Re: Four open questions on the Agentic Web report (2026-09-24): preimage defense, address assurance, trust leases, statement granularity

Larry, Lee,

Yes to the experiment. I can host the test definitions and the results in
the Agent Authority Conformance lab at LF Decentralized Trust, which is
open to any implementation:
https://www.google.com/url?q=https://github.com/Agent-Authority-Conformance/aps-conformance-suite&source=gmail&ust=1792693147914000&sa=E

It already has a close case family, cached-authorization-revocation: nine
timeline cases with a grant revoked mid session, calls on a retained
session and on a second worker, and the authority taken offline. Your
scenario has the same shape: evidence valid at T=0, revoked at T=10, calls
at T=30, T=60 and T=119, plus a variant where the revocation service is
unreachable.

Lee, your answer gives the cases two modes. With a cached lease, the T=119
call is expected to go through and the exposure is the lease. With a live
standing read, T=30, T=60 and T=119 are all expected to be refused. Each
run will say which mode it used.

I'll write it as a new case family in the next few days. Each call will
carry separate expected results for evidence freshness, authority validity
and action-time authorization, as you proposed, so a mechanism that covers
only one of them is scored on that one. I'll run APS against it first and
open the PR. Could each of you say which of the three your implementation
claims, so the cases don't expect more than that?

The wider version of this, independent projects testing each other's
evidence, is running in agent-governance-vocabulary #177:
https://www.google.com/url?q=https://github.com/aeoess/agent-governance-vocabulary/issues/177&source=gmail&ust=1792693147914000&sa=E.
You're both welcome there too.

Tymofii

P.S. Stars are a vanity metric until a certification needs 100 of them.
We're at 52.
Please ⭐️ APS:
https://www.google.com/url?q=https://github.com/agent-passport-system/agent-passport-system&source=gmail&ust=1792693147914000&sa=E

On Wed, Oct 21, 2026 11:03 AM, Larry Lewis <llewis@sovrlabs.com> wrote:

> Dear Lee, Tymofii, and AI Agent Protocol Community Group,
>
> Thank you, Lee, for sharing your review of the Agentic Web technical
> report and for presenting four thoughtful questions concerning identity
> assurance, addressing, trust freshness, and interoperability.
>
> I also appreciate Tymofii's response regarding delegation expiry and
> revocation in the Agent Passport System (APS).
>
> From the perspective of the Agent Trust Protocol (ATP) Community Group, I
> believe this discussion highlights an important opportunity for
> collaboration across the emerging agentic web ecosystem.
>
> Trust is not a single mechanism or verification event. It involves
> multiple layers of identity, evidence, authority, policy enforcement,
> revocation, and accountability.
>
> I would like to share a few observations concerning the four questions and
> propose a practical way for our respective projects to explore them
> together.
>
> *Q1 -  Preimage Defense and Identity Substitution*
>
> I agree that demonstrating cryptographic key control does not necessarily
> establish the legitimacy or continuity of an agent's claimed authority.
>
> We should distinguish between verifying a DID document, establishing its
> provenance, determining whether its verification methods remain valid, and
> ensuring that the identity presented corresponds to the authority expected
> by the receiving agent.
>
> This raises useful interoperability test cases involving identity-document
> substitution, compromised verification methods, key rotation, and
> conflicting authority claims.
>
> *Q2 - Address Assurance*
>
> Separating addressing from discovery is worth examining.
>
> Deterministically derived addresses can provide useful properties, but
> address integrity should not be confused with proof of legitimate ownership
> or authorization.
>
> I would be interested in exploring how RTTP-derived addressing interacts
> with DID resolution, existing agent discovery mechanisms, and independent
> authority verification.
>
> *Q3 - Trust Leases, Freshness, and Revocation*
>
> This question is particularly relevant to ATP's work on delegated
> authority and runtime enforcement.
>
> ATP distinguishes between trust evidence and authorization. A credential
> or statement may remain cryptographically valid while its underlying
> authority has expired, been revoked, or become insufficient for a
> particular action.
>
> Tymofii raises an important point: a 120-second freshness lease could
> allow previously verified evidence to remain within its accepted freshness
> window even after revocation.
>
> We should therefore distinguish at least three concepts:
>
>    1.
>
>    Evidence freshness — how recently the statement or credential was
>    verified.
>    2.
>
>    Authority validity — whether the delegation remains valid and
>    unrevoked.
>    3.
>
>    Action-time authorization — whether the requested operation is
>    currently permitted under the applicable constraints and policies.
>
> I would welcome further clarification regarding how RTTP/IQA handles
> revocation within an active freshness window, particularly when revocation
> information is unavailable or delayed.
>
> For ATP, this distinction is central to our approach: trust evidence
> informs authorization, but possession of valid evidence does not
> automatically grant permission to act.
>
> *Q4 - Statement-Level and Platform-Level Interoperability*
>
> I see these approaches as potentially complementary rather than mutually
> exclusive.
>
> Statement-level verification can support portable, independently
> verifiable evidence across systems. Platform-level infrastructure can
> provide additional operational services, governance, policy administration,
> and trust coordination.
>
> The important architectural question is whether independently operated
> agents can verify the evidence and enforce the appropriate authority
> without depending on a particular commercial platform.
>
> This is an area where I believe cooperation between our projects could
> produce useful implementation evidence.
>
> *Proposal — A Joint Trust Interoperability Experiment*
>
> Rather than limiting the discussion to architectural comparisons, I would
> like to propose a small, collaborative technical exercise involving
> RTTP/IQA, APS, and ATP.
>
> We could begin with the trust-lease and revocation scenario raised by
> Tymofii:
>
>    -
>
>    T=0: An agent receives valid identity and authorization evidence.
>    -
>
>    T=10 seconds: The issuing authority revokes the relevant delegation or
>    statement.
>    -
>
>    T=30, T=60, and T=119 seconds: The agent attempts an operation
>    requiring that authority.
>    -
>
>    Each implementation evaluates the requests according to its own
>    documented verification and enforcement mechanisms.
>    -
>
>    We compare the decisions, verification evidence, revocation handling,
>    and limitations.
>
> We should also examine what happens when the revocation service is
> temporarily unavailable and whether the receiving system can independently
> establish the authority needed to perform the action.
>
> The goal would not be to determine which protocol is superior or to
> require any project to adopt another project's architecture.
>
> Instead, we could establish a common set of security properties, test
> vectors, and reporting criteria while allowing each implementation to
> demonstrate its respective responsibilities.
>
> Importantly, a mechanism that does not claim to provide action
> authorization should not be evaluated as though it does. Its contribution
> and boundaries should be documented separately.
>
> *Publishing the Results*
>
> If there is interest, I suggest publishing the agreed test definitions and
> implementation results openly so other contributors can reproduce,
> evaluate, and extend them.
>
> This could help the community better understand:
>
>    -
>
>    Which trust guarantees are already implemented.
>    -
>
>    Which mechanisms complement one another.
>    -
>
>    Where interoperability boundaries exist.
>    -
>
>    What gaps require additional specification work.
>    -
>
>    Which security properties can be independently verified across
>    different agent systems.
>
> From ATP's perspective, our interest is in helping establish portable,
> verifiable, revocable, and enforceable trust mechanisms that can operate
> across agent frameworks and organizational boundaries.
>
> I believe this is an opportunity for the community to advance the
> technical foundations of the agentic web collectively.
>
> I would welcome both Lee's and Tymofii's thoughts on this approach, as
> well as feedback from other Community Group participants.
>
> Thank you again for contributing to this important conversation.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Larry Lewis
> Chair, Agent Trust Protocol Community Group
> W3C Community Groups
> llewis@sovrlabs.com​
>
>
> From: ShaoBao Li <lee@aicent.com>
> To: "Tymofii Pidlisnyi"<tima@aeoess.com>, "public-agentprotocol"<public-
> agentprotocol@w3.org>
> Cc: "ShaoBao Li"<lee@iqa.org>
> Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2026 12:42:37 -0500
> Subject: Re: Four open questions on the Agentic Web report (2026-09-24):
> preimage defense, address assurance, trust leases, statement granularity
>
> *Hi Tymofii,*
>
> Thank you for reading Q3 closely, and for the sharpest counterexample in
> the thread so far: an action in second 119 leaning on a statement its
> issuer revoked in second 10 is exactly the case worth pinning down.
>
> The short answer: in our design the lease bounds the exposure, it does not
> eliminate it — and we say so rather than hide it.
>
> Three mechanisms make that bound useful. First, default revocation is
> non-renewal: in Identity Quality Assurance (IQA), trust is re-earned every
> 120 seconds or it lapses, so the cheapest revoke an issuer can perform is
> to stop re-attesting, and the statement ages out at the next lease boundary
> — worst-case exposure equals the lease length itself, explicit and tunable
> per deployment, the same tradeoff class as bounded credential caches,
> accepted in exchange for verification that completes offline with no
> per-action network dependency.
>
> Second, explicit revocation is a first-class action, not an out-of-band
> promise: the iqa scheme defines a closed set of four actions — verify,
> audit, attest, revoke (draft-li-rttp-iqa-addressing-00, Section 5.4) —
> where revoke is specified as withdrawing the subject's standing, a state
> transition at the named organ, moving the subject toward ghost in the
> closed four-state set (ghost, probation, radiant, genesis); propagation to
> any given reader happens at that reader's next standing read.
>
> Third, the lease is a floor, not a ceiling: for actions whose risk profile
> cannot tolerate the window, the verifier does what your Agent Passport
> System does — it runs the check at the moment of action, as a live standing
> read (iqa://<subject>.<organ>.<root>/verify) instead of trusting the
> cached lease. Cached-lease verification and live standing reads are both
> legal clients of the same signed statements; the deployment picks per
> action class, and the protocol does not pretend the choice away.
>
> So the honest formulation is: Resonant Time Transfer Protocol (RTTP) does
> not push revocations inside the window; it prices the window. The
> 120-second lease makes staleness a named, bounded cost, and hands the
> verifier a live-escape hatch when a given action cannot pay it.
>
> I would also note the convergence rather than the difference: your APS
> runs the check at the action, ours re-earns the trust at the lease boundary
> — both are bounded exposures, with different bounds and different trust
> roots (monotonic delegation chains versus derived addresses plus signed
> statements). That maps onto our Q4: delegation-chain enforcement and
> statement-level verification look complementary rather than rival — a
> delegation could carry an IQA statement as one of its narrowing dimensions
> without either layer borrowing the other's authority.
>
> We will record this exchange as an adopted refinement of our public
> hand-in (https://blog.aicent.com/four-answers/): a lease bounds
> staleness; a live standing read closes high-stakes windows. If you spot an
> error in the above, say so on the list and we will adopt the correction in
> public — that is the standing offer the four questions came with.
>
> Best regards,
> Lee
> lee@aicent.com
> Author, draft-li-rttp-iqa-addressing-00 (ISE review)
> Resonant Time Transfer Protocol (RTTP, CRI 27) · Identity Quality
> Assurance (IQA, CRI 28)
> Blog: https://blog.aicent.com/
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> From:Tymofii Pidlisnyi <tima@aeoess.com>
> Send Time:Thu, Oct 22, 2026, 00:52
> To:"public-agentprotocol"<public-agentprotocol@w3.org>
> CC:ShaoBao Li<lee@aicent.com>; ShaoBao Li<lee@iqa.org>
> Subject:Re: Four open questions on the Agentic Web report (2026-09-24):
> preimage defense, address assurance, trust leases, statement granularity
>
> Lee,
>
> I'm Tymofii, author of Agent Passport System (draft-pidlisnyi-aps).
>
> On Q3: in Agent Passport System a delegation carries its own expiry and
> can be revoked before it, and the check runs at the moment of action rather
> than when the statement is fetched. A 120-second lease bounds how stale a
> cached statement can be, but an action in second 119 can still rely on a
> statement its issuer revoked in second 10. How does rttp handle a revoke
> inside the lease window?
>
> Tymofii
>
> P.S. Stars are a vanity metric until a certification needs 100 of them.
> We're at 52.
> Please ⭐️ APS: https://www.google.com/url?q=https://github.com/agent-
> passport-system/agent-passport-system&source=gmail&
> ust=1792687934666000&sa=E
>
> On Wed, Oct 21, 2026 06:05 AM, ShaoBao Li <lee@aicent.com> wrote:
> *Dear AI Agent Protocol Community Group,*
>
> We are the authors of draft-li-rttp-iqa-addressing-00 (in ISE review),
> the specification behind two provisionally registered URI schemes at IANA:
> Resonant Time Transfer Protocol (rttp, CRI 27) and Identity Quality
> Assurance (iqa, CRI 28).
>
> We read the Community Group's technical report on Agentic Web protocols
> (2026-09-24) line by line, and recorded our reading in a public review:
> https://aicent.com/blog/w3c-review/
>
> Our overall conclusion is positive: the report pushed the identity layer
> much further than the rest of the current stack, and its requirements list
> is honest about what remains open. We enter the discussion with four public
> questions rather than claims — each one is a gap we could not find an
> answer to, in the report or anywhere else.
>
> Q1 — Preimage defense: DID documents answer "who holds the key" — but
> which layer answers preimage defense against impersonation of an in-use
> authority? Is detecting a swapped identity document a matter of protocol,
> or of luck?
>
> Q2 — Address assurance: discovery depends on the discoverability of
> description documents — who vouches for the address of a description
> document itself? Should addressing be split out of "discovery" and
> specified as an independent layer?
>
> Q3 — Trust leases: TLS certificates have validity periods — does an
> agent's trust have a lease? Which layer carries the freshness and expiry of
> statements?
>
> Q4 — Granularity: must cross-platform interoperability take the "platform"
> as its unit (federated), or can it sink to the "statement" as its unit
> (registry-free)? Are the two granularities complementary?
>
> We have also published our own first-pass answers to all four, so the
> questions do not hang unanswered on our side either:
> https://aicent.com/blog/four-answers/ — offered as one hand-in among
> possible answers, not a claim to the last word.
>
> For Q2 and Q3 we have handed in a concrete paper, published and
> independently verifiable: the address is derived (the first 16 bytes of
> SHA-256 over a canonical authority, shaped as rttp://<intent>.<pillar>.<root>/<action>),
> and every statement carries a 120-second freshness lease with a closed
> four-state set. The specification is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/
> doc/html/draft-li-rttp-iqa-addressing-00 and the registry entries at
> https://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes/prov/rttp and
> https://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes/prov/iqa
>
> We raise these questions because the report's requirements list is the
> most honest public statement of where the Agentic Web stack currently ends,
> and because we believe all four are answerable — possibly by the report's
> own mechanisms, possibly by complementary designs such as ours.
>
> We would be glad to discuss any of the four asynchronously on this list,
> or to present briefly at one of the CG's biweekly meetings if the group
> finds it useful.
>
> Best regards,
> Lee
> lee@aicent.com
> Author, draft-li-rttp-iqa-addressing-00 (ISE review)
> Resonant Time Transfer Protocol (RTTP) · Identity Quality Assurance (IQA)
> Blog: https://aicent.com/blog/
>
>
>
>

Received on Wednesday, 21 October 2026 18:19:15 UTC