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comments on Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) of 3-Apr-2012

From: =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com>
Date: Tue, 01 May 2012 17:20:26 -0700
Message-ID: <4FA07DCA.3070308@KingsMountain.com>
To: W3C WebAppSec WG <public-webappsec@w3.org>
[ this message resolves:

   ACTION-51: Review CORS new sec cons language and provide editorial fixes
   http://www.w3.org/2011/webappsec/track/actions/51
]

[ these comments are on <http://www.w3.org/TR/2012/WD-cors-20120403/> ]


Although the CORS spec appears to be technically solid and is implemented in 
essentially all major browsers (congrats :) -- and obviously is the result of 
much hard work -- it could use a thorough editorial cleanup. This reader found 
it difficult to understand without having first been introduced to a fair 
amount of web security folklore as well as web browser internals 
colloquialisms. Given that the CORS spec is referenced by other specs, it would 
seem worthwhile to smooth its rough edges for posterity.


[ Note: this review is incomplete, except nominally for the review of the 
security considerations section, on which I concentrated. I'm sending this in 
its present state because the bigger points are covered and we're at the end of 
the Last Call period. There's more to comment on if given more time.

Also, the below includes review comments by Brad which I'm including raw rather 
than smoothly incorporating due to deadline pressure here.

by the way, this is really long and gnarly. ]




bigger overall items:
---------------------

The Security Considerations section is situated ahead of the meat of the spec, 
which makes it difficult to comprehend unless one skips ahead.

The spec's exposition of its functionality would be greatly enhanced by at 
least one diagram, e.g. a "ladder" or "swimlane" protocol flow diagram.

The spec abstract contains a specific technical example. It should have a more 
general overall description of the spec's problem space and approach, instead.


Should perhaps (boldly) define a new term for the notion of "an instance of an 
application from a foreign origin, executing in the user agent"
  suggestion: web application client instance

The examples are set off with the double vertical bar glyph along the left-hand 
edge -- however, they are not otherwise denoted explicitly as examples. The 
first time I read the spec, I hadn't before seen that example-denoting style 
and so was trying to read the para beginning with "If a resource author has a 
simple text resource..." as a logical continuation of the preceding paragraph 
and got pretty confused. I suggest the examples have at least a single line at 
the top (also set off using the double vertical bar glyph on the left) saying 
at least "For example: ".  E.g...

   ||  For example:
   ||
   ||  If a resource author has a simple text resource....
   ||



The spec should define, or reference a definition of..

  Ambient authority

  (perhaps others, tbd)



overall detailed comments/questions:
------------------------------------

The spec uses the terms "server" and "resource" almost but not quite 
interchangeably. There should be an exposition of what the terms mean and what 
the differences are between them, if these different terms must be used.  Could 
one of them, eg resource, be used consistently for both? Or is "server" needed 
in some particular places?  Also, the term "resource" is undefined in this spec.

(perhaps more, tbd)


editorial items
---------------

Section 5 Syntax -- perhaps should be divided up into two separate numbered 
subsections, one for response headers, the other for request headers. Also 
should have more whitespace in there in general, found it tough to visually parse.




Section 4 Security Considerations
---------------------------------

overall, this Sec Cons section is long and complicated. I'd divide it up into 3 
numbered subsections, which will make referring to the otherwise ambiguously 
numbered clauses less ambiguous.



To establish a point of reference, I'll denote this beginning parag as "1st parag":

   "Security requirements and considerations are listed throughout this
   specification. This section lists advice that did not fit anywhere else."

[ plus I'm not counting the numbered items as bare paragraphs ]


2nd & 3d paragraphs:

   The link entitled "simple cross-origin request" leads to the "simple 
cross-origin request algorithm" which doesn't actually define what denotes a 
request as being a "simple cross-origin request". See below for further details 
on this particular issue. Also 2nd & 3d parags should be their own numbered 
subsection.

Otherwise, here's a suggested re-write for 2nd parag combined with the 3d 
parag, rather than trying to comment/dissect in detail..

   "Conformant resources must always be prepared to receive simple
   cross-origin requests with user credentials because such requests are
   commonplace. For example, such requests can be generated by user agents
   processing cross-origin form element submissions or when fetching the
   source of script elements, whether or not the user agent conforms to this
   specification. Also, because of this, resources for which simple requests
   are not idempotent must protect themselves from Cross-Site Request Forgery
   (CSRF) by requiring the inclusion of an unguessable token in the explicitly
   provided content of the request. [CSRF]"

[ perhaps ought to add a terminology definition for "conformant resources" ]


[[ Brad's comment on above comment:

[Hill, Brad] There is a distinction between the properties of being "safe" and 
being "idempotent" that is critical here.  A GET request that deletes your 
account is idempotent, but it is not safe.  Rather than try to over-explain 
this, I chose to go with "significance other than retrieval".  That may be 
confusing, but to simply say idempotent is wrong.

I also don't think we need to restrict this advice to conformant resources.  In 
fact, every resource that has significance other than retrieval must protect 
itself from CSRF, whether it expects CORS requests or not.  That is a 
deliberate implication of the current wording - that this is an EXISTING 
problem in the Web architecture, not one created by CORS - though perhaps I was 
too subtle in that.

]]


4th parag:

   [note: suggest that 4th parag plus it's 3 following items be moved above
    present 2nd & 3d parag, and should become a separate numbered subsection ]

suggested rewrite:

   "This specification defines a mechanism by which a resource of one origin
   may explicitly authorize user agents to provide the resource's
   representation, as returned in an HTTP response, to requesters of other
   explicitly identified origins. However, ertain types of resources should
   not attempt to specify particular authorized origins, but instead either
   deny or allow all origins. For example: "


Item 2 (after 4th parag), states:

   "A resource that is publicly accessible, with no access control checks,
   can always safely return an Access-Control-Allow-Origin header whose
   value is "*". "

What is meant by "with no access control checks" is not clear. I suspect that 
what is meant here is: a resource that is intentionally publicly accessible and 
which uniformly processes all incoming requests without discrimination. Thus it 
can reasonably be made available to any cross-origin request. This can be 
signaled by returning a Access-Control-Allow-Origin header with a value of "*" 
to all requests. Yes?

If so, then Item 2 could be re-written to more clearly say this. Also, whether 
doing so is "safe" or not is somewhat out of scope for a specification such as 
this. "Reasonable" is perhaps a better term. For example:

   "A publicly accessible resource which is intended to uniformly process
   all incoming requests can possibly reasonably be made available to any
   cross-origin request. This implies that such a resource could always
   return an Access-Control-Allow-Origin header whose value is "*"."


[[ Brad's comment on above comment:

[Hill, Brad] I'd go stronger and say:

"A publicly accessible resource which is intended to uniformly process all 
incoming requests SHOULD always return an Access-Control-Allow-Origin header 
whose value is "*"."

This is because: say content from origin A wants to include content from origin 
B.  If the resource responds uniformly to all requests, the server at A could 
always act as a proxy for the user-agent.  Rather than force this undesirable 
pattern, uniform public content SHOULD be accessible cross-origin at the user 
agent.

]]


Item 3, beginning with "A GET response whose entity body happens to parse as 
ECMAScript":

I take it that the phrase "provided there are no sensitive comments" is meant 
to mean that an ECMAscript resource representation could ostensibly contain 
sensitive data of some form, most likely in code comments. And also "as it can 
be accessed cross-origin using an HTML script element" seems to be a way of 
saying that the browser's default Same Origin Policy does not apply to the 
stipulated source of an explicit HTML <script src="..."> tag.

This seems to me as being essentially be a particular case of item 2, and is 
arguably subsumed by item 2, although it may be useful as an example.

The ending sentence, "If needed, such resources can implement access control 
and CSRF protections as described above." could ostensibly also apply to item 
2, yes?

[[ Brad's comment on above comment:

[Hill, Brad] No, this is different than item 2.  Item 2 specifically refers to 
content that is public and with no authorization checks (and therefore proxiable).

Item 3 refers to the fact that user agents do not apply the Same Origin Policy 
to the script portions (e.g. not comments) of content interpretable as 
ECMAScript when included via a <script src=> tag.  That does not at all imply 
that the content is uniform - it might be a JSON response that contains private 
data or has side-effects authorized with the user's ambient authority.  It 
means that applying access-control headers to this content SHOULD NOT be done 
(lest it be thought effective) because such content is already accessible, 
cross-origin, through means outside CORS.

]]



5th parag:

Beginning "Care must always be taken by applications when making cross-origin 
requests...".  --  I would add at the end of this parag a sentence of "In 
particular: "

There's some confusion introduced here by this parag and item 1 when they refer 
to treating the Origin header as a credential, because up in the terminology 
section, the Origin header is explicitly called out as not being user 
credentials. Perhaps the bare term "credentials" needs to be also defined?


Item 1:

   "when relying on the Origin header as a credential" -- the "as a
   credential" phrase conflicts with the definition for "user credentials",
   and begs the question of the Origin header being a member of a
   broader class of "credentials", but this notion isn't explicated
   in the spec. Maybe this can be addressed by not trying to term the
   Origin header a credential, reather indicating that the server/resource
   is relying on it.

   "authorizing a request" (on the part of a server) is not defined. It
   appears to mean the situation where a server observes incoming HTTP
   requests and decides whether to fulfill/honor the requests based upon
   information (eg header fields) in the requests themselves and/or metadata
   about the requester and/or overall context of the requests.

suggested rewrite:

   When requests have significance other than retrieval, and when relying on 
the Origin header, servers must be careful to distinguish between accepting and 
processing a request, and authorizing (via the mechanism defined in this 
specification) the requester to have access to the returned resource 
representation.

[[ Brad's comment on above comment:

[Hill, Brad]

Both cookies and the Origin header are "credentials" or, more precisely, they 
may be treated as security capabilities by certain receivers.

I wanted to distinguish for server-side application authors between the two 
types of credentials:

1. Cookies, that describe who the user is, from the view of the site that set 
them. (given SOP, the same server receiving them or a related administrative 
domain)

2. Origin Header(s) which describe the browser's view of the origin of the 
application which caused the original request to be made, plus possibly other 
origins traversed in the course of HTTP redirects.

The general best practice is that whether to "accept and process" (e.g. return 
200 or 400) should be based only on (1), and that (2) informs a client-side 
user agent decision.  Really (2) is ideally only returned to the server to 
allow it to return a more efficient and privacy-preserving authorization 
header, say by including only that specific origin instead of a list of 
hundreds or thousands possible authorized origins.

As much as I would like to say that one MUST NOT use (2) in making 
authorization decisions as to whether or not to accept and service a request, I 
have to expect that application authors will do so.  In the best case, only to 
save the cost of producing and delivering an expensive response that will just 
be discarded, but perhaps to only authorize certain origins to produce certain 
responses or side-effects.

So I'm trying to walk a tightrope between recommending against something and 
providing realistic details for people who ignore that advice.  :P   I'm not 
surprised it came out a mess.

]]



Item 1.1:

   "Authorization for a request" seems to be imply the decision the server
   makes regarding whether to fulfill the request or respond with an
   error -- this should be clarified.

   "authority of the user" is undefined -- should "ambient authority" be used 
here? Or "user credentials" ?  Are they sometimes different things?

suggested rewrite:

   Servers should authorize requests using only the intersection of the user's 
credentials, any other user ambient authority, and the requesting origin(s). In 
the case of redirects, the Origin header may present multiple origins, and all 
must be authorized.


Item 1.2:

   Is there an appropriate reference to cite for "forwarding attacks"?

   "..the user agent sends the Origin header corp.example." -- is confusing.
   should be: "..the user agent sends a request with an Origin header having
   a value of 'corp.example'."

   "If corp.invalid or the network is malicious, it may cause the request to
   be delivered to corp.example,.."  Not clear how 'corp.invalid' could itself
   cause a request to be delivered to corp.example. Also is worth a footnote
   explaining how the network might be malicious (eg DNS has been poisoned).
   And an appropriate reference would be good too.

   Why is it a problem for corp.example to receive a request it's client
   instance intended for corp.invalid? This harks back to the question about
   "forwarding attacks".

[[ Brad's comment on above comment:

[Hill, Brad] First to explain: evil.com and good.com, to make it simpler.

good.com is a IP 1.2.3.4.  good.com has a na´ve anti-CSRF approach that trusts 
any request it receives with an Origin header with the value 'good.com'.

good.com makes a CORS request to evil.com.  evil.com changes its own DNS 
records to say it's IP is 1.2.3.4.  As a result, the request actually gets 
delivered back to good.com, with an Origin header of value 'good.com'.  If 
good.com honors this, without checking to see that the Host header said 
'evil.com', it may be vulnerable to something like CSRF.

Perhaps "forwarding attack" is not a good term for this, but I believe it falls 
within the definition as used in e.g. crypto protocol analysis: cause a message 
intended for one recipient to be delivered to another, who attempts to process it.

]]

   WRT: "Even better would be to exclusively use secure connections for
   cross-origin requests to enable user agents to detect such
   misdirections."   Yes, but such advice applies equally to all connections
   made by the user agent, plus being able to effectively do so is
   outside of the control of the web app in question -- e.g., the target
   resources may not be available over secure connections.

[[ Brad's comment on above comment:

[Hill, Brad] Yes, this is just a little banging of the HTTPS everywhere drum. 
Perhaps can be removed, but it is a valid countermeasure for such attacks, if 
you are trying to defend on the server. (e.g. matching the Host header doesn't 
have to happen in server-side application logic if it is done by client-side 
TLS connection logic)

]]



Item 1.3:

   begs question of oauth relation to cors

   I found this confusing: "It is often appropriate for servers to require
   an authorization ceremony asking a user to consent that cross-origin
   requests with credentials be honored from a given origin."

   Possible rewording: " < had rewording in mind but inadvertantly deleted it. 
would need to re-think & re-create > " -- i do think the above sentence can be 
made more clear.


Item 2.1 - 3d parag:

   "As a substitute for JSONP-style cross-origin credentialed requests, use
   of this specification significantly improves the security posture of the
   requesting application, as it provides cross-origin data access whereas
   JSONP operates via cross-origin code-injection. The requesting application
   has to validate that data received from origins that are not completely
   trusted conforms to expected formats and authorized values."

It is not clear whether the last sentence applies to the JSONP case, or to when 
a CORS-based approach is used.

[[ Brad's comment on above comment:

[Hill, Brad] Applies to both - very hard to do in the case of CORS, because the 
remote server gets to run code!

]]



Item 2.2:

   First sentence: "For resources that are safe and idempotent per HTTP,
   and where the credentials are used only to provide user-specific
   customization for otherwise publicly accessible information."

"safe and idempotent per HTTP" apparently refers to S9.1 of RFC2616, which is 
about methods rather than resources.

Suggested rewrite:

   "Safe and idempotent" HTTP methods are employed for retrieval only, and also 
if the supplied user credentials are used only to provide user-specific 
customization for otherwise publicly accessible information.


   2nd sentence: "In this case, restricting access to certain origins may
   protect user privacy by preventing customizations from being used to
   identify a user, except at authorized origins."

Suggested rewrite:

   In this case, only allowing certain origins to obtain user-specific data, 
such as customizations, may help in protecting user privacy.



Item 3:

[ not sure I want to touch this item because of the history of how this sec 
considerations section came about. there are a few relatively minor fixes that 
could possibly be made, but I'm not sure these parags need full-on rewriting ]

The term "implicit credentials" isn't defined.

[[ Brad's comment on above comment:

[Hill, Brad] "implicit credentials" == "ambient authority"   good substitution 
to make

]]



6th parag:

   "Authors of client-side Web applications are strongly encouraged to
   validate content retrieved from a cross-origin resource as it might
   be harmful."

Is there some reference(s) to point readers at?  Also, should not Web app 
client instances always be careful with data returned over the network because 
any/all of it could be harmful, eg if not using verified secure connections 
could be subject to DNS poisoning attacks for example.

[[ Brad's comment on above comment:

[Hill, Brad] Yes, this is another consequence of UMP - CORS disagreements. 
Pro-CORS folks said "developers on the Web understand and expect this to always 
be true"  Pro-UMP folks didn't think so.  This has some relevance in that even 
cross-origin data retrieved over HTTPS should be validated to prevent 
cross-origin DOM-based code injection attacks.  The attack patterns here are 
complex and unfortunately, you are right, the advice amounts to "untrusted data 
is untrusted".   :(

]]



7th parag:

   "Authors of client-side Web applications using a URL of the type
   people.example.org/~author-name/ are to be aware that only cross-origin
   security is provided and that therefore using a distinct origin rather
   than distinct path is vital for secure client-side Web applications."

This is confusing. Perhaps, if I understand correctly, this rewrite..

   Web applications that are not uniquely identified by specific host names, 
and/or mapped to specific ports, do not necessarily have a unique origin, and 
thus will not be able to securely utilize the mechanism defined in this 
specification. This is because an origin is composed of only the triple of 
scheme, hostname, and port.

   For example, a web application whose URL is of the type 
example.org/app-name/ and the app-name portion is necessary to distinguish the 
web application from other web applications also running at example.org, will 
be unable to securely employ the mechanism defined in this specification.

   Mapping web applications to distinct origins is vital for secure web 
applications.





"simple cross-origin request"
-----------------------------

The term "simple cross-origin request" conspicuously lacks a simple, all in one 
place, prose definition. Instead, the reader must click, and then the "simple 
cross-origin request" algorithm is displayed, but this algorithm doesn't itself 
say anything about what constitutes a "simple cross-origin request", rather one 
needs to click on "make a request steps", and another algorithm is displayed, 
however, the first sentence does open with "Whenever the make a request steps 
are applied, fetch the request URL from origin source origin...". Thus the 
reader can plausibly determine that a "simple cross-origin request" comprises 
fetching a URL, however there's nothing in any of these 3 levels of ostensible 
definition that indicate what makes the request "simple", or "cross-origin".

In subsequent casting about, the reader may notice that in the terminology 
section there's a definition for "simple method", and also that so that plus 
context elsewhere in spec seems to define "simple request" as one whose method 
is either GET, HEAD, or POST.

Also, "simple cross-origin request" is effectively defined by step 2 in section 
"7.1 Cross-Origin Request", because that step defines what actually constitutes 
a "simple cross-origin request" (i.e. the request method is a simple method).

Perhaps the definition for "simple cross-origin request" should simply be moved 
to be step 2 in section "7.1 Cross-Origin Request".


[[ Brad's comment on above comment, and on comments above in general:

[Hill, Brad] Perhaps "simple cross-origin request" is the wrong term.  What is 
described is hardly simple in the context of the overall model.  What it really 
is, is a "legacy cross-origin request" - what I said in the sec cons with:

  "A simple cross-origin request has been defined as congruent with those which 
may be generated by currently deployed user agents that do not conform to this 
specification."

It is not defined according to a particular logic other than, "these are the 
types of requests that may originate from user agents that do not implement 
CORS, and CORS does not attempt to provide any access control properties for 
these requests that differ from what non-CORS aware servers and clients have 
always done".

That definitely should be made more clear, and would have a salubrious effect 
across the specification, I expect.  Unfortunately, the behavior of "legacy" 
user agents in this regard is not clearly defined, except piecemeal in HTTP, 
and absent of security considerations.

Overall, very good food for thought.  Some good clarifications, some that I 
think miss the mark, but expose important muddiness in the spec and language.

]]

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Received on Wednesday, 2 May 2012 00:20:56 GMT

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