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RE: Comments on wrap/unwrap

From: GALINDO Virginie <Virginie.GALINDO@gemalto.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2013 20:53:49 +0200
To: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <public-webcrypto@w3.org>, Vijay Bharadwaj <Vijay.Bharadwaj@microsoft.com>, Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com>
Message-ID: <239D7A53E5B17B4BB20795A7977613A4CD578E3E55@CROEXCFWP04.gemalto.com>
Mark, Ryan, and all,
Lets gather other's view on that during the call today. 
Regards,
Virginie 

-----Original Message-----
From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi@google.com] 
Sent: lundi 17 juin 2013 19:56
To: Mark Watson
Cc: public-webcrypto@w3.org; Vijay Bharadwaj
Subject: Re: Comments on wrap/unwrap

On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 1:02 PM, Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 12:41 PM, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 12:24 PM, Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com> wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 12:00 PM, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 8:31 AM, Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com>
>> >> wrote:
>> >> > All,
>> >> >
>> >> > First, if you receive two versions of this email, they should be 
>> >> > equivalent.
>> >> > I wrote one last night and now find no sign of it in my email 
>> >> > system, so this is just a rewrite and retransmission :-(
>> >> >
>> >> > Second, sorry for the delay in responding on this topic. I was 
>> >> > unexpectedly out of the office all last week.
>> >> >
>> >> > I have two comments on the wrap/unwrap implementation in the 
>> >> > latest draft.
>> >> >
>> >> > 1) The procedures refer to the import/export procedures which 
>> >> > are currently unspecified. For the mechanism to meet the 
>> >> > original requirements, it's important that import and export 
>> >> > respect the attributes of the Key (usage, exportable). We need 
>> >> > to define mappings for these to/from JWK and in the import case 
>> >> > the values in the JWK must override those in the import method 
>> >> > parameters.
>> >>
>> >> I'm of a mixed opinion as to whether or not this needs to be 
>> >> specified to this level. The security model assumed here is 
>> >> already implementation dependent - whether or an implementation 
>> >> respects these fields, or provides any other guarantees, is 
>> >> already opaque to the web application.
>> >
>> >
>> > You could also say that about the extractable attribute, or 
>> > potentially anything in the spec. The spec defines what a compliant 
>> > implementation must do and there is some value in that even when 
>> > you don't have 100% proof that the UA is compliant.
>> >
>> > To support the use-case, this needs to be specified as proposed.
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> > 2) There is one important difference between our proposal and 
>> >> > what Ryan has implemented. We proposed methods that would 
>> >> > create/consume a JWE-encrypted JWK object in one step. Ryan's 
>> >> > proposed methods are simpler, more flexible and agnostic as to 
>> >> > the wrapping format. Implementing JWE-encrypted JWK takes two 
>> >> > steps but the JS could also implement other formats.
>> >> >
>> >> > However, in order to obtain the same properties, in terms of key 
>> >> > extractibility, as the original proposal it is necessary for any 
>> >> > temporary keys (such as JWE Content Encryption Key) to be 
>> >> > encoded in a way that carries attributes. To explain this, first 
>> >> > note that Ryan's methods wrap and unwrap are effectively 
>> >> > compound methods based on the existing encrypt, decrypt, import 
>> >> > and export: wrap = export+encrypt and unwrap=decrypt+import 
>> >> > where the intermediate result (at the '+') is not exposed to the 
>> >> > script.
>> >> >
>> >> > To implement JWE-encrypted JWK with these methods we proceed as
>> >> > follows:
>> >> >
>> >> > Wrap a key X using wrapping key Y:
>> >> > (W1) Generate a Content Encryption Key with usage "wrap"
>> >> > (W2) Use the CEK with the wrap method to export+encrypt X (using 
>> >> > JWK
>> >> > format)
>> >> > (W3) Use Y and with the wrap method to export+encrypt the CEK
>> >> > (W3) Construct the JWE object using the output of steps W2 and 
>> >> > W3
>> >> >
>> >> > Unwrap a key X using wrapping key Y:
>> >> > (U1) Extract the wrapped CEK and the payload from the JWE 
>> >> > structure
>> >> > (U2) Use Y and the unwrap method to decrypt+import the wrapped 
>> >> > CEK, resulting in a Key object K[CEK] for the CEK
>> >> > (U3) Use K[CEK] and the unwrap method to decrypt+import the 
>> >> > payload, resulting in a Key object for X
>> >> >
>> >> > Let's suppose the X has extractable=false. In order for this 
>> >> > property to be maintained it's essential the K[CEK] is not 
>> >> > extractible and does not have usage "decrypt". Otherwise, it 
>> >> > would be possible for the Javascript to use K[CEK] to simply 
>> >> > decrypt the payload, exposing the key X.
>> >> >
>> >> > Therefore, the wrapped encoding of the CEK must carry the 
>> >> > extractible and usages attributes (for cases where the 
>> >> > extractibility property of X must be maintained).
>> >>
>> >> I don't really see this as the case.
>> >>
>> >> Again, you're working from a threat model where you don't trust 
>> >> the executing JS. Obviously, this is a threat model that I 
>> >> disagree with, but you can mitigate this in an 
>> >> implementation-dependent way that matches your implementation-dependent dependency on named keys.
>> >
>> >
>> > We can't, because this is an issue also without named keys.
>> >
>> > Regarding the security model, we previously established that this 
>> > is an issue and that it affects the extractable attribute as much 
>> > as these other things. We should keep the specification consistent 
>> > - if we are going to have the extractable attribute at all then we 
>> > need to be able to deliver non-extractable wrapped keys, which has 
>> > the implications I described above.
>> >
>> > If the group decides that the model is invalid, then the 
>> > extractable attribute can be removed and my points above become moot.
>>
>> I disagree with your conclusion that supporting extractable requires, 
>> by definition supporting non-extractable wrapped keys - if anything, 
>> this highlights the general issue with key wrapping.
>
>
> No, that wasn't what I was getting at.
>
> We have extractable in the specification. It makes sense to have it 
> there only if you accept that there is some value in hiding keys from 
> the JS. So, let's just say that as long as extractable is in the 
> specification there is some value in hiding keys from the JS. We have 
> a separate issue to decide on that point, but for the moment, extractable is in the specification.
>
> If it is valuable to hide keys from the JS, it's also valuable to 
> deliver wrapped keys into the UA in such a way that they remain hidden from the JS.
> That was the main point of our wrap/unwrap proposal which the group 
> agreed should be implemented in the specification, albeit as a "feature at risk".
>
>>
>> Your proposed solution suggests that the JWE/CEK should be modified 
>> to support attributes - which helps for the JWE/CEK case, but does 
>> nothing for other formats, which would conceivably share the same 
>> issue.
>
>
> No, *your* proposed implementation of wrap/unwrap - in which we 
> require two operations to implement JWE-encapsulated JWK - implies 
> that the CEK must carry attributes to maintain the properties of the 
> original proposal (to which the group agreed).
>
> Other formats may also have the same problem: if the wrapping 
> operation is a single operation, then there is no need for the 
> temporary keys that must necessarily be used when wrapping using 
> public key cryptography to carry separate attributes. It is the 
> splitting into two operations, which is certainly elegant in the sense 
> of decoupling from the specific wrapping format, that introduces the requirement for attributes on the temporary key.
> At least in the model where you don't which to expose the wrapped key 
> to the JS.
>
> What we end up with is a solution which can support any wrapping 
> format (good), but only wrapping formats with attributed-carrying 
> temporary keys will be able to keep keys hidden from the JS.
>
> I'm fine with this, btw.

Mark,

I fail to see how you reach the conclusion of an attribute-carrying temporary key being necessary, especially given the following examples of other APIs.

>
>>
>>
>> CryptoAPI/CNG, for example (and +cc Vijay for the possibility of me 
>> misstating here) lacks the functionality you're requesting, and has 
>> worked out quite fine for applications.
>>
>> PKCS#11 somewhat supports the notion you're trying for, by virtue of 
>> the CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE and CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE attribute that applies 
>> to the wrap/unwrapping key. In the wrap case, the CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE 
>> specifies a list of attributes that the *key to be wrapped* must 
>> match. In the unwrap case, the CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE specifies a list 
>> of attributes that must not conflict with the caller-supplied list of 
>> attributes.
>>
>> My statement about the unwrapping key rejecting extractable=false is 
>> a failure mode consistent with this latter part. The issue you have 
>> seems to be whether or not the ability to mutate those attributes 
>> necessarily needs to be exposed to application authors, or whether it 
>> can be kept behind the notion of 'implementation dependent' - for 
>> example, coupled to named keys.
>
>
> Yes, this is another option, in which the unwrapping key carries 
> additional attributes not just about its own extractability/usages but 
> about the extractability/usages of keys that it unwraps. We would 
> require a new UnwrappingKey subclass that exposed these attributes, a 
> way to set them when generating keys and a mapping of these attributes 
> to JWK. We need this functionality for the case where there are no 
> named origin-specific keys (the TOFU case).
>
> I don't feel this is especially elegant. It seems unnecessarily 
> complex when the solution requiring the format to support attributes 
> on the CEK is fine for the use-cases at hand.
>
> Another possibility, which is even less elegant but also less complex, 
> is that when unwrapping keys in a format without attributes, the 
> attributes of the unwrapping key are simply copied to the unwrapped 
> key (I did say this was even less elegant ...).

I think it's fundamentally a mistake to attempt to solve this problem generically at this time, which is part of why I've highlighted from the beginning the issues with wrapping and unwrapping.

I don't think it necessarily requires a new UnwrappingKey subclass, nor of the mapping to JWK. I suspect there's probably some interim steps in how you see this process working that I'm missing, because it does not seem self-evident.

I do not see requiring the format to support attributes on the CEK being acceptable for the API, even if it will meet Netflix's specific use case. We should specifically be avoiding both coupling the API to any particular format AND inventing our own formats, which such a solution requires.

>
>>
>>
>> I don't think it's absolutely necessary for non-extractable unwrapped 
>> keys to be supported in V1.
>
>
> I do. It was almost the whole point of the original proposal. Let's 
> see what the rest of the group thinks.
>
> ...Mark

Again, I'm proposing a solution that attempts to solve a middle-ground in the quest for a generic long-term solution.

It allows for unextractable to be set for keys generated through the API, and permits implementations using the key discovery API (which is, inherently, as "implementation specific" as APIs such as EME) to provide a different set of guarantees.

I think we need to be extremely careful about trying to shove too much into V1, and I also think we must remain very aware of the fact that this particular feature you're requesting is one that is not at all common in the crypto libraries existing user agents are using - which was part of the whole motivation from this groups formation.
Received on Monday, 17 June 2013 18:54:18 UTC

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