Re: Knowledge Representation for the Trust Layer, Request for Feedback

Greetings AI KR CG,

I'd like to respond to Paola Di Maio's resolution-dependency note. It asked each group in the cluster to answer five questions in public: the resolution path a proposal assumes, its latency budget for agent-to-agent delegation, its behaviour when the resolution layer degrades, the justification for a ledger where one is used, and which other groups it has coordinated with. I build a DID/VC verification layer for autonomous agents, so the questions apply to us. Below is what the system does today.

One thing up front. In our deployment the resolution question is not the same across the system. One verification path resolves on-chain, another recomputes offline. They answer these questions differently, so I answer per path where it matters.

1. Resolution path. The verdict layer recomputes offline. Verification takes the decoded public inputs and rederives the result. Nothing is fetched at verification time — no DID, no mandate, no context. The anchor is a timestamp over a hash, read only to place the hash in time. A second, older path resolves on-chain against Base on every verification. That path carries the dependency the note describes, and until it is gone the system is not chain-independent.

2. Latency budget. The offline path does no network resolution. Call-chain depth adds no resolution cost there. The recursion raised in section 3 of the note lands on the on-chain path. We have no measured figures under realistic chain depth to report.

3. Degradation. When the anchor layer is unavailable, partitioned, or in governance dispute, the offline verdict still recomputes, because it never needs to reach the anchor. What is lost is the timestamp — the ability to place a result in time, not the ability to verify it. The on-chain path degrades the ordinary way: no RPC, no verification.

4. Ledger justification. The chain supplies a dated, tamper-evident record that a hash existed at a time. It does not supply the trust judgement. That is recomputed. An RFC 3161 timestamp or a transparency log supplies the same dated existence. For the anchor, a chain is one backend among several. We have recorded this as an accepted direction: the anchor becomes a backend abstraction, held in the record rather than the identifier, so the substrate can change without breaking a DID. This is a direction, not shipped. Today the write path is Base by default. The reason it matters is jurisdictional. In some jurisdictions an agent, reseller, or developer has no legal access to a public chain. A verification path that requires chain access shuts them out. That is a market boundary.

5. Coordination. What I can point to with artefacts behind it: a cross-run of an action-evidence conformance vector set against PSEA (draft-yossif-psea), with one axis recomputed by a second and third implementation before it was frozen, and the same vectors checked against a composition draft's negative classes. Charter-level coordination across this cluster is thin, mine included.

On the paper cited in the source pool: its single-chain passage sets a design requirement for the certifying layer — an arrangement to avoid — and does not describe that system's current anchoring. The distinction does not change the note's argument.

Hope this helps.

Best,
Lars 


> Am 03.08.2026 um 14:10 schrieb Paola Di Maio <paola.dimaio@gmail.com>:
> 
> Greetings everyone:
> 
> The Trust Layer rests on explicit representation at a critical junction where it intersects with DID and the blockchain.
> Several community and work groups chartered work on agent identity, agent trust establishment, and runtime verification of agent claims. Their scopes overlap. Their vocabularies converge, and published founding texts diverge on one engineering property that determines whether any of the proposals will hold under production load, and none of them names it: resolution dependency: where an agent's identity document is fetched from at the moment a counterparty needs to verify a claim.
> 
> Three arrangements are in play across the current proposals — resolution from a distributed ledger, resolution from a domain the operator controls, and resolution from a registry a third party maintains. Each carries a different answer to who can make an agent disappear, a different latency profile at the ninety-ninth percentile, and a different failure mode under network partition or governance dispute. Charter text as published does not distinguish among them.
> 
> Distributed ledger technology sits in three distinct positions across this landscape. One proposal places public-chain receipts directly in scope as audit anchors. Another borrows ledger vocabulary for an append-only record model and disclaims blockchain and consensus mechanisms explicitly. A third carries no chain reference in its own text at all. Separately, an unaffiliated Zurich operator runs a live W3C VC + DID agent trust layer anchored on an Ethereum layer-two network. A reader confined to charter documents would conclude that ledger infrastructure plays a marginal role in agent identity. Deployment evidence says otherwise.
> 
> The concern is not confined to one consortium. Work on agent identity and agent trust is under way at the IETF, the FIDO Alliance, the OpenID Foundation, the Decentralized Identity Foundation, the Linux Foundation, the Ethereum improvement process, NIST, and several security consortia, and the same variable goes unstated across most of them. Part II surveys that landscape. One effort, Ethereum's ERC-8004, answers the question explicitly and answers it as a hybrid, which establishes that the disclosure asked for here is achievable and already shipped.
> 
> The knowledge-representation problem is: these charters are formal representations of systems that are still evolving, and the representation omits the variable that governs the represented system's behaviour. What gets modelled is the trust relationship. What gets left unmodelled is the substrate the relationship depends on to hold at runtime. Ontologies built on the first without the second may crosswalk cleanly and interoperate poorly.
> 
> 
> Please give feedback on the draft technical not, send corrections s and edits via github and a ping to this list
> https://github.com/w3c-cg/aikr/blob/main/trust/kroftrust.md
> 
> Kindly redistribute to interested parties *ie, other CG and WGs mailing lists  and chairs who may be able to contribute
> to address the open questions
> 
> Thank you
> Paola Di Maio

Received on Thursday, 6 August 2026 16:05:45 UTC