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Re: What will incentivize deployment of explicit proxies?

From: Roberto Peon <grmocg@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 8 Dec 2013 20:17:26 -0800
Message-ID: <CAP+FsNdWTS5tbmFVLRPuRJJHrjrbMCSR4QGFSO1YXa7hpwFmtg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
Cc: HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
On Sun, Dec 8, 2013 at 6:33 PM, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> wrote:

> This thread makes me wonder if, rather than focusing on introducing a new
> kind of proxy to address the “enterprise/school/prison” (ESP) use case, we*
> should instead focus on fixing how trust roots are configured and managed
> in browsers / OSs.
>
> I say that because the requirement is already being met in the market;
> ESPs are able to inspect and modify traffic as it goes by on the wire by
> configuring a new trust root. It’s just that there are some nasty side
> effects brought about by that solution.
>
> We may be able to mitigate the bad effects of the current solution — e.g.,
> by allowing the user to understand when their browser is using a trust root
> that was added later (AIUI some versions of Chrome already do this
> visually?), by giving the user more fine-grained control over what new
> certificates can be used for (to address the BYOD user), etc.
>
> If we can do that, we avoid the potential for new security choices in
> front of non-enterprise end users, ones that Will is justifiably nervous
> about (since anything that would allow a MITM warning to be clicked through
> is a VERY attractive attack vector).
>
> The one thing that wouldn’t be addressed by this approach is the potential
> for a “semi-trusted” proxy that can see inside encryption and yet promises
> e2e integrity. So, to me it seems like we should be focusing on the use
> cases that lead us there (rather than on that particular solution, yet).
>
> The one that’s been clearly identified is shared caching; is there another?
>

malware/virus scanning

-=R


> Cheers,
>
>
> * for some value of “we". Not every problem needs to be hit with an
> HTTP-shaped hammer.
>
>
>
> On 7 Dec 2013, at 7:26 am, Werner Baumann <werner.baumann@onlinehome.de>
> wrote:
>
> > Am Tue, 3 Dec 2013 10:53:26 -0800
> > schrieb William Chan (陈智昌) <willchan@chromium.org>:
> >
> >>
> >> <pushback>
> >> I can probably expect to be tarred and feathered by my security team
> >> if I tell them we need to put up a UI asking the end user to make a
> >> decision about security :)
> >> </pushback>
> >>
> > Yes, that's the problem with your security team. Talking about security
> > for the end user, but the one party that has no saying is the end user.
> >
> > Talking as an end user: It is me, and only me, who decides whom to
> > trust in which respect and to what extend. It is not your security team.
> >
> > Sure, there are users who don't care. And there are lot of users who
> > can't make informed decisions, because all the necessary information is
> > hidden from them, many times by UI-experts who work based on the dogma
> > that users are stupid.
> >
> > Werner
> >
>
> --
> Mark Nottingham   http://www.mnot.net/
>
>
>
>
>
Received on Monday, 9 December 2013 04:17:54 UTC

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