- From: Kaveh Ranjbar <kaveh@whisper.security>
- Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2026 12:36:45 +0100
- To: public-credentials@w3.org
- Message-ID: <CA+kObRJW1XJkQt5ymftooyG0NHBvwNGpMaWOJm+Y7JhcTj9szg@mail.gmail.com>
Hi all, I have just joined the group and wanted to introduce myself. My background is the internet's naming and numbering layer, six years on the ICANN Board and fifteen at the RIPE NCC, so I come at credentials from the DNS and registry side rather than the wallet side. What brought me here is the DNS-anchored trust question. I recently started contributing to the did:dns method, on making DNSSEC normative and adding an optional DANE-EE / TLSA key binding, so a verification method's key can be checked against a DNSSEC-signed name and chained to the IANA root. Reading around, I keep seeing the same primitive surface on this side of the fence: did:web already stands on a DNS name, today via the WebPKI certificate at that name, and the "High Assurance DIDs with DNS" draft from Jesse Carter and Jacques Latour at CIRA reaches past that to DNSSEC and DANE/TLSA to harden it. That overlap is the part I find interesting. I would like to help make the DNS side of it rigorous and, ideally, shared: one normative DANE-EE profile (3 1 1, per RFC 7671 and 7218, chaining back to RFC 6698) that both did:web high-assurance and did:dns could point at, rather than each reinventing it. I have running code for this at the per-name level, so I can bring implementation experience rather than just opinions. To put a concrete question on the table: is there appetite to converge did:web high-assurance and did:dns on a common DANE-EE key-binding profile, or are these better kept as method-specific choices? I am happy to bring it to a Tuesday call if that is the better venue. For context only, I co-founded Whisper Security, but I am here as a DNS person and not to pitch anything. Kaveh Ranjbar
Received on Friday, 17 July 2026 13:41:04 UTC