W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > May 2017

Re: Cookies under Suborigins

From: Jochen Eisinger <eisinger@google.com>
Date: Tue, 09 May 2017 09:34:07 +0000
Message-ID: <CALjhuie1+jQaHjctDzLhO9-nxurbEpm1=f8iYYPMUjsHMj4hQQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Aleksandr Dobkin <dobkin@google.com>, public-webappsec@w3.org
Cc: Devdatta Akhawe <dev.akhawe@gmail.com>, Mike West <mkwst@google.com>
On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 5:39 AM Aleksandr Dobkin <dobkin@google.com> wrote:

> Documents are cookie-averse by default in suborigined content
> (document.cookie returns the empty string and setting document.cookie does
> nothing). Much of our content makes use of Google Analytics and the current
> behavior of the analytics script is to silently stop working when cookies
> are not working. For us at Google, to achieve broad adoption of Suborigins
> in legacy content, it's sufficient to set the 'unsafe-cookies' flag. This
> is because, with a few possible exceptions, we do not directly store CSRF
> tokens in cookies and the values of JS-accessible cookies are not very
> sensitive.
>
> However, for many sites that store CSRF tokens in cookies, the
> 'unsafe-cookie' will indeed be unsafe. I would for us to consider
> alternative designs that would make it easier to adopt Suborigins out of
> the box, while still being safe for everyone.
>
> Google Analytics (and I suspect similar products) use cookies to store IDs
> for user and session tracking. Analytics, for example, uses the '_ga'
> cookie. Nevertheless, to keep existing script working without modification,
> it is necessary to permit suborigined content to read and write certain
> cookies.
>
> I suspect the reason for using cookies is mainly historical, and
> sessionStorage could be used in most cases. However, cookies are
> occasionally used is for tracking across subdomains of a TLD and across
> HTTP and HTTPS versions of a site, and here, sessionStorage is not a good
> replacement.
>
> I briefly looked at the CSRF protection implementation used by Dropbox.
> Dropbox stores the CSRF token in a cookie called '__Host-js_csrf' (which is
> httponly) as well as a cookie called 't' (which is normally available via
> document.cookie). If the suborigned content gets access to the 't' cookie,
> it would be able to attack other, non-suborigined, content on the domain.
>
> Dropbox will need to change its CSRF mechanism when adapting applications
> for suborigins, though, and I don't think there is a good way to avoid
> doing so. It's not safe to reuse the same token among multiple suborigins,
> so per-suborigin tokens would have to be used. This simplest way to do this
> would probably be to compute tokens as hmac(value=suborigin,
> key=site_wide_csrf) and embedding them in HTML.
>
> Considering the three requirements above (compat with legacy tracking
> scripts, cross-domain tracking, and compat with CSRF cookies), we can come
> up with different designs and see how well they meet the requirements. I've
> summarized my findings in the following table. The coumn headings list
> requirements and various design ideas are listed in the row headings.
>
>
>
>                          | compat w/ legacy | cross-domain | safe w/ legacy
>                          | tracking scripts | tracking     | CSRF cookies
>
> =========================+==================+==============+================
> No cookies               | No               | No           | Yes
> (current implementation) |                  |              |
>
> -------------------------+------------------+--------------+----------------
> No cookies restrictions  | Yes              | Yes          | No
> -------------------------+------------------+--------------+---------------
> Prefixed access only     | No               | No           | No
>
> -------------------------+------------------+--------------+----------------
> Transparent prefixes     | Partial*         | No           | Yes
>
> -------------------------+------------------+--------------+----------------
> Local cookies            | Partial**        | No           | Yes
>
> -------------------------+------------------+--------------+----------------
> Everything but __Host-   | Yes              | Yes          | mostly No
>
> -------------------------+------------------+--------------+----------------
> Cookie whitelist         | Yes***           | Yes***       | Yes
>
> -------------------------+------------------+--------------+----------------
> Cookie blacklist         | Yes              | Yes          | Yes****
>
> * Yes, but results in cookie inflation and breaks cross-domain tracking.
> ** Yes, but breaks cross-domain tracking.
> *** Yes, but requires configuration.
> **** Yes,  but requires and configuration and is dangerous.
>
> Explanation of designs:
>
> No cookies: Document is cookie-averse. Assigning to document.cookie is a
> no-op. cookie.document is always blank.
>
> No cookie restrictions: Document gets access to document.cookie as though
> it was not suborigined.
>
> Prefixed access only: Document can only get and set cookies whose names
> begin with a per-suborigin prefix. Setting document.cookie only works if
> the cookie names begins with __Sub_{name}-. document.cookie only exposes
> cookies that begin with the same prefix.
>
> Transparent prefixes: Same as above except that prefix are automatically
> added when assigning to document.cookie. Reading from document.cookie
> returns unprefxed cookies.
>
> Local cookies: document.cookie string is stored in a hidden LocalStorage
> field. So assigning to document.cookie works but these cookies are not
> included in the Cookie header
>
> Everything but __Host-: Access to cookies is allowed except for __Host-
> prefixed cookies.
>
> Cookie whitelist: Cookie access is allowed to cookies whose names are
> whitelisted in the Suborigins header. Setting document.cookie is only
> allowed if the cookie name is on the whitelist. document.cookie only
> exposes cookies whose names are on the whitelist.
>
> Cookie blacklist: Same as above, but with a blacklist.
>
> What does everyone think of these solutions? Are we open to potentially
> adopting any of them?
>
> From the list above, 'local cookies' and 'cookie whitelist' designs meet
> most of the requirements. Personally, I think the 'local cookies' solution
> would be a useful to have and could be safely enabled by default. The
> 'cookie whitelist' feature might be useful as well, but is more dangerous
> and also requires a whitelist be specified.
>

It looks like the "local cookies' could also be implemented as a small
polyfill, right?

"Regular cookies" and "no cookies" are easy to spec, while the new models
you describe would require defining a new thing, so I'd lean towards
punting this to after the v1 has launched, wdyt?



>
> -Alex
>
Received on Tuesday, 9 May 2017 09:34:53 UTC

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