W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > xml-encryption@w3.org > December 2001

Minutes of 011203-tele

From: Joseph Reagle <reagle@w3.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2001 13:37:38 -0500
To: xenc <xml-encryption@w3.org>
Message-Id: <20011203183739.6EFC210BE@policy.w3.org>


  Chair: Joseph Reagle
  Note Taker: Joseph Reagle [ascii]


     * Joseph Reagle, W3C
     * Blair Dillaway, Microsoft
     * Ed Simon, XMLsec
     * Donald Eastlake, Motorola
     * Katherine Betz, IBM


Status of documents

     * Working through last call. Reagle created a Last Call Issues
       document for tracking.

Still Open Items

    1. Eastlake: add real life examples in section 5.5 to illustrate.
       Pending. Open for re-assignment.
    2. Action Hughes: ( XML Encryption Processing Model) Will investigate
       and send an email on Xerces implementation using XNI, or DOM when
       processing Element or Element Content.
    3. ACTION Reagle: add warning text on this point if it doesn't
       already exist, "decrypted content may not be well-formed XML."
       REDIRECT: Chrisitan will provide some text since he's best aware
       of the source of confusion.
    4. ACTION Eastlake: Edit section 5.5 . "Is it possible to change the
       order of the input to KM so that it will look like:"
    5. ACTION Dillway: consider Key threshold schemes on top of KeyInfo
       in one week.




     * Takeshi Imamu
         1. Reagle: how to structure the schema so EncryptedData has a
            nonce on its CipherData, but CipherData doesn't?
            ACTION: to make the change to put the Nonce attribute in the
            EncryptedData element.
     * Jiandong Guo
         1. Nonce and Key Wrap Algorithm: "It seems to me that with the
            key wrap algorithm specified in section 5.6.2, there is no
            way a nonce can be used, although you may still set up one in
            the corresponding CipherData element by the document."
            Eastlake responded that if you have a bad key, a nonce won't
            help you in any case.
     * Blake Dournaee
         1. <AgreementMethod> question. "it doesn't look like XML
            Encryption actually specifies the logistics to perform the
            key agreement without also specifying actual encrypted data,
            which is impossible because the shared key hasn't been
            generated "
            Eastlake: it is not a key agreement protocoll itself, but a
            hint to the result of a previously agree to key.
            Teleconf agrees.


     * Next call tenatively on December 17, 2001. 


Joseph Reagle Jr.                 http://www.w3.org/People/Reagle/
W3C Policy Analyst                mailto:reagle@w3.org
IETF/W3C XML-Signature Co-Chair   http://www.w3.org/Signature/
W3C XML Encryption Chair          http://www.w3.org/Encryption/2001/
Received on Monday, 3 December 2001 13:37:40 UTC

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