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Re: EncryptionMethod in XMLEnc and SignatureMethod in XMLDSig

From: Tom Gindin <tgindin@us.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2002 15:48:46 -0500
To: "Blair Dillaway" <blaird@microsoft.com>
Cc: <xml-encryption@w3.org>
Message-ID: <OF46440F3E.970BDA6A-ON85256B92.00716EF4@pok.ibm.com>

      I don't think that XMLEncryption is vulnerable to algorithm
substitution in the same way as XMLSignature can be.  Has anyone ever seen
an attack that substituted algorithms (or even keys) and produced valid
plaintext from the same ciphertext?  The argument for making
SignatureMethod optional is different than this - it's that for some key
types it's redundant (notably DSA) and the algorithm substitution attacks
don't work against PKCS#1 1.5 mode.

            Tom Gindin

"Blair Dillaway" <blaird@microsoft.com>@w3.org on 04/05/2002 12:34:54 PM

Sent by:    xml-encryption-request@w3.org


To:    <xml-encryption@w3.org>
cc:
Subject:    Re: EncryptionMethod in XMLEnc and SignatureMethod in XMLDSig


While it might be nice to have a consistent treatment of EncryptionMethod
and SignatureMethod in the schemas, I think its more important to have
stable specifications for XML Signature and XML Encryption at this point.
So I am not in favor of changing the schema for either of these elements.


I do agree with Merlin's argument about fragility of signed or encrypted
documents when the algorithms are omitted. I expect most applications will
include the xxxMethod element to explicitly identify the algorithm. Still,
there are folks who will use these for applications (like messaging
systems) where they will be concerned about how many bytes of overhead are
required. So I lean toward having these be optional.


Blair


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
To: Christian Geuer-Pollmann <geuer-pollmann@nue.et-inf.uni-siegen.de>
Cc: Karel Wouters <Karel.Wouters@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>, Aleksey Sanin <
aleksey@aleksey.com>, xml-encryption@w3.org
From: merlin <merlin@baltimore.ie>
Date: Tue, 02 Apr 2002 16:59:25 +0100
Message-Id: <20020402155925.86ABB43BEA@yog-sothoth.ie.baltimore.com>
Subject: Re: EncryptionMethod in XMLEnc and SignatureMethod in XMLDSig


[ I believe I mis-sent the last copy of this. ]

The attack is to break a message digest algorithm, and to replace the
signed data with text indicating that the broken digest is to be used,
such that the new signed data under the broken message digest algorithm
has the same hash as the original signed data under the original message
digest algorithm. If the digest algorithm isn't in the signed text, just
change its setting in the appropriate place; possibly the application's
configuration file.

This isn't practical against DSA because its use of SHA-1 is currently
fixed.

Under RSA, the solution (that we also inherit) is to include the signature
OID within the RSA ciphertext. The attacker cannot replace this instance
of the algorithm specifier, and so this attack will be readily apparent.

Given our current signature algorithm support, SignatureMethod may safely
be omitted. However, the dsig spec is beyond change so a discussion to
make it optional is somewhat fruitless.

Personally, I don't see the benefit of the optionality of these
algorithm identifiers. It doesn't seriously save much space, it doesn't
add security, it makes the long-term durability of documents much more
fragile, and it makes it more difficult to design a friendly API that
exposes the full capabilities of the specification.

Merlin

r/geuer-pollmann@nue.et-inf.uni-siegen.de/2002.04.02/15:39:21
>Hi Karel,
>
>but this attack is always possible, isn't it? If the verifying application

>allows (accepts) weak signature methods, an attacker can change the
>ds:SignatureMethod/@Algorithm value and the ds:SignatureValue . This
attack
>does not depend on whether the SignatureMethod is optional or not.
>
>Or am I completely on the wrong track.
>
>Regards,
>Christian
>
>--On Dienstag, 2. April 2002 16:00 +0200 Karel Wouters
><Karel.Wouters@esat.kuleuven.ac.be> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> I think that SignatureMethod in ds:SignedInfo should be present in
>> each signature, because it restricts the attacker:
>> If I leave out SignatureMethod, the attacker might be able to come up
with
>> a weaker SignatureMethod, tamper with the references and claim that the
>> signature was produced with this method.
>> RSA with a weak hash algorithm would suffice.
>> (actually, he might produce 'any' signature if the hash function is weak
>> enough)
>>
>> So specifying the SignatureMethod ensures the verifier that this
signature
>> is generated with a solid technique.
>>
>> (mailinglist, correct me if I'm wrong)
>>
>> Karel.
>>
>> On Mon, 1 Apr 2002, Aleksey Sanin wrote:
>>
>>> Sorry for mistype, actually Imeant SignatureMethod in XMLDSig:
>>>
>>> A minor issue but probably it's worth to fix it: the EncryptionMethod
>>> in XMLEncryption and SignatureMethod in XMLDSig both have the same
>>> meaning: algorithm selection. However, EncryptionMethod is *optional*
>>> element and SignatureMethod is *required*. From my point of view it is
>>> inconsistent. Either both should be required or both should be
optional.
>>> I would prefer the second (both optional) since application can have
this
>>> information from the context.
>>>
>>>
>>> Aleksey Sanin <aleksey@aleksey.com>
>>> http://www.aleksey.com/xmlsec
Received on Friday, 5 April 2002 15:49:24 GMT

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