- From: Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net>
- Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 10:23:59 +0100
- To: Patrick Hayes <phayes@ihmc.us>
- Cc: Jos De Roo <jos.deroo@agfa.com>, semantic-web <semantic-web@w3.org>
> On 22 Jan 2020, at 23:29, Patrick J Hayes <phayes@ihmc.us> wrote: > > > >> On Jan 22, 2020, at 8:22 AM, Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net> wrote: >> >> >> >>> On 19 Jan 2020, at 06:06, Patrick J Hayes <phayes@ihmc.us> wrote: >>> … >>>> >>>> PS. I think I remember Pat Hayes claiming RDF was a first order logic >>>> on this list a year or so ago… (that would I presume not fit it being >>>> a regular logic,… But I am not an expert in this (yet). >>> >>> RDF is a (very minimal) fragment of FOL. Technically it is binary (relations of arity 1 or 2) FOL restricted to conjunction and the existential quantifier. No negation, disjunction or universal quantifier. It also lacks any scoping mechanism, but this does not matter when there is no negation, disjunction or universal quantification. One would get full FOL by adding negation and a scoping mechanism (such as an explicit existential quantifier, although other syntaxes could be used.) >> >> yes, so that is why it looks so close to regular logic as far as I understand. > > Looks like it, indeed. I was not familiar with this ‘regular’ terminology. It is also closely similar to CSPierce’s “existential graphs” from around 1880 (though Pierce also had scoping and negation, so RDF is, again, a sublanguage of Pierce’s notation.) I find it interesting that this particular weak but useful, and eminently ’graphable’, logic has been reinvented so many times since the very beginning of modern logical studies. Yes, I have been coming across Pierce’s logic quite a lot recently researching this area. Just last week I found an article "The Logic of Picturing: Wittgenstein, Sellars and Peirce’s EG-beta” by Rocco Gangle, Gianluca Caterina, Fernando Tohmé which details his logic and even mentions Regular Logic. And more tangentially an article "Wittgenstein’s Struggles with the Quantifiers” by Jan von Plato His problem was with universal quantification to be precise, which is exactly the quantifier missing in both regular and coherent logic. It would be quite interesting if Wittgenstein had all along been a ”coherent logician” so to speak. I wrote up a question with links to all of that here: https://gitlab.com/web-cats/CG/issues/12 > > Pat > >> >
Received on Thursday, 23 January 2020 09:24:07 UTC