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Re: proposed editor's note on mandatory to implement algorithms (ACTION-214)

From: Frederick Hirsch <frederick.hirsch@nokia.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2009 18:37:49 -0500
Cc: Frederick Hirsch <frederick.hirsch@nokia.com>, Rob Miller <rdmiller@mitre.org>, Brian LaMacchia <bal@exchange.microsoft.com>, Chris Solc <csolc@adobe.com>, Kenneth M Graf <kenneth.m.graf@intel.com>, XMLSec WG Public List <public-xmlsec@w3.org>
Message-Id: <858D5531-6614-40D6-A13A-433D7C8D4FE3@nokia.com>
To: ext Thomas Roessler <tlr@w3.org>
I suggest the following change to your proposed editors note:

(a) Change "Positions of Working Group members include:" to
"Positions of some Working Group members against the currently  
expressed mandatory algorithms include:"

(b) For #2 suggest changing
"both for hash and public-key algorithms." to "both for hash and  
public-key algorithms, in the event one is proven insecure, to enable  
a quick change to an alternative."

(c) in #2 Remove ", which is, e.g., not the case for RSA."

(d) change #3 to:

3. There should be recommended algorithms, but no mandatory to
implement algorithms.  The rationale is that this gives greater  
flexibility to deployments. (Other WG members argued against this  
since it could harm interoperability not having mandatory algorithms.)


regards, Frederick

Frederick Hirsch
Nokia



On Feb 17, 2009, at 6:20 PM, ext Thomas Roessler wrote:

> Here's a proposal for an editor's note that can be added to the
> Encryption 1.1 and Signature 1.1 WDs (in Signature this should go into
> the beginning of section 6; haven't looked where it best fits into
> Encryption), with an additional pointer in the status of the document:
>
>> There is currently no consensus on mandatory to implement
>> algorithms; the current draft text represents one possible outcome.
>> Positions of Working Group members include:
>
> For Signature:
>
>> 1. RSA and DSA are acceptable as a mandatory to implement signature
>> algorithms.  Given limited support in parts of the industry,
>> elliptic curve DSA is not acceptable as a mandatory to implement
>> algorithm, and might lead to lack of implementation of this version
>> of the specification.
>
> For Encryption:
>
>> 1. Given limited support in parts of the industry, Elliptic Curve
>> Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement is not acceptable as a mandatory to
>> implement algorithm in this specification, and might lead to lack of
>> implementation of this version of the specification.
>
> Then, for both specs:
>
>> 2. Going forward, this specification needs to have credible
>> algorithm agility, both for hash and public-key algorithms.
>> Therefore, there should be two mandatory to implement public-key
>> algorithms from different families.  At this time, elliptic curve
>> based algorithms are the only credible contenders.  They have the
>> additional benefit of providing a reasonable balance between key
>> sizes and security level, which is, e.g., not the case for RSA.
>
> Signature only:
>
>> As profiles built on top of XML Signature that currently rely on DSA-
>> SHA1 or RSA-SHA1 as the only supported signature algorithm will need
>> to be updated in the future, the Signature core specification should
>> outline a clear way forward in terms of choice of algorithms.  This
>> choice should be Elliptic Curve DSA.
>
> Both:
>
>> 3. There should be recommended algorithms, but no mandatory to
>> implement algorithms.  On certain constrained devices, only a single
>> algorithm might be implemented at a given time, but there may be
>> updatte mechanisms in place that enable algorithm agility in
>> deployments.
>
>> The Working Group welcomes further community input and comment on
>> this issue.
>
>
> Rob, Brian, Chris, Ken -- please let me know whether this describes
> your positions in reasonable accuracy, and feel free to suggest finer
> word-smithing.
> --
> Thomas Roessler, W3C  <tlr@w3.org>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
Received on Tuesday, 17 February 2009 23:46:08 GMT

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