RE: D-AR006.11 discussion points

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dilber, Ayse, ALASO [mailto:adilber@att.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 08, 2002 2:02 PM
> To: Joseph Hui; Christopher Ferris; www-ws-arch@w3.org
> Subject: RE: D-AR006.11 discussion points
> 
> 
> i don't know if you will receive this but i'm having lots of 
> e-mail problems today, i thought i answered your question in 
> a different message but it sounds like it wasn't delivered.  
> so here it is:

Well, here it is what?  Another mail problem? ;-)
Please take your time, Ayse.
Fix you mail first; the world can wait. :-)

Joe Hui
Exodus, a Cable & Wireless service
=============================================
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Joseph Hui [mailto:Joseph.Hui@exodus.net]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 08, 2002 4:41 PM
> To: Dilber, Ayse, ALASO; Christopher Ferris; www-ws-arch@w3.org
> Subject: RE: D-AR006.11 discussion points
> 
> 
> Ayse,
> 
> Then what's your answer to my questions in [1]
> pertaining to threat characterization?
> 
> I'm copying the text of the original question over
> as follows:
> 
>   Auditing* as a security aspect?
>   Can you explain why?  E.g. for starter, how would you
>   characterize the threat (model) that's unique to Auditing?
>   Note that the impetus for requiring each of the original
>   six begins with a unique threat, or in some cases, threats.
> 
> Joe Hui
> Exodus, a Cable & Wireless service
> 
> PS: I wasn't interested in what auditing means in
>     the conventional sense.  It's obvious.
> 
> [1] http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Member/w3c-ws-arch/2002May/0056.html
> ======================================================================
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Dilber, Ayse, ALASO [mailto:adilber@att.com]
> > Sent: Wednesday, May 08, 2002 12:59 PM
> > To: Joseph Hui; Christopher Ferris; www-ws-arch@w3.org
> > Subject: RE: D-AR006.11 discussion points
> > 
> > 
> > No, I didn't back out on Auditing!  I was having serious 
> > e-mail problems that's why I couldn't respond.  I believe 
> > that the Auditing should be included!
> > Ayse
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Joseph Hui [mailto:Joseph.Hui@exodus.net]
> > Sent: Wednesday, May 08, 2002 3:55 PM
> > To: Christopher Ferris; www-ws-arch@w3.org
> > Subject: RE: D-AR006.11 discussion points
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Christopher Ferris [mailto:chris.ferris@sun.com]
> > > Sent: Wednesday, May 08, 2002 12:00 PM
> > > To: www-ws-arch@w3.org
> > > Subject: Re: D-AR006.11 discussion points
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Joe/Ayse,
> > > 
> > > 1) Please keep this, and all technical discussion, on the public
> > > mailing list.
> > > 
> > > 2) It seems to me that Joe is suggesting that the bulleted
> > > item under D-AR006.11 that says:
> > > 
> > > "There are six aspects in the security framework for Web 
> > > Services architecture: Accessibility, 
> > > Authentication, Authorization, Confidentiality, Integrity, 
> > > and Non-repudiation. Together they form 
> > > the foundation for secure Web Services.
> > 
> > The above text is NOT a requirement at all!!!
> > It doesn't even read like one.
> > It's a lite intro for D-AR006.1 thru D-AR006.6.
> > The editors inserted D-AR006.10 and D-AR006.11 in
> > the wrong place.  The two should have followed D-AR009;
> > and the intro should not have been bulletized.
> > What a mess.  sigh.
> > 
> > D-AR006.11 text should read as follows:
> > 
> >   D-AR006.11 The architecture must provide an interface for
> >   Web Services to directly communicate with their underlying
> >   infrastructure.
> > 
> >   The interface is for negotiating services that an infrastructure
> >   may provide to, or perform on behalf of, requesting Web Services.
> >   Such value-added services may include: security, content delivery,
> >   QoS, etc. For instance, a Web service may instruct (via the 
> > interface)
> >   the security agents of its infrastructure to defend against
> >   DOS/DDOS attacks on its behalf."
> > 
> > > is actually a separate requirement from D-AR006.11 and should 
> > > have been
> > > labeled D-AR006.12 in the document. Am I reading this 
> > > correctly? If so,
> > > then this needs to be fed to the editors as a comment so 
> that it is
> > > certain to be tracked (and fixed in the next editor's draft).
> > > 
> > > The question I have then is whether or not Joe is accepting
> > > Ayse's request to add Auditing to this list of 6 aspects
> > > or whether he is suggesting that yet another requirement
> > > (D-AR006.13) be created to accomodate Auditing... do any others
> > > have an opinion on this?
> > 
> > I think Ayse has already backed out on Auditing.
> > So it's no longer an issue whether I'd accept it.
> > (I wasn't inclined to accept it because there's no
> > threat model that's uniquely associated with Auditing.
> > But I wouldn't decide one way or the other without
> > hearing the case out first.)
> > 
> > Whoever wants to give it another shot is welcome to
> > present his/her *reasoning and analysis*.
> > 
> > Cheers,
> > 
> > Joe Hui
> > Exodus, a Cable & Wireless service
> > ==================================================
> > > 
> > > Thanks,
> > > 
> > > Chris
> > > 
> > > Joseph Hui wrote:
> > > 
> > > >>From: Dilber, Ayse, ALASO [mailto:adilber@att.com]
> > > >>
> > > > [snip]
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > >>D-AR006.11 the six aspects need to be replaced with the 
> > > >>following seven aspects of the security framework: 
> > > >>
> > > > 
> > > > Ayse, the D-AR006.11 number was taken.
> > > > You may want to re-number your proposal as D-AR006.12 instead
> > > > if you're serious about it (to be voted on or debated).
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > >>Auditing; 
> > > >>
> > > > 
> > > > Auditing* as a security aspect?
> > > > Can you explain why?  E.g. for starter, how would you
> > > > characterize the threat (model) that's unique to Auditing?
> > > > Note that the impetus for requiring each of the original
> > > > six begins with a unique threat, or in some cases, threats.
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > >>Authentication (includes identification and authorization);
> > > >>
> > > > 
> > > > Authc & Authz are separate sec aspects. 
> > > > 
> > > > Example 1: The security policy of the very system that you're
> > > > using probably includes only Authz but not Authc.  To login,
> > > > you simply enter user name and password, the system checks
> > > > the password file and lets you in.  You are not asked to
> > > > authenticate yourself as Ayse.  BTW, password file is known
> > > > to be one form of Access Control List (ACL).
> > > > 
> > > > Example 2: Alice's security policy includes Authc & Authz.
> > > > To join Alice's party, Bob must present a certificate to
> > > > Alice to authenticate himself as Bob -- Authc, AND, after
> > > > successful authc (sometimes aka positive identification),
> > > > Alice checks whether Bob is on her guest list (i.e. ACL)
> > > > before allowing him into her party.  
> > > >  
> > > > 
> > > >>Access Control (file permission, etc.);
> > > >>
> > > > 
> > > > Access Control is just a Authz means.  (See example 2 above.)
> > > > 
> > > > Cheers,
> > > > 
> > > > Joe Hui
> > > > Exodus, a Cable & Wireless service
> > > > ========================================================
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > >>Confidentiality; 
> > > >>Availability; Integrity; Non-repudiation.
> > > >>Thanks,
> > > >>Ayse
> > > >>
> > > >>-----Original Message-----
> > > >>From: Christopher Ferris [mailto:chris.ferris@sun.com]
> > > >>Sent: Saturday, May 04, 2002 10:00 AM
> > > >>To: wsawg public
> > > >>Subject: D-AR006.11 discussion points
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>SUNW: This requirement goes "inside" a web service and places 
> > > >>requirements
> > > >>on how it is designed.  We should be focusing on externally 
> > > observable
> > > >>(through the web service interfaces) behaviour
> > > >>
> > > >>SYBS: Implementation details. Don't seem to fit in Web 
> > > >>Services Architecture
> > > >>group..
> > > >>
> > > >>W3C: See 
> > > 
>>http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/www-ws-arch/2002May/0015.html
> > >>
> > >>ORCL: I don't quite see how "an architecture" can actually 
> > provide an
> > >>interface. And in this case the goal may be too ambitious 
> given the
> > >>number of different possible "infrastructures".
> > >>
> > >>PF: I just don't see the need for this.
> > >>
> > >>TIB: not clear to me that individual Web services would 
> ever want to
> > >>know whether they were under DOS at some lower layer
> > >>
> > >>CrossWeave: Don't understand this
> > >>
> > >>CMPQ: The interface is for negotiating services that an 
> > >>infrastructure may
> > >>provide to, or perform on behalf of, a requesting Web Services.
> > >>Such value-added services may include: security, content delivery,
> > >>QoS, etc. For instance, a Web service may instruct (via the 
> > >>interface) the security
> > >>agents of its infrastructure to defend against DOS/DDOS 
> > >>attacks on its behalf.
> > >>
> > >>This seems to say that the requirement is
> > >>"The security framework must provide for negotiations 
> pertaining to
> > >>security considerations."
> > >>
> > >>That is, the requirement is for negotiation support;  within 
> > >>security context,
> > >>it is security negotiation, within QoS context, it is QoS 
> > >>negotiation, etc.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > > 
> > > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
>

Received on Wednesday, 8 May 2002 17:14:15 UTC