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Re: Final Review of Digest Authentication

From: <hallam@etna.ai.mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 10 Jun 96 20:49:17 -0400
Message-Id: <9606110049.AA07555@Etna.ai.mit.edu>
To: Paul Leach <paulle@microsoft.com>, www-security@ns2.rutgers.edu, "'http-wg%cuckoo.hpl.hp.com@hplb.hpl.hp.com'" <http-wg%cuckoo.hpl.hp.com@hplb.hpl.hp.com>, 'John Franks' <john@math.nwu.edu>
Cc: hallam@etna.ai.mit.edu
X-Mailing-List: <http-wg@cuckoo.hpl.hp.com> archive/latest/890

Paul writes:

>  Both Basic and Digest authentication are vulnerable to "man in the
>  middle" attacks, for example, from a hostile or compromised proxy.
>  Clearly, this would present all the problems of eavesdropping.  But
>  it could also offer some additional threats.

This isn't quite right. Digest authentication is not vulnerable
to a man in the middle attack as described. Digest is vulnerable to
a downgrade attack where a client supports BASIC and BASIC is
vulnerable to man in the middle.

If a client does not support Digest the vulnerability to password 
snooping goes away beacuse a client will not divulge the password under
any circumstances.

Its a picky point but an important one.

Received on Monday, 10 June 1996 17:48:52 UTC

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