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Re: definitionOf

From: Richard H. McCullough <rhm@cdepot.net>
Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2002 12:18:31 -0800
Message-ID: <000a01c29008$d49c0cd0$bd7ba8c0@rhm8200>
To: "Jon Hanna" <jon@spin.ie>, "RDF-Interest" <www-rdf-interest@w3.org>
I agree, not too useful, so let me say a few words.

A couple of years ago, I would have said "yes" instead of "no", because species can be treated as if they were individuals and be combined into wider concepts.

The crucial difference is in their relation to the facts of reality.  Individuals are directly perceived; that an individual exists cannot be denied.  Species are abstractions from reality; a species (or more generally, any concept) is a "floating abstraction" if there are no individuals to tie it to reality.  In other words, if a species cannot be "reduced" to individuals, it does not exist.

Distinguishing individuals from species is the key to distinguishing fact from fiction.
Dick McCullough 
knowledge := man do identify od existent done
knowledge haspart list of proposition

  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Jon Hanna 
  To: RDF-Interest 
  Sent: Tuesday, November 19, 2002 10:57 AM
  Subject: RE: definitionOf

  > No.

  An accurate answer perhaps, but not a useful one. Please remember that some
  of us are hackers, not logicians.

  What makes "Jon Hanna" operate at a different level to "Man" or "Animal".
  Certainly there are some things that are true of "Jon Hanna" that are not
  true of "Man", and some true of "Man" that are not true of "Animal".

  However I wish to know what difference needs to be stated at the level we
  are working at here beyond the fact that "Man" and "Animal" are Classes and
  "Jon Hanna" is not.

  In other words what objection do you have to one treating "Man" as a
  individual, and allowing creationists to say <_:Man> <dc:creator> <_:God>
  and evolutionists to refute this! Or if this is not treating "Man" as an
  individual, why is it not?
Received on Tuesday, 19 November 2002 15:18:32 UTC

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