- From: Tyler Close <tyler.close@gmail.com>
- Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 15:05:56 -0700
- To: Adam Barth <w3c@adambarth.com>
- Cc: public-webapps <public-webapps@w3.org>
On Tue, Jun 9, 2009 at 2:52 PM, Adam Barth<w3c@adambarth.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jun 9, 2009 at 2:20 PM, Tyler Close<tyler.close@gmail.com> wrote: >> I had thought CORS, by it's use of Origin, was meant to be a safe >> replacement for JSON-P. > > Can you explain again how the attack works for Origin-header-for-CORS? > Keep in mind that the response is delivered to the original > requester, who should be accurately identified by the Origin header > (even through redirects). But the side-effects of the request still happen. The attacker can cause mutation of server-side state belonging to the victim user. I believe the scenario in the first email works as described in CORS. I don't see anything in the CORS redirect steps that changes the Origin processing from what is described in your I-D. http://www.w3.org/TR/access-control/#redirect-steps These documents really need to state that they are only addressing messaging between mutually trusting sites. --Tyler -- "Waterken News: Capability security on the Web" http://waterken.sourceforge.net/recent.html
Received on Tuesday, 9 June 2009 22:06:34 UTC