W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > December 2014

Re: Proposal: Marking HTTP As Non-Secure

From: Michael Martinez <michael.martinez@xenite.org>
Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:55:51 -0500
Message-ID: <54935B77.9000204@xenite.org>
To: public-webappsec@w3.org, security-dev@chromium.org, mozilla-dev-security@lists.mozilla.org, blink-dev@chromium.org
On 12/18/2014 5:29 PM, Chris Palmer wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 2:22 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>>   A) i don't think we should remove "This website does not supply
>>> identity information" -- but maybe replace it with "The identity of this
>>> site is unconfirmed" or "The true identity of this site is unknown"
>> None of them are correct when an interception proxy is involved. All
>> of them lead to a false sense of security.
>>
>> Given the degree to which standard bodies accommodate (promote?)
>> interception, UA's should probably steer clear of making any
>> statements like that if accuracy is a goal.
> Are you talking about if an intercepting proxy is intercepting HTTP
> traffic, or HTTPS traffic?
>
> A MITM needs a certificate issued for the proxied hostname, that is
> signed by an issuer the client trusts. Some attackers can achieve
> that, but it's not trivial.

No it doesn't need a certificate.  A MITM can be executed through a 
compromised or rogue router.  It's simple enough to set up a public 
network in  well-known wifi hotspots and attract unwitting users. Then 
the HTTPS doesn't protect anyone's transmission from anything as the 
router forms the other end of the secure connection and initiates its 
own secure connection with the user's intended destination (either the 
site they are trying to get to or whatever site the bad guys want them 
to visit).

Google, Apple, and other large tech companies learned the hard way this 
year that their use of HTTPS failed to protect users from MITM attacks.



-- 
Michael Martinez
http://www.michael-martinez.com/

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Received on Thursday, 18 December 2014 22:56:20 UTC

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