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Re: [Widgets] URI Scheme revisited.... again

From: Marcos Caceres <marcosscaceres@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2008 15:31:30 +0100
Message-ID: <b21a10670810130731k7383c28bm7cc66f6c977724d9@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Mark Baker" <distobj@acm.org>
Cc: public-webapps <public-webapps@w3.org>

On Mon, Oct 13, 2008 at 5:08 AM, Mark Baker <distobj@acm.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 10, 2008 at 4:00 PM, Marcos Caceres
> <marcosscaceres@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Ok, In one of my previous emails I said that this was a potential
>> privacy/security issue:
>>
>> "The reason we don't
>> want to allow vendors to mint their own is that there are potential
>> security and privacy issues related to URI schemes such as file:. For
>> instance, because Dashboard uses "file:" it is very easy for me to
>> work out what the username and home directory of a user on MacOsX by
>> simply picking up any DOM node that contains a dereferenced URI (eg.
>> by examining an img's src, I get something like
>> "file:///Users/marcos/Library/widget/Default.png")."
>>
>> I'm no security/privacy expert, but this seems like an easy way to at
>> least get someone's username (from which I may be able to  derive who
>> they are, etc).  Also, if the implementation is crap and does not
>> restrict file:// to the scope of the widget package (thankfully Apple
>> does), then widgets could basically read any files on the hard drive.
>
> Sure, but standardizing on a URI scheme won't fix this, because one
> can guess URIs in any scheme.  Less opaque schemes like hierarchical
> ones are a little more susceptible of course, but it's a problem for
> all schemes.

In the case of widgets, it's not a problem at all for the structure of
the package to be guessed (as anyone can just decompress the widget
locally anyway and take a look at it's directory structure; that is
not the issue). What we don't want is a situation where the underlying
operating system is also exposed.

That is why we proposed the new scheme. I don't see how a scheme like
"widget://myWidget.wgt/path/to/file" exposes anything about the
underlying file system (apart from the name of the widget package)?
Instead, file: exposes way too much IMO (i.e.
"file:///Users/marcos/Library/..."! my username is exposed in the
path, which  everyone can acknowledge is pretty a bad thing, no?).

> I suspect implementors are familiar with this issue already, but if
> you like, you could point out that implementations should ensure that
> widgets can't access local resources that the implementation doesn't
> want them to access.

We will of course point out that implementations should ensure that
widgets can't access local resources. That is explicitly part of the
requirement for the URI scheme.

Kind regards,
-- 
Marcos Caceres
http://datadriven.com.au
Received on Monday, 13 October 2008 14:32:13 GMT

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