W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-webappsec@w3.org > December 2014

Re: Proposal: Marking HTTP As Non-Secure

From: Christian Heutger <christian@heutger.net>
Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 21:41:35 +0000
To: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
CC: "edulix@agoravoting.com" <edulix@agoravoting.com>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, "blink-dev@chromium.org" <blink-dev@chromium.org>, "security-dev@chromium.org" <security-dev@chromium.org>, "dev-security@lists.mozilla.org" <dev-security@lists.mozilla.org>
Message-ID: <D0B3BEFC.8F135%christian@heutger.net>
> Reducing the number of parties you have to trust from [ the site operator, the operators of all networks between you and the site operator ] to just [ the site operator ] is a huge win.

But how can I trust him and who is he? No WHOIS records no imprint, all spoofable, so in what should I trust then? If there is a third-party, who state me, the details given are correct and they have a warranty for misinformation, thatís something I could trust. I also look at online-shopping if there are customer reviews, but I do not recognize them as fully trustable as they may be spoofed, if the shop has a seal like Trusted Shops with a money-back guarantee, I feel good and shop there.

> I think you'll find EV is not as "extended" as you might be hoping.

I know, but itís the best we currently have. And DV is much worser, finally loosing any trust in HTTPS with it, scaling it down to encryption, nothing else.

> But more importantly, the only way to get minimal server auth, data integrity, and data confidentiality on a mass scale is with something at least as easy to deploy as DV. Indeed, you'll see many of the other messages in this thread are from people concerned that DV isnít
> easy enough yet! So requiring EV is a non-starter.

I agree on data confidentiality, maybe also on integrity although DV without effort or costs may break that also in any way, but server auth is somehow saying nothing as any server endpoint I called I get, nothing more is authenticated. However, I support the idea of having mass encryption, but before confusing and damaging end users mind on internet security, there need to be a clear differentiation in just encryption and encryption with valid authentication.

> HTTPS is the bare minimum requirement for secure web application *transport*. Is secure transport by itself sufficient to achieve total *application-semantic* security? No. But a browser couldn't determine that level of security anyway. Our goal is for the browser to tell
> as much of the truth as it can programatically determine at run-time.

But wasnít that the idea of certificates? Seals on websites can be spoofed, WHOIS records can be spoofed, imprints can be spoofed, but spoofing EV certificates, e.g. in combination with solutions like pinning, is a hard job.. Considering there would be no browser warning for self-signed certificates, I do not see any advantage in mass developed (finally requiring a full automated process) DV certificates. Itís a bit back to the roots to times, I remember, some website operators offered their self-signed root to be installed in the browser to remove the browser warning.
Received on Monday, 15 December 2014 08:56:42 UTC

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