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Re: Using HTTP Trailers [was: Content-Integrity header]

From: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2012 19:50:00 -0700
Message-ID: <CABP7RbcFiKyLdcZB_4LvsXGa7S5eymzH5mA2JxipimPTG-bC0A@mail.gmail.com>
To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
Cc: "Ludin, Stephen" <sludin@akamai.com>, Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>, "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Yeah, this has been my experience as well. Unfortunately, I'm not sure
if this is something that can be effectively fixed. Off the top of my
head, I don't know of a single server or client side http stack that
is capable of easily setting Trailers in the stream. I just checked
and support for trailers is still missing in the Servlet API, for
instance.

I know this kind of thing is generally frowned upon, but one possible
approach is to make use of a special content-type... for instance...

  HTTP/1.1 200 OK
  Trailer: Content-Integrity
  Content-Type: application/http-trailers; type="text/plain"

  foobar

  Content-Integrity:
sha-256:aec070645fe53ee3b3763059376134f058cc337247c978add178b6ccdfb0019f

This is just a strawman, but essentially, it would append a checksum
to the end of the content stream. It's not a trailer in the
traditional sense, it's actually encoded as part of the payload. In
lieu of proper Trailer support this is the only other way I can see it
working effectively in HTTP/1.1.

For HTTP/2.0, I suppose it would be possible for us to take a more
appropriate approach either with trailers or by building the integrity
mechanism into the framing somehow.

(Warning: thinking out loud *before* having consumed any beer... the
ideas expressed above may not make any sense. May need to apply
alcohol and try again)

- James

On Tue, Jul 10, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> wrote:
> chunk-extensions aren't widely supported in APIs, and usually dropped hop-by-hop (then again, trailers can be too).
>
> Some discussion of trailer support in Apache:
>   http://apache-http-server.18135.n6.nabble.com/HTTP-trailers-td4796242.html
>
> … and using Trailers to surface debug information in Firebug:
>   https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups#!topic/firebug/v5ldjoVThH8
>
> (yes, this is a bit of a project for me)
>
> Finally, I know some server-side implementers would would LOVE to be able to set things like ETag and Last-Modified in trailers, and have them used by caches...
>
> Cheers,
>
>
> On 11/07/2012, at 4:33 AM, Ludin, Stephen wrote:
>
>> I really like the idea of placing the Digest in the chunk trailers.  Being
>> able to calculate these digests on the fly and not buffer the entire
>> message is critical in my opinion.
>>
>> Another concept that I have been playing with is providing digests on
>> individual chunks using chunk-extension.  The rational for this is for
>> very large objects.  With per-chunk digests the client would have the
>> ability to re-request a specific corrupted section of an object using a
>> range request rather than the entire object.  This can have enormous
>> perceived performance and reliability benefits for consumers of things
>> such as software download and large media files.
>>
>> I was working on a draft to propose this, but I didn't feel it was well
>> baked enough to share.  If there is interest in this type of functionality
>> I will polish it up and post it.
>>
>> One issue to point is is that for these types of "frame" based integrity
>> checks I generally feel like we are reinventing the content integrity
>> portion of SSL/TLS.  Though I see the value in begin able to do this apart
>> from SSL it forces the question at what point do you just switch over to
>> SSL to get the desired functionality?
>>
>> -stephen
>>
>>
>>
>> On 7/9/12 4:00 PM, "Amos Jeffries" <squid3@treenet.co.nz> wrote:
>>
>>> On 10.07.2012 07:08, HAYASHI, Tatsuya wrote:
>>>> +1
>>>>
>>>> I know that this is demanded.
>>>> When I discussion about http-authentication and phishing,
>>>> it is requested by many people.
>>>> It is a difficult problem.
>>>> ex) proxy...
>>>>
>>>> I think that it is good to do this discussion now.
>>>>
>>>> ---
>>>> Tatsuya
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Jul 7, 2012 at 8:23 AM, James M Snell wrote:
>>>>> In general, I'm +1 on the general idea albeit with a few caveats...
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. To minimize complexity, only a single Content-Integrity header
>>>>> should be used. I don't want, as Roy points out, to have to iterated
>>>>> through a bunch of unsupported header values looking for the one I
>>>>> want. Just as it makes very little sense for an implementor to
>>>>> provide
>>>>> multiple Last-Modified, Etag and Content-Type headers in a single
>>>>> message; there should be only a single Content-Integrity statement
>>>>> and
>>>>> I either understand it or I don't.
>>>
>>> Either the client advertises what it supports (opening itself to
>>> middleware erasing options they can't modify). Or the server uses
>>> multiple algorithms in hopes that the middleware cannot violate them
>>> all.
>>> It makes perfect sense to have several levels of integrity check. MD5,
>>> SHA1, AES in one response and allow the client to validate the strongest
>>> it can handle.
>>>
>>> There is also an arguable case for middleware wanting to add its own
>>> hash to inform the client essentially "this is what I got given". So the
>>> point of manipulation can be back-traced when the more secure end-to-end
>>> checks fail.
>>>
>>> If you want end-to-end integrity, don't stop at half measures.
>>> Particularly at half measures which can be corrupted.
>>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. The performance impact of calculating the digest needs to be
>>>>> carefully considered. I'd rather not be required to buffer a full
>>>>> representation in memory all the time just to calculate a header
>>>>> value. I know it's largely unavoidable, but perhaps there's some
>>>>> currently elusive solution that can be considered. For instance..
>>>>> allowing Content-Integrity to appear as a trailer at the end of a
>>>>> chunked response.
>>>
>>> As has been said Trailers happen here.
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 3. Something needs to be said about what happens if the
>>>>> Content-Integrity check fails. For instance, if a request containing
>>>>> Content-Integrity is sent to the server and the server detects that
>>>>> the signature is invalid, what should happen? what must happen?
>>>>> Likewise, how are intermediaries expected to treat the
>>>>> Content-Integrity header given that any intermediary is able to
>>>>> modify
>>>>> the payload at any time?
>>>
>>> This is going to be most useful on request/responses sent with
>>> "no-transform" of course.
>>> If the integrity was only a MD5 or SHA1 hash which middleware can edit
>>> easily there is no end-to-end integrity, just hop-by-hop integrity.
>>>
>>>
>>> Also, there has to be a mutual secret between origin server and client.
>>> Without that, when integrity is compromised the transforming hop will
>>> simply erase or replace the Content-Integrity header value. A secret key
>>> unknown to that middleware is required to make the integrity hash break
>>> when it tries this.
>>>
>>> AYJ
>>>
>>
>>
>
> --
> Mark Nottingham
> http://www.mnot.net/
>
>
>
>
>
Received on Wednesday, 11 July 2012 02:50:48 GMT

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