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Fwd: [widget-digsig] Pls review: Additional considerations on elliptic curve algorithms to consider

From: Frederick Hirsch <Frederick.Hirsch@nokia.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2009 06:33:11 -0400
Cc: Frederick Hirsch <Frederick.Hirsch@nokia.com>
Message-Id: <101D837F-8A9E-4CD0-8428-E60A41A204CB@nokia.com>
To: XMLSec WG Public List <public-xmlsec@w3.org>
fyi. This should close ACTION-258.

regards, Frederick

Frederick Hirsch

Begin forwarded message:

> From: "Hirsch Frederick (Nokia-CIC/Boston)" <Frederick.Hirsch@nokia.com 
> >
> Date: April 8, 2009 6:30:09 AM EDT
> To: Web Applications Working Group WG <public-webapps@w3.org>
> Cc: "Hirsch Frederick (Nokia-CIC/Boston)" <Frederick.Hirsch@nokia.com>
> Subject: [widget-digsig] Pls review: Additional considerations on  
> elliptic curve algorithms to  consider
> The XML Security WG would like to refine the question about the
> suitability of elliptic curve as a mandatory to implement algorithm
> for XML Signature 1.1 by highlighting that the  scope of elliptic
> curve is greatly limited in what is proposed to be mandatory in XML
> Signature 1.1.
> As T-Mobile pointed out previously in their comments [1], the specific
> curve being used in an instance of ECDSA is important and there are a
> few sets of well-known ("named") curves that have been standardized.
> The P-256, P-384 and P-521 curves are three of the five NIST-defined
> prime curves.
> Since the publication of the First Public Working Draft of XML
> Signature 1.1, the following clarifying text was added by the XML
> Security WG to  the end of section 6.4.3 of XML Signature 1.1 [2]:
> "This specification REQUIRES implementations to support the
> ECDSAwithSHA256 signature algorithm, which is ECDSA over the P-256
> prime curve specified in Section D.2.3 of FIPS 186-3 [FIPS186-3] (and
> using the SHA-256 hash algorithm). It is further RECOMMENDED that
> implementations also support ECDSA over the P-384 and P-521 prime
> curves; these curves are defined in Sections D.2.4 and D.2.5 of FIPS
> 186-3, respectively."
> It is important to realize  that by reducing the scope of the
> requirement to a specific curve that this should simplify evaluation
> of whether it is desirable to make this  mandatory to implement.
> The XML Security WG would also like to note the importance of this
> algorithm to US Government customers, as evidenced by their adoption
> of Suite B [3]. This is reflected in the XML Security WG Use Cases
> and  Requirements document in section [4].
> These considerations can also apply to the decision of which
> algorithms should be required in Widget Signature.
> Please share this additional information in your organization and
> indicate if it would cause any change in position regarding the
> mandatory to implement algorithms.
> Thank you
> regards, Frederick
> Frederick Hirsch, Nokia
> Chair XML Security WG
> [1] http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webapps/2009JanMar/0842.html
> [2] http://www.w3.org/2008/xmlsec/Drafts/xmldsig-core-11/Overview.htm#sec-SignatureAlg
> [3] Fact Sheet NSA Suite B Cryptography, http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.shtml
> [4] http://www.w3.org/TR/2009/WD-xmlsec-reqs-20090226/#algorithm- 
> suiteb
Received on Wednesday, 8 April 2009 10:34:26 UTC

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