Re: Trying to summarise (was Re: DAP and security)

On Nov 19, 2009, at 7:58 AM, Adam Barth wrote:

> On Thu, Nov 19, 2009 at 3:24 AM, Robin Berjon <robin@berjon.com>  
> wrote:
>> Finally, we can all talk about policy and trust in browsers until  
>> we're bluer in the face than a hypothermic smurf the fact of the  
>> matter is that I don't believe that this is a case where discussion  
>> can produce consensus. There are use cases for policy, and  
>> solutions for those will be developed at the very least for the  
>> widgets landscape. If it so happens that they yield interesting  
>> innovative stuff that could be useful in browsers, then it'll be  
>> easy to point to it as proof and demo. Far easier than to argue  
>> about it, and it'll happen faster if we create the technology  
>> rather than talk about it :)
>
> I don't believe you can design secure APIs by first implementing the
> APIs and then worrying about security later.  That's the road that
> leads to systems like User Account Control (UAC).  Instead, you need
> to understand the security requirements up-front and design your APIs
> to match.
>
> If you ignore input from browser vendors who've been working with
> these issues for years, it's unlikely you'd design something they'll
> find palatable.

This is pretty much how I feel about the security design aspects of  
many of the proposed DAP specifications. If you look at the specs  
listed in the Input section here: <http://www.w3.org/2009/dap/>, they  
mostly have missing or unhelpful Security Considerations sections. The  
BONDI security document listed there doesn't seem to provide anything  
for security other than a policy mechanism, with no hint of what might  
be a safe default policy for the Web.

Apple will consider joining the DAP Working Group, but the security  
direction so far is on reason we are hesitant.

Regards,
Maciej

Received on Thursday, 19 November 2009 17:36:01 UTC