Re: please review table of contents for web certificate API Specification

On 2013-04-01 12:16, Aymeric Vitte wrote:
> Mountie,
> 
> Maybe you forgot to copy the list... I will look at the document

Actually Mountie wanted to perform a _limited_review_ by people he felt
could be useful.  I think that was good idea.  Now it is "unlimited"...

> 
> Anders,
> 
> Yes things are already available if you want to create your own 
> certificate stuff, but what's the problem with having an API designing 
> this instead of everybody making his own ?

If you look closely on my reply to Mountie, I noted that he is also targeting
the system/platform/browser keystore.  This is (AFAICT...), _way_ outside of the
Web Crypto agenda and that's more significant than if storing certificates in
IndexDB is quirky compared to a high-level Web Crypto method doing something similar.

Anders

> 
> And the server can be inside the browser too, example : [1] Interception 
> Detector, for those that might find this dubious that's not a 1st of 
> April joke :-) , I don't know the efficiency in reality but for sure it 
> will detect if there is someone in the middle, the browser does create 
> certificates and establish TLS connections with himself via a server on 
> top of Websockets, see [2] and email me separately if you want to try 
> it, funny to see what browsers do again, for example Chrome if you use 
> abcd.google.com thinking that you are trying to do bad things to google 
> and not allowing it.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> [1] http://www.ianonym.com/intercept.html
> [2] http://www.ianonym.com/check-min.html
> 
> Le 01/04/2013 08:43, Anders Rundgren a écrit :
>> On 2013-04-01 02:14, Mountie Lee wrote:
>>> Hi.
>>> before going futher,
>>> I need comment for table of contents for Web Certificate API Specification
>> Hi Mountie, although I'm qualified as a reviewer it seems that people don't
>> like my ideas on certificate enrollment because I was _thrown_out_ (!) from the
>> IETF PKIX list when I criticized http://tools.ietf.org/wg/pkix/draft-ietf-pkix-est
>>
>> The core motive for EST was keeping the ASN.1 constructs engineers know, not making
>> client-side PKI a better solution.  For me keeping PKCS #10 is a non-goal. In addition
>> Apple's _shipping_solution_ (XML bootstrap + SCEP) for iOS is _much_better_ than EST.
>>
>> _Your_ stated motivation is keeping the existing RA/CA interface.  IMO, that's
>> fine but it won't make client certificates more useful because these interfaces where
>> _not_ designed for direct provisioning to "ordinary" end-users using web-browsers.
>>
>> If you don't mind here are some high-level comments on the draft:
>>
>> - Revocation.  Is an RA function and doesn't make sense in a client
>>    (you rather call the bank and say that you lost the card)
>>
>> - Targeting existing TLS solutions _and_ the Web Crypto API. This is
>>    where I get completely lost :-(
>>
>>    The Web Crypto API already have key generation and key storage; adding
>>    a returned certificate wouldn't require any additional API you would
>>    rather use IndexDB storage.
>>
>>    Targeting the existing TLS solution means using the "platform keystore".
>>    Since I have already spent 5000 hours and 5 years on this topic I think
>>    we are talking about something which is _extremely_hard_ from every possible
>>    point-of-view (political, technical, commercial, privacy, security etc).
>>    There are also a bunch pf "patent trolls" waiting for a chance to sue
>>    Google or Microsoft if they start using methods which _I_ claim are
>>    _necessary_ such as "Secure Messaging".  Ryan knows that for sure:
>>
>> http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto-comments/2013Mar/0074.html
>>
>>    My take on this is developing a scheme with _Chinese_makers_ because they
>>    are not bound by US patents.   Their internal market + Asia + Africa +
>>    South America pretty much offsets the "old world" (Europe) and the
>>    "new world" (USA) which probably won't get a working certificate
>>    solution this decade unless IPR-holders give up their rights.  That
>>    Mozilla still don't dare providing ECC support sort of says it all.
>>
>> Returning to the core again: I don't see that you actually _can_ target
>> Web Crypto key storage _and_ platform/PKCS #11 storage without running
>> into very severe GUI, privacy and security issues.
>> The Web Crypto WG have shown no interest in discussing this topic.
>>
>> Best
>> Anders
>>
>>> the contents are extracted by WG charter and email comments.
>>>
>>> please comment any missing parts or different what you think.
>>>
>>> this mail is unofficial
>>>
>>> regards
>>>
>>> Web Certificate API Specification
>>> http://mountielee.github.com/webcertapi/webcertapi.html
>>>
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Mountie Lee
>>>
>>> PayGate
>>> CTO, CISSP
>>> Tel : +82 2 2140 2700
>>> E-Mail : mountie@paygate.net <mailto:mountie@paygate.net>
>>>
>>> =======================================
>>> PayGate Inc.
>>> THE STANDARD FOR ONLINE PAYMENT
>>> for Korea, Japan, China, and the World
>>>
>>>
>>>
> 

Received on Monday, 1 April 2013 12:06:44 UTC