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RE: DAP and security (was: Rename "File API" to "FileReader API"?)

From: Marcin Hanclik <Marcin.Hanclik@access-company.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2009 10:15:33 +0100
To: Maciej Stachowiak <mjs@apple.com>, Frederick Hirsch <frederick.hirsch@nokia.com>
CC: ext Jonas Sicking <jonas@sicking.cc>, David Rogers <david.rogers@omtp.org>, Dominique Hazael-Massieux <dom@w3.org>, Robin Berjon <robin@berjon.com>, "public-device-apis@w3.org" <public-device-apis@w3.org>, public-webapps WG <public-webapps@w3.org>
Message-ID: <FAA1D89C5BAF1142A74AF116630A9F2C28942D757E@OBEEX01.obe.access-company.com>
Hi Maciej,

I think we should separate the policy definition from its application.
We could have a single policy abstraction for browsers/OS vendors and all others.
At the risk of oversimplification we could summarize that such abstraction is just a list of applicable security concerns.
In some environments some third parties could be responsible for policy application (corporate, walled garden etc) within a configurable runtime/OS/etc and in the others the policy could be hard-coded and not modifiable (e.g. in a freely downloaded browser the browser vendor applies the policy once and forever).
Still we could have the same security concerns.

Thanks,
Marcin

Marcin Hanclik
ACCESS Systems Germany GmbH
Tel: +49-208-8290-6452  |  Fax: +49-208-8290-6465
Mobile: +49-163-8290-646
E-Mail: marcin.hanclik@access-company.com

-----Original Message-----
From: Maciej Stachowiak [mailto:mjs@apple.com]
Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2009 2:20 AM
To: Frederick Hirsch
Cc: ext Jonas Sicking; David Rogers; Marcin Hanclik; Dominique Hazael-Massieux; Robin Berjon; public-device-apis@w3.org; public-webapps WG
Subject: Re: DAP and security (was: Rename "File API" to "FileReader API"?)


On Nov 18, 2009, at 5:13 PM, Frederick Hirsch wrote:

> This is a good point, and an argument for "policy" rather than
> implicit user consent, if I'm not mistaken. It highlights that
> usability might also be an issue with the non-modal interaction
> model,  as well as not always be very meaningful (since I the user
> might have no idea what most directories are for or where to
> navigate). Arbitrary directory navigation for writing files is not a
> good idea.

"policy" is not a solution to the scenario Jonas posted either. Who is
going to define a home PC or Mac user's browser policy? The user
doesn't have the expertise to do it. There's no sysadmin to do it for
them. And browser/OS vendors should not be in the game of whitelisting
a specific set of sites for extra access.

Regards,
Maciej

>
> More importantly we have to be careful with analogies.
>
>
> regards, Frederick
>
> Frederick Hirsch
> Nokia
>
>
>
> On Nov 18, 2009, at 3:14 PM, ext Jonas Sicking wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 5:27 AM, David Rogers
>> <david.rogers@omtp.org> wrote:
>>> Hi Maciej,
>>>
>>>> From my side I'd like to understand what your thoughts and
>>>> proposals for file writing security / policy would entail - would
>>>> you defer the decision responsibility to the user via a prompt?
>>
>>> From my point of view the answer is unfortunately "there are no
>>> simple
>> answers, it's always a judgement call".
>>
>> For example for the geolocation the security model is basically:
>>
>> 1. Page asks for user position
>> 2. User is faced with a non-modal dialog where he/she can answer yes
>> or no, or simply ignore the dialog
>> 3. Only if the user answers "yes" then the position is returned to
>> the page.
>>
>> In this case I think this was an acceptable solution.
>>
>> If we added a directory API which gave access to a requested path on
>> the users hard drive we could use a similar security model:
>>
>> 1. Page asks user for permission to read/write to a specific
>> directory, say "C:\"
>> 2. User is faced with a non-modal dialog where he/she can answer yes
>> or no, or simply ignore the dialog
>> 3. Only if the user answeres "yes" a reference to the directory is
>> returned which the page can read from/write to.
>>
>> This would *not* be an acceptable solution to me, despite being
>> basically identical to the geolocation case.
>>
>> The reason is two-fold. I think it's easier to explain to the user
>> what the user is authorizing ("your location"), and if a user doesn't
>> understand and still clicks "yes", it has less catastrophic results.
>>
>> For the directory API though, it's much harder to explain the
>> decision
>> to the user. What's the "C:\" directory? What's the difference
>> between
>> that and "C:\Documents and Settings\Jonas Sicking\My Images"?
>> What's a
>> directory? Also, if a user clicks "yes" without understanding the
>> risks, that has catastrophic results if the directory in question is
>> "C:\" and read/write access is granted.
>>
>> When it comes to security dialogs, the basic rule to keep in mind is
>> "Lots of people are not going to understand it and just click
>> whatever
>> button they think will get stuff to work, or a random button".
>>
>> / Jonas
>>
>


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Received on Thursday, 19 November 2009 09:16:20 GMT

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