- From: Amir Hameed <amsaalegal@gmail.com>
- Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 11:54:28 -0700
- To: Jori Lehtinen <lehtinenjori03@gmail.com>, kamimura@veritaschain.org, Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>
- Cc: W3C Credentials CG <public-credentials@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CANGYBszma=r4mL5_+Fn1+QybBC0_oxo-bsd-bx3mRPzuZvTk4w@mail.gmail.com>
Hello everyone, First, thank you to Tokachi, Jori, Manu, and everyone else who has taken the time to engage with this proposal and provide thoughtful feedback. I sincerely appreciate the interest, expertise, and willingness to contribute. Tokachi, thank you for offering to participate as a co-editor or reviewer. Your work on cryptographically verifiable audit trails, evidence preservation, and crypto-agility for high-assurance systems is highly relevant to the objectives of this effort. I believe your perspectives on migration semantics, verifier behavior, evidence continuity, and operational deployment guidance would be extremely valuable as we shape the work. Jori, thank you as well for the thoughtful comments and references. I particularly appreciate the emphasis on algorithm-agnostic approaches, long-term sustainability, and the importance of designing systems that can accommodate future cryptographic evolution rather than optimizing solely for the current transition. I believe that perspective aligns strongly with the broader direction this work should take. Manu, thank you for the clarification and context regarding the existing W3C Data Integrity architecture and the ongoing quantum-resistant Data Integrity work. I think you've captured the essence of what I was attempting to articulate. The more I have reflected on the discussion, the more I agree that the most important observation is not that we need a new cryptographic architecture, but rather that the Data Integrity architecture was already remarkably forward-looking in this area. The existence of Proof Sets means that many of the capabilities people are now seeking for post-quantum migration—algorithm agility, parallel signatures, independent verification, and gradual deployment—are already present within the architecture. In many respects, the foundation was laid years ago. Where I see the remaining gap is not in the cryptographic mechanism itself, but in documenting and operationalizing how that capability can be used in practice. As you noted, the capability exists, but many implementers are either unaware of it or do not immediately recognize how naturally it supports post-quantum migration and future cryptographic transitions. I increasingly view this effort not as a proposal for new cryptography, but as a deployment and continuity playbook for capabilities that already exist within the W3C ecosystem. The discussion has also helped me broaden the scope beyond post-quantum migration alone. While post-quantum cryptography is the immediate catalyst, the underlying challenge is larger: cryptographic algorithms will continue to evolve, and trust systems must be capable of surviving multiple generations of cryptographic change. In that sense, the long-term objective is not merely post-quantum migration, but cryptographic continuity—the ability for trust systems to adapt to future algorithm transitions, deprecations, and even unforeseen failures without requiring disruptive ecosystem-wide redesigns. Based on the feedback received so far, I am working on a refined blueprint that builds directly upon existing Data Integrity Proof Sets and focuses on: Deployment patterns and operational guidance. Issuer and verifier migration lifecycles. Algorithm agility and cryptographic continuity. Governance and interoperability considerations. Recovery and reissuance procedures. Long-term trust preservation across multiple cryptographic generations. I believe this is an area where broad participation will be especially important. This topic sits at the intersection of standards, cryptography, digital identity, governance, security engineering, enterprise deployment, government adoption, and long-term trust infrastructure. No single stakeholder group has all of the answers, and the quality of the final work will depend heavily on diverse perspectives from across the ecosystem. I would therefore like to encourage anyone interested—whether from Verifiable Credentials, Data Integrity, wallets, issuers, verifiers, post-quantum cryptography, audit systems, digital identity programs, government initiatives, academia, or industry—to participate in the discussion and help shape the work. My next email will share a more complete blueprint for the proposed work item, incorporating the valuable feedback received so far and reframing the effort around operational guidance for cryptographic continuity using existing Data Integrity Proof Sets. Thank you again to everyone who has contributed to the discussion. I look forward to continuing the conversation and collaborating with the community on what I believe is an important multi-stakeholder effort for the future of security, interoperability, and digital trust. Best regards, Amir Hameed On Sun, 14 Jun 2026 at 09:37, Jori Lehtinen <lehtinenjori03@gmail.com> wrote: > > I also agree with you, Jori, that the QR spec should note how you do the > transition easily with proof sets. > > Yes, this is the pragmatic approach. > > > IIUC, this is already done because we foresaw the problem over a decade > ago. Data Integrity allows proof sets that are cryptographic > algorithm-agnostic. Always has. > > Proof sets do provide flexibility, and the data model does seem to allow > all the transition scenarios I can think of. > > I was not aware of proof sets. Even without them, issuing two separate VCs > would of course be a possible workaround. > > Where I may disagree is that, with or without proof sets, we seem to need > the capability to resolve multiple Data Integrity suites instead of > resolving multiple algorithms within one suite. I doubt there is much > difference in canonicalization, hashing, and other preprocessing between > PQC and ECC suites. I guess it is possible to use mostly the same code for > both and simply choose the algorithm based on the declared suite, but it > feels counterintuitive to talk about different Data Integrity suites if the > only meaningful difference is the algorithm. > > And as a side note, we have had discussions worried about signature size, > byte size, and performance. Yet here we are ready to grow the data model > and required runtime by using multiple proofs and suites. > > And as another side note I'm most likely not aware of some critical > information related to the differences between the PQC and ECC suites... > > Nothing critical here; these are just my personal biases I wanted to > share, and maybe I am sensing some form of a double standard ; ). But > sometimes the most important thing is simply to get the job done, and the > great work from the group does that. > > I also have not been actively contributing... so these are just some > thoughts that are making me personally second guess using these standards > in my projects, and me communicating in what kind of specs/projects I would > love to contribute to. > > But, here I agree that dedicating a section to documenting algorithms on > how to cleanly migrate using the existing data model is the productive and > right thing to do. > > > su 14.6.2026 klo 15.42 Manu Sporny (msporny@digitalbazaar.com) kirjoitti: > >> On Sun, Jun 14, 2026 at 5:38 AM Jori Lehtinen <lehtinenjori03@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> > I’m not sure whether there is already a PQC Data Integrity suite on the >> W3C standards track. >> >> There is: >> >> https://w3c.github.io/vc-di-quantum-resistant/ >> >> It will be published as a first public working draft this coming week >> (and it is standards-track at W3C): >> >> https://w3c.github.io/vc-wg/minutes/2026-05-27.html#5aec >> https://github.com/w3c/transitions/issues/806#issuecomment-4575832272 >> >> > That experimental draft is what I found quickly, and perhaps a section >> on hybrid signatures and/or pqc migration in general could be added to it. >> >> We're not going to do hybrid signatures. IMHO, hybrid is a waste of >> time given that the architecture of Data Integrity allows you to do >> proof sets. You've always been able to do that with Data Integrity >> (going on 10+ years now): >> >> https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-integrity-1.1/#proof-sets >> >> So, the W3C VC + Data Integrity solution is to just put a parallel >> signature on the VC. I believe Amir is saying that we should document >> that more clearly. I also agree with you, Jori, that the QR spec >> should note how you do the transition easily with proof sets. >> >> I do also acknowledge that JOSE/COSE has no such capability that is >> broadly deployed today, but that's a design decision that technology >> stack made and it's not viewed as an architectural failure there. I >> don't think the VCWG or CCG has the bandwidth to "fix" JOSE/COSE at >> this point wrt. proof sets given that it's not seen as an issue in >> that community. That's where hybrid would make more sense, but it >> really does feel like they're out of time due to the accelerated >> transition timeline. >> >> > But for me, the requirement would be that we specify an >> algorithm-agnostic key management solution and an algorithm-agnostic Data >> Integrity suite that can handle whichever algorithms are recommended over >> time. >> >> IIUC, this is already done because we foresaw the problem over a >> decade ago. Data Integrity allows proof sets that are cryptographic >> algorithm-agnostic. Always has. >> >> That said, people continue to not understand that this capability >> exists... and you can't blame them, it's buried in the global >> standards, and not many people read those. >> >> I agree with Amir that we need more people to write about this >> capability and that there is a fairly straight-forward, non-disruptive >> solution that can be deployed that can easily weather the transition >> to a post-quantum world. >> >> -- manu >> >> -- >> Manu Sporny - https://www.linkedin.com/in/manusporny/ >> Founder/CEO - Digital Bazaar, Inc. >> https://www.digitalbazaar.com/ >> >>
Received on Sunday, 14 June 2026 16:51:13 UTC