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Re: Content-Integrity header

From: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2012 11:00:49 +1200
To: <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Message-ID: <0125733d444bbbd8d657794af87ecc68@treenet.co.nz>
On 10.07.2012 07:08, HAYASHI, Tatsuya wrote:
> +1
>
> I know that this is demanded.
> When I discussion about http-authentication and phishing,
> it is requested by many people.
> It is a difficult problem.
> ex) proxy...
>
> I think that it is good to do this discussion now.
>
> ---
> Tatsuya
>
> On Sat, Jul 7, 2012 at 8:23 AM, James M Snell wrote:
>> In general, I'm +1 on the general idea albeit with a few caveats...
>>
>> 1. To minimize complexity, only a single Content-Integrity header
>> should be used. I don't want, as Roy points out, to have to iterated
>> through a bunch of unsupported header values looking for the one I
>> want. Just as it makes very little sense for an implementor to 
>> provide
>> multiple Last-Modified, Etag and Content-Type headers in a single
>> message; there should be only a single Content-Integrity statement 
>> and
>> I either understand it or I don't.

Either the client advertises what it supports (opening itself to 
middleware erasing options they can't modify). Or the server uses 
multiple algorithms in hopes that the middleware cannot violate them 
all.
It makes perfect sense to have several levels of integrity check. MD5, 
SHA1, AES in one response and allow the client to validate the strongest 
it can handle.

There is also an arguable case for middleware wanting to add its own 
hash to inform the client essentially "this is what I got given". So the 
point of manipulation can be back-traced when the more secure end-to-end 
checks fail.

If you want end-to-end integrity, don't stop at half measures. 
Particularly at half measures which can be corrupted.


>>
>> 2. The performance impact of calculating the digest needs to be
>> carefully considered. I'd rather not be required to buffer a full
>> representation in memory all the time just to calculate a header
>> value. I know it's largely unavoidable, but perhaps there's some
>> currently elusive solution that can be considered. For instance..
>> allowing Content-Integrity to appear as a trailer at the end of a
>> chunked response.

As has been said Trailers happen here.

>>
>> 3. Something needs to be said about what happens if the
>> Content-Integrity check fails. For instance, if a request containing
>> Content-Integrity is sent to the server and the server detects that
>> the signature is invalid, what should happen? what must happen?
>> Likewise, how are intermediaries expected to treat the
>> Content-Integrity header given that any intermediary is able to 
>> modify
>> the payload at any time?

This is going to be most useful on request/responses sent with 
"no-transform" of course.
  If the integrity was only a MD5 or SHA1 hash which middleware can edit 
easily there is no end-to-end integrity, just hop-by-hop integrity.


Also, there has to be a mutual secret between origin server and client. 
Without that, when integrity is compromised the transforming hop will 
simply erase or replace the Content-Integrity header value. A secret key 
unknown to that middleware is required to make the integrity hash break 
when it tries this.

AYJ
Received on Monday, 9 July 2012 23:01:26 GMT

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