PKCS#1v1.5

I am curious as to why the proposed API includes PKCS#1v1.5 as a padding mode for RSA.  It has been known since 1998 (due to Bleichenbacher (http://www.springerlink.com/content/j5758n240017h867/) and improved later (http://www.iacr.org/archive/eurocrypt2000/1807/18070374-new.pdf)) to be vulnerable to padding oracle attacks.  For some time it was questionable whether these attacks were useful in real world situations but this year at CRYPTO there was a paper where another improved version of the attack was used to break cryptographic tokens which relied on PKCS#1v1.5 (http://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/70/47/90/PDF/RR-7944.pdf).  Considering this is a new API not burdened with the shackles of backward compatibility, why not simply go with OAEP which is provably secure?

~Travis Mayberry