Re: Knowledge Representation for the Trust Layer, Request for Feedback

Isaac's integrity-vs-availability split is the right cut, and I'd carry it
one artifact further.

The same property holds for the evidence a trust decision rests on — the
verdict about what an agent connects to, not just who the agent is. If that
verdict is content-addressed (named by the hash of its canonical preimage)
and signed, its integrity is resolution-independent: a verifier confirms
it's the right artifact by hash and checks the signature against a
published JWKS, trusting no source. Fetch it from a ledger, an operator
domain, IPFS, or an email attachment and the check is identical. What stays
location-bound is exactly what Patrick flagged: availability and freshness
— is it current, has it been revoked. Those resolve by policy, separately
from integrity.

This is the shape of the tool-safety attestations I work on (CTEF, and
draft-etcheverry-action-ref at the IETF): Ed25519/JWS over an RFC 8785
(JCS) canonicalization, content-addressed to the exact tool definition, so
drift since vetting fails the hash and the verdict re-derives offline
byte-for-byte. It's been cross-validated across independent implementers.
In KR terms, I'd model two properties per artifact, per Isaac —
integrity-resolution (content-address vs location) and
availability-resolution (ledger / domain / registry) — and apply that split
to the identity document and the belief-state/verdict artifacts alike,
since the resolution question repeats at each.

Happy to contribute the tool-safety-verdict side of that crosswalk to
kroftrust.md if useful.

Best,
Kenne

On Thu, Aug 6, 2026 at 9:05 AM Lars Kersten Kroehl <lars@moltrust.ch> wrote:

> Greetings AI KR CG,
>
> I'd like to respond to Paola Di Maio's resolution-dependency note. It
> asked each group in the cluster to answer five questions in public: the
> resolution path a proposal assumes, its latency budget for agent-to-agent
> delegation, its behaviour when the resolution layer degrades, the
> justification for a ledger where one is used, and which other groups it has
> coordinated with. I build a DID/VC verification layer for autonomous
> agents, so the questions apply to us. Below is what the system does today.
>
> One thing up front. In our deployment the resolution question is not the
> same across the system. One verification path resolves on-chain, another
> recomputes offline. They answer these questions differently, so I answer
> per path where it matters.
>
> 1. Resolution path. The verdict layer recomputes offline. Verification
> takes the decoded public inputs and rederives the result. Nothing is
> fetched at verification time — no DID, no mandate, no context. The anchor
> is a timestamp over a hash, read only to place the hash in time. A second,
> older path resolves on-chain against Base on every verification. That path
> carries the dependency the note describes, and until it is gone the system
> is not chain-independent.
>
> 2. Latency budget. The offline path does no network resolution. Call-chain
> depth adds no resolution cost there. The recursion raised in section 3 of
> the note lands on the on-chain path. We have no measured figures under
> realistic chain depth to report.
>
> 3. Degradation. When the anchor layer is unavailable, partitioned, or in
> governance dispute, the offline verdict still recomputes, because it never
> needs to reach the anchor. What is lost is the timestamp — the ability to
> place a result in time, not the ability to verify it. The on-chain path
> degrades the ordinary way: no RPC, no verification.
>
> 4. Ledger justification. The chain supplies a dated, tamper-evident record
> that a hash existed at a time. It does not supply the trust judgement. That
> is recomputed. An RFC 3161 timestamp or a transparency log supplies the
> same dated existence. For the anchor, a chain is one backend among several.
> We have recorded this as an accepted direction: the anchor becomes a
> backend abstraction, held in the record rather than the identifier, so the
> substrate can change without breaking a DID. This is a direction, not
> shipped. Today the write path is Base by default. The reason it matters is
> jurisdictional. In some jurisdictions an agent, reseller, or developer has
> no legal access to a public chain. A verification path that requires chain
> access shuts them out. That is a market boundary.
>
> 5. Coordination. What I can point to with artefacts behind it: a cross-run
> of an action-evidence conformance vector set against PSEA
> (draft-yossif-psea), with one axis recomputed by a second and third
> implementation before it was frozen, and the same vectors checked against a
> composition draft's negative classes. Charter-level coordination across
> this cluster is thin, mine included.
>
> On the paper cited in the source pool: its single-chain passage sets a
> design requirement for the certifying layer — an arrangement to avoid — and
> does not describe that system's current anchoring. The distinction does not
> change the note's argument.
>
> Hope this helps.
>
> Best,
> Lars
>
>
> Am 03.08.2026 um 14:10 schrieb Paola Di Maio <paola.dimaio@gmail.com>:
>
> Greetings everyone:
>
> The Trust Layer rests on explicit representation at a critical junction
> where it intersects with DID and the blockchain.
>
> Several community and work groups chartered work on agent identity, agent
> trust establishment, and runtime verification of agent claims. Their scopes
> overlap. Their vocabularies converge, and published founding texts diverge
> on one engineering property that determines whether any of the proposals
> will hold under production load, and none of them names it*: resolution
> dependency*: where an agent's identity document is fetched from at the
> moment a counterparty needs to verify a claim.
>
> Three arrangements are in play across the current proposals — resolution
> from a distributed ledger, resolution from a domain the operator controls,
> and resolution from a registry a third party maintains. Each carries a
> different answer to who can make an agent disappear, a different latency
> profile at the ninety-ninth percentile, and a different failure mode under
> network partition or governance dispute. Charter text as published does not
> distinguish among them.
>
> Distributed ledger technology sits in three distinct positions across this
> landscape. One proposal places public-chain receipts directly in scope as
> audit anchors. Another borrows ledger vocabulary for an append-only record
> model and disclaims blockchain and consensus mechanisms explicitly. A third
> carries no chain reference in its own text at all. Separately, an
> unaffiliated Zurich operator runs a live W3C VC + DID agent trust layer
> anchored on an Ethereum layer-two network. A reader confined to charter
> documents would conclude that ledger infrastructure plays a marginal role
> in agent identity. Deployment evidence says otherwise.
>
> The concern is not confined to one consortium. Work on agent identity and
> agent trust is under way at the IETF, the FIDO Alliance, the OpenID
> Foundation, the Decentralized Identity Foundation, the Linux Foundation,
> the Ethereum improvement process, NIST, and several security consortia, and
> the same variable goes unstated across most of them. Part II surveys that
> landscape. One effort, Ethereum's ERC-8004, answers the question explicitly
> and answers it as a hybrid, which establishes that the disclosure asked for
> here is achievable and already shipped.
>
> The knowledge-representation problem is: these charters are formal
> representations of systems that are still evolving, and the representation
> omits the variable that governs the represented system's behaviour. What
> gets modelled is the trust relationship. What gets left unmodelled is the
> substrate the relationship depends on to hold at runtime. Ontologies built
> on the first without the second may crosswalk cleanly and interoperate
> poorly.
>
> Please give feedback on the draft technical not, send corrections s and
> edits via github and a ping to this list
> https://github.com/w3c-cg/aikr/blob/main/trust/kroftrust.md
>
> Kindly redistribute to interested parties *ie, other CG and WGs mailing
> lists  and chairs who may be able to contribute
> to address the open questions
>
> Thank you
> Paola Di Maio
>
>
>

Received on Friday, 7 August 2026 22:11:56 UTC