- From: <bugzilla@jessica.w3.org>
- Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 02:28:35 +0000
- To: public-webcrypto@w3.org
https://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=25815 --- Comment #2 from Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com> --- Another example: A number of language bindings that allow creating language/library-specific keys from primitives (e.g.: n,e,d for RSA) may not compute the other parameters (necessary for output). Further, if just n,e,d are specified, they can lead to unsafe handling of data. For example, in a number of Java JCE implementations, creating an RSA private key with JUST n,e,d will disable RSA blinding attacks, which exist to mitigating timing attacks against RSA. On the flip side, several cryptographic libraries require that the caller supply all the parameters, as they're required by PKCS#8. Handling the JWK case would require the UA to perform the MPI math itself. My proposed resolution for this is: - Normalize on operation error for any form of weirdness - Require that JWK RSA keys have all the parameters from JWA, which is valid according to JWA (from talking with Mike, it's assumed as the default) -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.
Received on Wednesday, 23 July 2014 02:28:37 UTC