Re: Additional use cases

I meant
for public-private key pair in current WebCrypto API spec,
I have no objection for silent operation and the keys can be owned by
provisioners.

but

for certificate-private key pair,
I have objection for silent operation.
because
at least as my understanding,
the client certificate is issued to individual and it's paired private key
is owned my user.
the private key should not be accessed without user permission.
that means non-silent operation.

PIN or passphrase can be used for getting user permission.

I have mentioned previously that
users always click "yes" on simple questions like installing binary plugins.
but
PIN or passphrase is different from simple "yes" clicking.

regards
mountie.

On Wed, May 8, 2013 at 2:15 AM, Aymeric Vitte <vitteaymeric@gmail.com>wrote:

>  One way I would see to solve the key ownership issue or PIN code
> discussions, would be to have a user password mechanism with indexedDB,
> which does not exist.
>
> Regards,
>
> Aymeric
>
> Le 07/05/2013 18:38, Mountie Lee a écrit :
>
> Hi.
>
>  if the signature is generated by the operation of origin and sent to 3rd
> party as user's signature,
> how the 3rd party can trust signature?
>
>  non-repudiation is legal term in Korea and EU.
>
>  even with trusted origin,
> if the certificate key pair is controlled NOT by user BUT by origin, the
> generated signature can not be trusted.
>
>  accessing to private key of certificate key pair need user consent. not
> allowing silent operation for certificate key pair.
>
>  for existing TLS client x509 certificate, your comment is right and not
> convenient to control.
> that is the reason charter described TLS login/logout or other features.
>
>  regards
> mountie.
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, May 8, 2013 at 1:10 AM, Seetharama Rao Durbha <
> S.Durbha@cablelabs.com> wrote:
>
>>  I am not sure I follow what is meant by user owns the cert Vs. origin
>> owns the cert. For all practical purposes, the origin uses a secure
>> protocol to associate a cert to a user. Cert could have been obtained by
>> the user from a 3rd party or issued by the origin. But for non-repudiation
>> purposes, it does not matter.
>>
>>  The problem for non-repudiation is whether someone else could have
>> generated the signature. With no secure SOP, a malicious script can easily
>> generate the signature and submit to the origin.
>>
>>  In case of TLS, there are no signatures involved, and the keys are not
>> exposed to scripts. The user can demonstrate the ownership of a certificate
>> to anyone who cares – whether malicious content or genuine content. So, TLS
>> usage is totally different.
>>
>>
>>    On 5/7/13 9:44 AM, "Mountie Lee" <mountie@paygate.net> wrote:
>>
>>     existing TLS client X509 certificate can be used on any sites for
>> establishing TLS connection.
>>
>>  if keys are totally owned by origin, the origin has full control for
>> the keys of UA with silent operation.
>> if keys are owned by user, the origin has limited control for the keys
>> with user consent (like TLS client x509 certificate).
>>
>>  before going to certificate discussion,
>>  we have to conclude how to handle key ownership issue and solve the
>> conflict between existing TLS client x509 certificate and webcrypto's
>> certificate.
>>
>>  the definition of certificate in wikipedia(
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate) describe as
>> following
>> "In cryptography <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography>, a *public
>> key certificate* (also known as a *digital certificate* or *identity
>> certificate*) is an electronic document that uses a digital signature<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature> to
>> bind a public key <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key> with an
>> identity — information such as the name of a person or an organization,
>> their address, and so forth. The certificate can be used to verify that a
>> public key belongs to an individual."
>>
>>  the certificate is issued to identify the entities (individuals or
>> organizations)
>> means
>>
>>  certificate is tightly binded into key ownership.
>>
>>  if the keys are controlled by origins (provisioners, servers or the
>> cloud), it can not be used for non-repudiation of individual.
>> technically the cross-origin issued can be addressed with suggested
>> solutions (CORS, postMessage...).
>> but it can not be the answer for non-repudiation requirement.
>>
>>  user owns the certificate key pair and has control --> generated
>> digital signature --> non-repudiable
>>
>>  regards
>> mountie.
>>
>>
>> On Wed, May 8, 2013 at 12:14 AM, Seetharama Rao Durbha <
>> S.Durbha@cablelabs.com> wrote:
>>
>>>  With the ownership of the key based on SOP that is not cognizant of
>>> tampering (as of now), I am afraid that any discussion of signatures will
>>> be futile, they cannot be used for non-repudiation, at the end of the day.
>>>
>>>  http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto/2013Apr/0247.html
>>>
>>>
>>>   On 5/6/13 10:38 AM, "Lu HongQian Karen" <karen.lu@gemalto.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>    Hi Arun,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Here are the two use cases that I have talked about at the recent F2F
>>> meeting.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Cross-origin use cases:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 1.  Asymmetric key use case: A healthcare association (origin 1) issued
>>> Dr. Smith an X.509 certificate and the corresponding private key. Dr. Smith
>>> accesses an e-prescription service (origin 2) and uses her private key to
>>> sign e-prescriptions.
>>>
>>> 2.  Secret key use case: Danny signed up at a cloud storage (origin 1)
>>> that created him a secret access key and persisted it through Danny’s UA.
>>> Danny stores his 3D model data in the cloud storage. He then uses an online
>>> 3D printing service (origin 2) to print his model. To access Danny’s model
>>> in Origin 1, Origin 2 needs to use Danny’s secret key. Danny tells Origin 2
>>> certain attribute(s) of his key. The Origin 2 finds the key object through
>>> the UA and uses the key to sign API requests for getting the model from
>>> cloud storage.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Although these two use cases are out of the current WG scope. It’ll be
>>> good to collect them for future work.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Karen
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>  --
>> Mountie Lee
>>
>> PayGate
>> CTO, CISSP
>> Tel : +82 2 2140 2700
>> E-Mail : mountie@paygate.net
>>
>>   =======================================
>> PayGate Inc.
>> THE STANDARD FOR ONLINE PAYMENT
>> for Korea, Japan, China, and the World
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>  --
> Mountie Lee
>
> PayGate
> CTO, CISSP
> Tel : +82 2 2140 2700
> E-Mail : mountie@paygate.net
>
>   =======================================
> PayGate Inc.
> THE STANDARD FOR ONLINE PAYMENT
> for Korea, Japan, China, and the World
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> jCore
> Email :  avitte@jcore.fr
>
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>


-- 
Mountie Lee

PayGate
CTO, CISSP
Tel : +82 2 2140 2700
E-Mail : mountie@paygate.net

=======================================
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THE STANDARD FOR ONLINE PAYMENT
for Korea, Japan, China, and the World