Re: Call for Co-Editors: Post-Quantum Migration Pattern for Verifiable Credentials (Ed25519 + ML-DSA Dual-Signature Model)

Good data point, Stephen — One thing worth flagging so the 10x doesn't get
read as "the PQC cost" in general: that size/perf hit is largely an
ML-DSA-44 characteristic. Among the NIST signatures, ML-DSA-44 is on the
heavy end for size — Falcon-512 signatures are roughly 3.6x smaller (~666
vs ~2420 bytes), which for a log-based method like did:webvh would
meaningfully cut the per-entry and resolution overhead you measured. It's a
genuine tradeoff, not a free win — Falcon has trickier (floating-point,
constant-time) signing and some weaker BUFF properties (exclusive ownership
/ non-resignability) that matter in a long-lived log context. But for
size-sensitive logs it's probably worth benchmarking alongside ML-DSA-44
before the spec settles on the PQC profile. Happy to share Falcon-512
numbers if useful.

— Sylvain Cormier, Paraxiom Technologies Inc.

On Sun, Jun 14, 2026 at 2:41 PM Stephen Curran <swcurran@cloudcompass.ca>
wrote:

> As Jori mentioned, Log based verification methods provide a nice way to
> evolve to PQC.  We've been experimenting with the did:webvh DID Method
> (did:web + verifiable history -- https://didwebvh.info) to include PQC to
> secure a did:webvh Log and have found some interesting performance numbers
> (below).
>
> For background, did:webvh uses a combination of mechanisms for the needed
> crypto-agility in securing the DID Log:
>
>    - multikey to make sure that the verifier can determine the type of
>    key used (and multihash for hash)
>    - identification in the log of the version of the did:webvh spec in
>    use, including the ability to increase the spec version in any log entry
>    - dictating in each spec version the permitted hashing algorithms and
>    Data Integrity cryptosuites so the verifier knows exactly what algorithms
>    must be used to secure the DID Log.
>       - Note -- this only constrains the algorithms/key types used to *secure
>       the did:webvh DID Log itself *- not the verification methods
>       included in the secured DIDDoc. The DID Controller is free to use ANY
>       cryptographic key types in the DIDDoc itself. did:webvh does not put any
>       constraints on the DIDDoc contents.
>       - Currently (spec version 1.0) permits only eddsa-jcs-2022. The
>       next version of the spec will most likely add the stabilized ML-DSA-44
>       cryptosuite. Per NIST -- ML-DSA-44 is the logical PQC successor to EDDSA.
>    - the 1.0 spec also allows for the use of "pre-rotation" for the
>    securing key -- committing to the hash of the public key to be used to sign
>    the next log entry. When pre-rotation is in use, key rotation is required
>    for every entry, meaning the public key is only published on use, and never
>    reused -- a PQ protection in and of itself. We expect that pre-rotation
>    will be required in the next version of the did:webvh spec. Inspired by
>    KERI's pre-rotation approach.
>
> Given that, the only (experimental) change we had to make was to pretend
> that the v1.0 spec included ML-DSA-44, and add ML-DSA-44  cryptosuite
> (mldsa44-jcs-2024) support for creating and resolving the DID.  We then
> used the benchmark of the generation of a "10 year" DID, one that is
> rotated monthly (120 rotations -- no witnesses).  In comparing the EDDSA
> and ML-DSA performance, we have found on the same machine about 10x slower
> in adding a log entry (56ms to 510ms), 10x slower in resolution of the last
> entry (460ms to 4677ms), and had a 10x (~ increase in log file size (117kb
> to 1.07MB).  Those numbers were for the Rust implementation, but the
> TypeScript implementation performance ratios were about the same.
>
> Note that this was a quick experiment, but even that has led to
> interesting discussions/approach changes on how to evolve the
> specification. +1 to using these types of experiments to understand and
> account for the practical impacts of the transition -- and to use them to
> guide updates to specifications.
>
> The basing of did:webvh for securing the DID Log on Data Integrity
> cryptosuites made the necessary changes very easy -- basically, changing
> only the signature generation and verification. Everything else (JCS
> processing, proof preparation, etc.) stayed the same. OK, we also had to
> ease the restrictions on the permitted cryptosuites... :-)
>
> --
>
> Stephen Curran
> Principal, Cloud Compass Computing, Inc.
>


-- 
                          Sylvain Cormier - Founder
Paraxiom Technologies inc.
https://paraxiom.org
514 804 8434

Received on Sunday, 14 June 2026 18:54:32 UTC