> Since the signature value on the signature node only covers the > signed info element, the individual x.509 elements present in the > key info is not signed at all. In that case, how can these values be > trusted, unless it is cross verified with x.509 certificate. Right, you don't trust them. You either use the info as lookup keys into your own set of keys/certs that you do trust, or you use the cert, etc., information in the signature, and validate it up to a trust anchor (CA) that you do trust. If you just naively accept whatever credentials are in the certificate, then all you can do is *verify the signature.* The process of determining if you trust the identity of the signer is often called *validating the credentials.* Both things must happen. XMLDSIG defines the semantics of verification; validation is a local policy and implementation issue. /r$Received on Tuesday, 4 February 2003 10:08:11 GMT
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