- From: Aymeric Vitte <vitteaymeric@gmail.com>
- Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2013 01:25:11 +0100
- To: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
- CC: "public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org" <public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <514CF667.1090706@gmail.com>
That's not the subject (see your anwsers to "exposing certificates"
thread and document.location.tls proposal). SSL/TLS, SOP, iframes
SSL/TLS+SOP strange behavior, I can write pages about it too.
AV>I am not changing the attack, what do you mean by "physical attack" ?
RS--> ?
AV> I am taking back a WebCrypto Use Case example ("But at some point in
time, a malicious user -- Jane Doe -- with access to the JavaScript
console of John Doe's browser does something of the sort:")
AV--> That's not a physical attack ?
AV> with a different attack, and by "she intercepts" I mean : she really
intercepts the connection even if it is SSL/TLS
RS>Intercepting SSL/TLS MUST be out of scope.
AV >or she uses a more simple means like silent protocol analyzer, or
other, a way that she can get John's messages
(ie inside John's computer)
RS--> ?
Regards,
Le 23/03/2013 00:57, Ryan Sleevi a écrit :
>
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 4:52 PM, Aymeric Vitte <vitteaymeric@gmail.com
> <mailto:vitteaymeric@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>
> Le 23/03/2013 00:15, Ryan Sleevi a écrit :
>> Aymeric,
>>
>> I'm sorry, your responses do not make any sense.
>
> Would be cool that you avoid this kind of "gratuit" statement.
>
>
>>
>> Your original attack stated "John leaves 5mn to see the postman"
>> and "jane inserts from his webconsole an iframe"
>>
>> I described to you why physical attacks are out of scope.
>>
>> You've now suggested twice you're not describing physical
>> attacks, even though you explicitly did. If you're going to keep
>> moving the goal posts and changing the attack, I'm afraid we
>> cannot have a productive discussion of the risk model.
>
> I am not changing the attack, what do you mean by "physical
> attack" ? I am taking back a WebCrypto Use Case example ("But at
> some point in time, a malicious user -- Jane Doe -- with access to
> the JavaScript console of John Doe's browser does something of the
> sort:") with a different attack, and by "she intercepts" I mean :
> she really intercepts the connection even if it is SSL/TLS, or she
> uses a more simple means like silent protocol analyzer, or other,
> a way that she can get John's messages.
>
>
> Intercepting SSL/TLS MUST be out of scope.
>
>
>
>>
>> If a site is not using SSL/TLS, but instead rolling its own
>> crypto, then I'm sorry, but that cannot be dealt with in any
>> reasonable way, because it entirely breaks the same-origin-policy
>> that is essential to modern web security. While I'm sure novel,
>> clever, amusing, and any number of platitudes, the one that is
>> missing is "secure", and so we should not pretend it's a security
>> risk to do something knowingly insecure.
>
> Sorry, no (see node-Tor OP again inside the browser, no need of
> SSL/TLS). I don't see why you associate SSL/TLS to SOP (while you
> insisted in other emails that there is no SSL/TLS associated to an
> origin), but that's another discussion.
>
>
> Please point out those e-mails.
>
> A web origin is Scheme/Host/Port.
>
> Scheme is either HTTP or HTTPS. An origin accessed over HTTP is *not*
> the same as an origin accessed via HTTPS - because they are different
> schemes.
>
> No user agent can distinguish between "HTTP that is totally insecure"
> and "HTTP that is running using your custom protocol that you promise
> is secure".
>
> Attempting to deliver, use, or design a cryptographic protocol over
> HTTP is fundamentally and inherently flawed - it goes back to the
> secure script distribution problem that we are NOT trying to solve.
>
> While there's certainly the possibility of delivering scripts
> *entirely* out of band (eg: via models such as extensions or web
> apps), it MUST NOT be conflated with pseudo-secure delivery of script
> over HTTP.
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 4:12 PM, Aymeric Vitte
>> <vitteaymeric@gmail.com <mailto:vitteaymeric@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>> I thought that by "physical access" you meant that Jane can
>> access John's computer.
>>
>> But probably you mean that she intercepts John's connection.
>> She does not need to do so, she could get John's messages
>> from his computer (wireshark or other if no SSL/TLS for the
>> site).
>>
>> Again, unlikely but possible, because if the site relies on
>> its own secure system, it might not use SSL/TLS.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Le 22/03/2013 23:45, Ryan Sleevi a écrit :
>>> I'm not sure what you mean - Jane's "use of web console" is
>>> a physical access attack.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 3:42 PM, Aymeric Vitte
>>> <vitteaymeric@gmail.com <mailto:vitteaymeric@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>> That's a different version of Jane's attack (from web
>>> console, then physical access) against John described in
>>> WebCrypto Use Cases.
>>>
>>> More difficult and more unlikely, but maybe not if we go
>>> outside of John/Jane's simple context.
>>>
>>> Then maybe it should be referenced somewhere.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Le 22/03/2013 19:48, Ryan Sleevi a écrit :
>>>> Physical access attacks MUST remain out of scope of
>>>> this work.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Mar 22, 2013 at 11:12 AM, Aymeric Vitte
>>>> <vitteaymeric@gmail.com
>>>> <mailto:vitteaymeric@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Tricky, difficult or completely unlikely but maybe
>>>> possible : Use Case, John and Jane, Jane does not
>>>> leave John but wants to spy him, sometimes she uses
>>>> his computer then knows how to access it, while
>>>> John is visiting the social site he leaves 5mn to
>>>> see the postman, she inserts from his web console
>>>> an iframe in the page (jane.com <http://jane.com>)
>>>> and sends a postMessage with John's keys to the
>>>> iframe which "stores" (ie references the underlying
>>>> data) the keys in jane.com <http://jane.com>'s
>>>> indexedDB. She intercepts John's connexion and
>>>> decrypt messages with John's computer when he is
>>>> out reinjecting messages using jane.com
>>>> <http://jane.com>.
>>>>
>>>> Usually this will not work because outside origin
>>>> iframes can not access indexedDB, but indexedDB
>>>> spec just says : User agents MAY restrict access...
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> jCore
>>>> Email : avitte@jcore.fr <mailto:avitte@jcore.fr>
>>>> iAnonym : http://www.ianonym.com
>>>> node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
>>>> GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms
>>>> Web : www.jcore.fr <http://www.jcore.fr>
>>>> Webble : www.webble.it <http://www.webble.it>
>>>> Extract Widget Mobile : www.extractwidget.com
>>>> <http://www.extractwidget.com>
>>>> BlimpMe! : www.blimpme.com <http://www.blimpme.com>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> jCore
>>> Email :avitte@jcore.fr <mailto:avitte@jcore.fr>
>>> iAnonym :http://www.ianonym.com
>>> node-Tor :https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
>>> GitHub :https://www.github.com/Ayms
>>> Web :www.jcore.fr <http://www.jcore.fr>
>>> Webble :www.webble.it <http://www.webble.it>
>>> Extract Widget Mobile :www.extractwidget.com <http://www.extractwidget.com>
>>> BlimpMe! :www.blimpme.com <http://www.blimpme.com>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> --
>> jCore
>> Email :avitte@jcore.fr <mailto:avitte@jcore.fr>
>> iAnonym :http://www.ianonym.com
>> node-Tor :https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
>> GitHub :https://www.github.com/Ayms
>> Web :www.jcore.fr <http://www.jcore.fr>
>> Webble :www.webble.it <http://www.webble.it>
>> Extract Widget Mobile :www.extractwidget.com <http://www.extractwidget.com>
>> BlimpMe! :www.blimpme.com <http://www.blimpme.com>
>>
>>
>
> --
> jCore
> Email :avitte@jcore.fr <mailto:avitte@jcore.fr>
> iAnonym :http://www.ianonym.com
> node-Tor :https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
> GitHub :https://www.github.com/Ayms
> Web :www.jcore.fr <http://www.jcore.fr>
> Webble :www.webble.it <http://www.webble.it>
> Extract Widget Mobile :www.extractwidget.com <http://www.extractwidget.com>
> BlimpMe! :www.blimpme.com <http://www.blimpme.com>
>
>
--
jCore
Email : avitte@jcore.fr
iAnonym : http://www.ianonym.com
node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms
Web : www.jcore.fr
Webble : www.webble.it
Extract Widget Mobile : www.extractwidget.com
BlimpMe! : www.blimpme.com
Received on Saturday, 23 March 2013 00:22:34 UTC