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breakout discussion from UbiWeb workshop

From: Charles McCathieNevile <chaals@opera.com>
Date: Thu, 09 Mar 2006 12:55:35 +0900
To: "Public Tip" <www-archive@w3.org>
Cc: oribie <ot@w3.org>
Message-ID: <op.s54nuxt3wxe0ny@widsith.local>
Meeting: Breakout on security and privacy

chair: Dave
present: Karl Dubost, Franklin Reynolds, Brent Mori, Johan Hjelm, Michelle  
Dan Hong, Charles McCathieNevile, Hallvord Steen, David Raggett, Kapil  
Sachideva, Reto, Tahar Cherif

Topic: Data mining / privacy - how do you enforce promises?



JH: you need something smarter than P3P especially in machine to machine.  
There are things that let you delve deeper into objects. One problem is  
that there is a lot of data for users to handle



KS: There are ID providers who can host you



JH: That assumes constant connectivity which doesn't happen



KS: When you share, you have a consent framework. Problem is being  
connected. If shared data is signed, you might be able to resolve problems  
with a legal process - you have enough to prove whatshould have happened.



CMN: There are lots of data that people are simply not prepared to hand  
over, because you cannot guarantee that it won't be handed over



JH: People are not consistent about what data they want to hand out - they  
want to be able to take it back. There is also a lot of data - your fridge  
wants to know whether it can hand over the milk level to the egg company...



FR: This really does happen already.



JH: the trick is that as a user you need to be able to ddelegate away the  
consent, not be asked every time. But you need to be sure that the consent  
you gave out is being followed.



FR: Kapil is talking about having recourse when someone has broken the  
rules

KD: The possibility of giving your data and the granularity - you need to  
be able to say which data you share with whom, and what happens to them.  
You should have the possibility to recall the data, or correct them. (Or  
at the very least to see them).

JH: You need to delegate this too.

CMN: There are use cases where it is important to make anonymous  
statements, or to ensure that personal information cannot be spread beyond  
the person the data is about. This matches legal requirements

FR: It is a legal obligation to give access to data?

CMN: Yes. Most companies in Europe are probably in breach

JH: There are cases where granularity can be critical. We are getting into  
a zone where the industrial framework is manageable, but spreading this  
level of accuracy to the home scenario will introduce another set of  
problems. And you want to be sure that nobody hacks your insulin pump.

DR: What about usability - how do we improve that?

FR: I had envisioned that P3P would have standard templates, a  
negotiation, a handful of common choices.

CMN: I agree that it is obvious. Part of the problem is lack of screaming  
customers, and there is some progress. Hopefully the usability isn't  
covered by the same kind of patents that took out some of the useful stuff  
in P3P to start with.

JH: Turns out users couldn't care less about privacy - until they  
personally feel the pain and then it should have been fixed for them  
beforehand.

DR: Machine to machine communication isn't the same model as for people

JH: You can have the same model, but you need to visualise it differently.  
You need to develop it so that it is machine friendly from the start.

CMN: The next steps are going to be looked at in W3C workshop next week...  
we did start doing the stuff on basic certificates and SSL working or  
not...

FR: So imagine you are printing something at an airport, and there is a  
man-in-the-middle reading your private documents

JH: I may be a print-and-remember-and-send-to-your-rival

FR: So we get back to the need for a bond. The service description is  
vetted by a third party and I can call the police if something happens

KS: The spoof problem can be dealt with by certification.

FR: How do I validate the certificate of the printer I am going to?

JH: You print the signature key on the printer...

KD: We are heading to legal identity for machines.

KS: Verisign are looking at embedding images into certificates.

FR: The problem is that Verisign has the identity but I can't tell

DR: That's where you get a statement signed about which printers are  
where, and you add that to a note to a particular printer...

FR: Today at the office i need to know the name of the printer I want.  
It's no help to know the name unless I can bind the name clearly to a  
device

KD: We identify things as people through recognition, or delegated trust.  
There might be a model that we can use such as "someone I trust says I can  
use this printer".

FR: So if there is no spoofing I trust the room not to spoof a printer...

JH: You are assuming that the discovery is ... If you can only discover  
close things, e.g. by telling bluetooth to only find stuff within a few  
feet. The issue is if you are sitting in the lounge, using remote  
connectivity to discover, you don't know. You have to constrain the device  
to perform as the user expects. The user has an expectation, we have a  
neat technical solution, but we don't manage to match these things to each  
other. The invisibility of the process is sometimes too strong.

FR: Challenge is to remove spoofability - how do I know that I am talking  
to this printer I can see with no man in the middle.

KS: Certified image of that device might be one of the answers.

JH: There are 2D barcodes on things in Japan. You could use that as an ID  
to check against.

FR: But they are cheap enough to paste one over the other and make  
yourself a man in the middle.

DR: But then you're not going to use it.

KS: Must be tamper resistant

CMN: and difficult to duplicate

FR: If you dynamically generate a barcode, we can check it

DR: We are requiring a user to do something, too.

CMN: Which won't work at the "getting milk out of the fridge" level...

TC: Discussion was mostly machine - human-or-machine questions. What about  
human-human

JH: You don't need machines to mediate human-human communication

TC: Exchannging information with a remote doctor you do need mediation.

JH: It is more pertinent for people but exists for machines. It is really  
about reputation management...

KD: There is a Rule Interchange group at W3C...


-- 
Charles McCathieNevile                     chaals@opera.com
   hablo español  -  je parle français  -  jeg lærer norsk
      Peek into the kitchen: http://snapshot.opera.com/


Received on Thursday, 9 March 2006 03:56:01 GMT

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