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Re: Seeking Feedback on Capability URLs Draft

From: Daniel Appelquist <Daniel.Appelquist@telefonica.com>
Date: Fri, 23 May 2014 18:49:51 +0000
To: www-tag <www-tag@w3.org>
CC: John Kemp <john@jkemp.net>
Message-ID: <CFA55672.43690%daniel.appelquist@telefonica.com>
Thanks so much for these comments, John!  BTW I don’t think the point of
the document is to discourage the use of capability URLs - rather to
encourage the adoption of best practice around their use.  Hopefully we
can clarify that in future drafts.


Dan

On 23/05/2014 15:58, "John Kemp" <john@jkemp.net> wrote:

>On 05/23/2014 09:28 AM, Daniel Appelquist wrote:
>> Hi folks - as discussed, I’ve made a blog post
>> http://www.w3.org/blog/TAG/2014/05/22/capability-urls-feedback/

>> seeking some feedback on the Capability URLs draft. The goal here is
>> to get some more eyeballs looking at this and feeding back to us so
>> we can finalize this document and get it out the door as a finding by
>> the July f2f. If you can help spread the word on this it will help
>> get more feedback which will mean a better finding.
>
>I've previously thought about commenting on this document, but stopped
>myself, mostly because I think the document strikes the wrong tone for
>me; why does the foremost architectural body on the Web seem so against
>the use of capability URLS, when (albeit in my opinion) they seem so
>much better aligned with Web architecture than ACL/password approaches?
>
>I highly recommend the web-keys document
>(http://waterken.sourceforge.net/web-key/) for an in-depth discussion of
>why this is so (or at least, it agrees with my opinion ;)
>
>But since you've asked again... here's some feedback.
>
>In general, the examples used in the document are excellent examples of
>when one might use these mechanisms.
>
>I would note a couple of other interesting examples in use:
>
>* OAuth access tokens use the URI fragment of an HTTP Location header to
>hold an OAuth access token, creating a capability URL:
>http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.2.2

>
>* The use of capability URLs to protect against XSRF attacks (as
>passwords, cookies and other forms of "ambient authority" do not)
>
>Some comments about the "leaks" described in your blog post discussion,
>which may be relevant to the document discussion:
>
>* People share private things other than links in search boxes,
>including their thoughts and feelings, phone numbers and other such
>information. They probably don't want to tell Google AdWords those
>things either. Protecting people from themselves has not proven
>particularly effective in the past.
>
>Passwords are a good example too - people share them inappropriately all
>the time because they don't have effective fine-grained delegation over
>their web resources. Capability URLs provide the possibility to do that.
>Using capability URLs effectively would allow me to share the ability
>for a collaborator to read something at a URL without needing a
>password, but write access may require either/both a different
>capability URL and an account or other credentials.
>
>* Companies who use capability URLs often do not think of the need to
>provide an explicit means of delegation. That is, providing a means by
>which the user can explicitly restrict use of the capability URL to
>people other than themselves (or provide different capability URLs to
>collaborators than the one they use to access the resource themselves).
>If a company wishes to use capability URLs, they should explicitly think
>about delegation, unless their wish is that sharing is truly
>unconstrained for their users. I would argue that at least one of the
>companies whose users accidentally leaked their private data made a
>conscious decision NOT to provide their users with this functionality
>(at least, not for free). A company might wish to design that delegation
>system such that an individual person shared with gets a unique URL for
>their access; that different URLs are assigned depending on the
>privileges possible via that URI (read/write etc.) An excellent document
>for understanding this particular issue regarding capability systems is
>
>* If the companies had followed TAG guidance from the capability URLs
>document, they might have prevented one of the issues (rel=noreferrer).
>
>In summary, I'd like to suggest that password-based approaches could
>certainly be seen as being less congruent with Web architecture than
>capabilities. I would also note that passwords have some problems which
>may actually be remedied by the use of capabilities. And finally, how
>much more do we want to rely on passwords when many users still use weak
>passwords; when those who store huge password databases are regularly
>compromised, and when account proliferation has accentuated these
>problems?
>
>My point in railing against passwords, and talking up the use of
>capability systems is that the decision to use one or the other is
>simply a design choice. One is not better, or even simply more secure
>than the other. Thus, I would orient this document more towards
>discussing the design issues in using capability URLs, and not
>attempting to compare with account-based authentication at all. It is
>clear to me, having implemented capability-based systems, that such
>systems need not be any less secure than ACL-based systems. But it all
>depends on the design decisions one makes. I think the point of TAG
>advice should be to improve the architectural advice available. I do not
>think the best advice for capability URLs should (appear to) be "use
>passwords".
>
>Concretely for the document, I would advise more discussion of the issue
>of delegation, and how such delegation might provide a fine-grained
>authorization approach to sharing and editing Web content. I think that
>is the biggest outstanding area for advice. Much of the other actual
>recommendations around the use of capabilities are already very good.
>
>If you want much more detailed feedback than mine, I would recommend
>sending your request for feedback to the cap-talk mailing list
>(http://www.eros-os.org/mailman/listinfo/cap-talk) where many experts on
>capability systems lurk.
>
>Thank you for working on this document - I believe that it has the
>potential to provide excellent advice to those implementing
>capability-based systems.
>
>Regards,
>
>- johnk
>
>>
>> Thanks, Dan

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Received on Friday, 23 May 2014 18:50:26 UTC

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