> fall >>> from the sky. And we get Finnegan's Wake and Beethoven's 7th for the >>> same reason even though know one knows what message they convey. >>> >>> But I think "intent" can explain another use case Tim has given. >>> He is >>> adamant that numbers, such as the 46th Mersenne prime, are not >>> information resources. I was puzzled by his refusal because it seems >>> very clear to me that all of its essential characteristics *can* be >>> conveyed in a message; I just did so. But if we set aside the AWWW >>> definition of IR, and instead talk about the Tim-derived GR model, >>> we >>> can say that something that has a wa-representation that is a >>> numeral >>> designating the 46th Mersenne prime is a perfectly fine GR, since >>> the >>> *intent* is to communicate the digits of the 46th Mersenne prime; >>> while the number itself does not carry any intent and is therefore >>> not >>> a GR. >>> >>> More generally, "intent" explains why GRs are contingent on the real >>> world, as opposed to being purely mathematical constructions, while >>> still being able to withstand any Xiaoshu-like attempts at giving >>> them >>> mass and phsyical location. >>> >>> If we can determine that >>> (a) "intent" is not vacuous, and >>> (b) "intent" is the *only* way that generic-resources can differ, >>> other than in their traces >>> then we will have a complete characterization of generic >>> resources: GR >>> = trace + intent. >>> >>> I read this and find "intent" to be very similar to "phlogiston", >>> but >>> remember that chemistry had its origins in alchemy. >>> >>> Jonathan >>> >>> Appendix: Use cases >>> 1. >>> http://random.org/integers/?num=100&min=1&max=100&col=5&base=10&format=html&rnd=new >>> - yes >>> 2. Moby Dick -yes >>> 3. Beethoven's 7th - yes >>> 4. 46 Mersenne Prime - no >>> 5. A 19th-century publication that has no URI yet (possibly ever) >>> - yes >>> 6. data:text/plain,intent_depends_on_context - no? (doesn't imply >>> intent; only names a trace) >>> 7. function from time and request to representation - no (doesn't >>> imply intent; only names a trace) >>> 8. "network data object" a la RFC 2616 - some of them, yes, if you >>> take this to mean "generic resource deployed on a network" >>> 9. "network service" a la RFC 2616 - ? >>> ... >>> >>> >>> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> IHMC (850)434 8903 or (650)494 >> 3973 >> 40 South Alcaniz St. (850)202 4416 office >> Pensacola (850)202 4440 fax >> FL 32502 (850)291 0667 mobile >> phayesAT-SIGNihmc.us http://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------ IHMC (850)434 8903 or (650)494 3973 40 South Alcaniz St. (850)202 4416 office Pensacola (850)202 4440 fax FL 32502 (850)291 0667 mobile phayesAT-SIGNihmc.us http://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes
Received on Thursday, 28 May 2009 19:43:30 UTC