- From: Peter F. Patel-Schneider <pfps@research.bell-labs.com>
- Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2002 11:59:42 -0400 (EDT)
- To: sandro@w3.org
- Cc: www-rdf-rules@w3.org, timbl@w3.org
From: Sandro Hawke <sandro@w3.org>
Subject: Is n3 a rules language or a logic language?
Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2002 11:00:55 -0400
> In trying to understand TimBL's intended semantics for n3, I've found
> two different ways of looking at the language. I think they correspond
> to it being considerd (1) a rules language or (2) a logic language.
>
> Informally, the question is whether "p implies q" should be understood
> as (1) "if you have p in your collection of true statements, you may
> add q to your collection of true statements", or (2) "you should know
> that if ever p is true, q is also true".
>
> The first is an inference rule, properly written as "p |- q" or
> p
> ---
> q
> and the second is a logic sentence using the "material conditional" or
> "implication" logical connective, variously written as
> p=>q
> p->q
> p [a curve looking kind of like a backwards C] q
>
> In a rules language, "p implies q" (p |- q) tells you what you can do,
> while in a logic language, "p implies q" (p -> q) tells you a general
> fact. The general fact may be used according to some rules to produce
> other facts.
I believe that the situation is more complex than this.
There is a distinction to be made between statements in a logic and the
meaning of such statements. As I understand it, the material conditional
is a statement in a logic, so one can say things like:
( p implies q ) or ( r implies s )
On the other hand, a rule of inference is part of the meaning of logic,
generally part of a proof theory for the logic. So, for example, modus
ponens is a rule of inference, written in one style of writing rules of
inference as
a , a implies b
--------------
b
This should be read as ``If you have concluded a, and you have concluded that a
implies b, then you can conclude b.''
On the other hand
a
---
b
is a different rule of inference, which should be read as ``If you have
concluded a then you can conclude b.''
There is a connection between the two that roughly goes as follows. If you
have concluded that a implies b, then if you conclude a you can also
conclude b. However, this derived rule does *not* carry the entire meaning
of a implies b. For example, most proof systems that include modus ponens
also include modus tolens, a proof rule that looks like
not b, a implies b
------------------
not a
> A logical reasoner knowing one particular rule (which I think is
> "modus ponens": A, A->B |- A) will do the same thing given "p->q" as a
> rules engine would if it were given "p |- q". In fact, a reasoner
> using any other sound and sufficiently-complete set of inference rules
> would act the same given "p->q" as a rules engine would with "p |- q".
This is definitely not true. A rules engine with p |- q will not conclude
anything from not q whereas a complete reasoner for the propositional
calculus will conclude not b from not a and a implies b.
> More generally, if you turn the "|-" into "->" in any collection of
> rules, and feed the rules to a reasoner using at least modus ponens,
> the reasoner will produce (eventually) the same results as the rules
> engine.
Again, not true.
> Let's apply this to n3. cwm is a rules engine; TimBL thinks of
> log:implies as constructing a rule. For example, he is happy to write
>
> # n3 example 1
> { :a :b :c }
> log:implies
> { { :d :e :f }
> log:implies
> { :g :h :i }
> }.
>
> and describe that as one rule which, if triggered by the presence of
> ":a :b :c" will cause the addition of a second rule. That second
> rule, if triggered by the presense of ":d :e :f" will cause the
> addition of ":g :h :i".
Here one of the problems with N3. There is no indication in N3 of whether
log:implies is supposed to be material implication, a proof rule, or some
other logical connective (such as, for example, some sort of relevance
implication).
> On the other hand, if we treat log:implies as a logical implication
> operator, it's clear you can rewrite the sentence above as:
>
> # n3 example 2
> { :a :b :c. :d :e :f }
> log:implies
> { :g :h :i }
>
> which has the same final effect. (You might worry the inner rule
> will only be inferred in the rules-style, not in the logic-style.
> That's not really true; a reasoner using sufficiently-complete
> inference rules would also infer from example 2, given ":a :b :c" that
> "{:d :e :f} log:implies {:g :h :i}".
Again this depends on what the meaning of log:implies is.
> Is there any way to distinguish what cwm does from what a sound and
> complete FOL reasoner would do with the same inputs? I don't think
> so.
I do not know how cwm works. However, my guess is that it is incomplete
with respect to the propositional calculus.
> If one were using such a reasoner, one might be tempted to add
> negation to the language (because there's no additional cost), which
> could be interesting and useful. But that's a different issue.
>
> My conclusion is this: we can treat log:implies as either creating an
> inference rule ( |- ) or as the material conditional ( -> ); from the
> outside no one will be able to tell the difference.
Not true, or, at least, not true without the presence of some other
machinery.
> -- sandro http://www.w3.org/People/Sandro/
>
Peter F. Patel-Schneider
Bell Labs Research
Received on Thursday, 5 September 2002 12:00:08 UTC