

# **Site and user security concerns for real time content serving**

Chris Mejia, IAB


Sean Snider, Yahoo!

Prabhakar Goyal, Microsoft

# Agenda

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- Introduction: what is IAB?
- Use case
- SafeFrame Overview
- HTML5 Sandbox/CSP – Asks
- Next Steps and Q&A



OK, YES, WE DO WANT TO BID ON THAT 8:04AM AD SLOT IN THE SAN DIEGO MARKET.

$\frac{\partial}{\partial a} \ln f_{a,0^2}(\xi) =$   
 $\frac{(\xi-a)}{6^2} \sqrt{2} x a m(T(\xi))$   
 $\frac{q}{\partial \theta} \ln L(\xi, 0) S \frac{\partial}{m} m$   
 $f_T(x) = (\frac{\partial}{\partial a} \ln L(x, 0))$   
 $m(T(\xi) + f(x, \theta)) = \text{YES}$

THAT WAS LAST FEBRUARY.

TOM FISH BURNE

ONLINE ADVERTISING IS EVOLVING. ARE YOU?

*media*  
**LIFESTREET**

CREATED BY marketoon studios


LIFESTREETMEDIA.COM

# Introduction: what is IAB?

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- Interactive Advertising Bureau
  - Membership-based trade organization, based in NYC
  - Founded in 1996
  - Members are online media publishers
  - Over 600 members in the US
  - 86% of digital advertising in US runs on IAB member sites
  - IAB develops digital advertising & publishing standards
- How do our interests align?
  - Ad content is served from 3<sup>rd</sup> parties in real time
  - Publishers are concerned with site and user security
  - Most Web content is paid for by advertising & sponsorship
  - We believe in the power of a “free” Web

# Use case: Real time content serving



# Publisher areas of concerns

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## ● Isolation

- Separation between publisher and 3<sup>rd</sup> party code
- Prevent data leakage – page content, cookies, other data
- Prevent JS and CSS collision

## ● Functional / UI

- Allow rich interactions without providing full access

Covered by  
Iframe+SafeFrame

- Restrict certain media types
- Control autoplay

## ● Ability to control other “attack surface areas”

- Prevent downloads
- Plugin activation
- Navigation
- Messaging
- ..

Topic of today's  
discussion

# SafeFrame Overview

# What is SafeFrame?


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- A cross domain IFRAME
- Standard definition of APIs between the top level browsing context and the content inside the IFRAME
  - Said IFRAME MUST be a direct child of the top, it cannot be nested.
- API establishes functionality for ‘heavy interactions’ with the top level browsing context:
  - Expand/Resize the Frame
  - Draw additional elements
  - Etc.
- Each piece of functionality can be allowed or disallowed by the top level browsing context
- API allows for some data sharing
  - Geometric information
  - Relevant DOM events



# What is SafeFrame?


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- Creates one or more IFRAME(s) using a **Secondary agnostic origin**
  - But content is injected, rather than loaded from a given URL, mitigating the need for an HTTP request per IFRAME.
    - Typically document URI for the IFRAME is a **CDN** (content delivery network) URI
    - Document and it's initial resources are cacheable
- 3<sup>rd</sup> party content is typically free form HTML and JavaScript


# How it Works

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
# How it Works

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
# How it Works

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# How it Works

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# **Proposed Extensions**

# HTML5 Sandbox and CSP

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- Limitations (as we see it)
  - Current sandbox attributes/directives are too coarse grain
  - There are additional areas of control publishers desire
- Ask
  - Enhancement to allow finer controls, i.e., ability to restrict
    - Individual plug-ins (Sandbox)
    - Allow / Deny access to a given IFRAME via JavaScript
    - Downloads
    - Alternate navigation

# SafeFrame, Sandbox and CSP

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Desired Feature	Covered by HTML5 Sandbox?	Included in by CSP 1.1?	Comments
allow-plugins	No	Yes	HTML 5 sandbox
plugin-types	No	Yes	Support for enabling/disabling specific plugin types
media-types	No	No	Restrict use of certain type of images, audio, video
require-user-initiation	No	No	Prevent autoplay of audio/video without user initiation Prevent navigation without user initiation



# SafeFrame, Sandbox and CSP

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Desired Feature	Covered by HTML5 Sandbox?	Included in by CSP 1.1?	Comments
file-download	No	No*	Rule to allow / disallow using navigation or an iframe to load content that triggers a download
restrict-script	No	No	Javascript in an IFRAME restricted to itself regardless of origin Allow storage/cookie read/write
force-self-nav-top/force-self-nav-new	No	No	Force navigation target to self or new
message-src	No	No	Rule allowing/disallowing x-origin messaging

# Next Steps

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- **Define details around the proposed extensions (write the spec)**
- **Communicate the proposal to W3C via the established processes - bugzilla items and spec extension draft**
- **Discuss other areas of collaboration**

# Thank You!

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## ● Contacts

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- Sean Snider: [ssnider@yahoo-inc.com](mailto:ssnider@yahoo-inc.com)
- Prabhakar Goyal: [pgoyal@microsoft.com](mailto:pgoyal@microsoft.com)

## ● References

- SafeFrame: <http://www.iab.net/safeframe>
- Digital advertising ecosystem overview: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1C0n\\_9DOlwE](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1C0n_9DOlwE)