W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webcrypto@w3.org > July 2014

[Bug 26465] Algorithm normalization doesn't allow arbitrary operations for AlgorithmIdentifier fields

From: <bugzilla@jessica.w3.org>
Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2014 20:24:53 +0000
To: public-webcrypto@w3.org
Message-ID: <bug-26465-7213-O4HvafCkbn@http.www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/>
https://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=26465

--- Comment #6 from Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com> ---
(In reply to Mark Watson from comment #5)
> I don't have a non-hypothetical example. But we are talking about
> extensibility here, so we should allow for all kinds of extension (within
> reason). Unless there is some reason to believe that this form of extension
> is unlikely to be needed.

Which I believe, and am having trouble seeing this as "within reason", thus
trying to come up with a more useful scheme.

> If we want to allow the flexibility for the "enc" member to be normalized
> using operation "encrypt", then instead if just looking up 'desiredType' in
> [[supportedAlgorithms]] we would want also to be provided with an object
> like this:
> 
> { "enc" : "encrypt" }

I specifically avoided this because it de-generates into the same problem as
wrap/unwrap with key-specified attributes (the PKCS#11 problem with
CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE/CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE) in that we need to support infinite
layers of recursion, such that

{ "enc" : { "param1": "encrypt", "param2": { "subparam": "encrypt",
"anothersubparam": "sign" } } }

I agree that there is a hypothetical use case, but to me, the practical
existence of such a hypothetical strikes at a strong design smell. That is, I
think there are going to be far more issues with such a hypothetical
"NewSignatureAlgorithm", and I don't think supporting a non-monkeypatched
approach with algorithm identification are going to solve those issues.

On a more practical concern, since we're dealing with hypotheticals, I will
note that none of the other platform APIs need to deal with / treat this
problem. Considering the lead time for any sort of successful peer review on
the suitability of NewSignatureAlgorithm, I'm also not convinced that we should
try to solve this problem now.

-- 
You are receiving this mail because:
You are on the CC list for the bug.
Received on Thursday, 31 July 2014 20:24:54 UTC

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.1 : Tuesday, 6 January 2015 21:17:23 UTC