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Re: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion - Gemalto contribution

From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2015 22:06:15 +0100
Message-ID: <CADEL5zuQsHZ0xqe9+T=SC429=7+FqOOW0E8hhK8XLxB2nQ8YAA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Siva Narendra <siva@tyfone.com>
Cc: Lu HongQian Karen <karen.lu@gemalto.com>, GALINDO Virginie <Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com>, public-web-security@w3.org, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>, public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org, Brad Hill <hillbrad@fb.com>, POTONNIEE Olivier <Olivier.Potonniee@gemalto.com>, PHoyer@hidglobal.com
Hi Siva,
Apple Pay is an application.

There's no application in Gemalto's presentation since they (apparently)
believe that the merchant by definition is trusted for directly accessing
the card.

This is a downright horrible assumption and would never pass EMVCo
certification either.

Regards
Anders

On Feb 2, 2015 9:29 PM, "Siva Narendra" <siva@tyfone.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Anders. While traditional EMV on GP Smart Card does not easily allow
for it, that is exactly what EMV Tokenization enables. Apple Pay implements
EMV Tokenization on a GP Smart Card chip. Google Wallet can leverage EMV
Tokenization independent of Apple for the same credit card number. And so
can other independent GP hardware. Similar to Tokenization for EMV, atleast
in the US even the government standards for CAC/PIV recently released what
is called as Derived Credential. This space is rapidly evolving and we
shouldn't get tied up with one approach such as FIDO assuming rest of the
world will adopt it.
>
> Best,
> Siva
>
>
>
> --
> Siva G. Narendra Ph.D.
> CEO - Tyfone, Inc.
> Portland | Bangalore | Taipei
> www.tyfone.com
> Voice: +1.661.412.2233
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 12:18 PM, Anders Rundgren <
anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 2015-02-02 19:54, Siva Narendra wrote:
>>
>> Hi Siva,
>> Disregarding the privacy and authentication issues for a moment, I still
don't understand how you could perform EMV-like payments using the posted
proposals unless you bind the EMV-token to a single domain and used some
kind of IFRAME+postMessage() arrangement which is [sort of] FIDO anyway.
>>
>> Gemalto needs to do this exercise and show it to the world (which they
BTW to date have had more than three years to carry out):
>> https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-identity/2011Nov/0030.html
>>
>> I'm dead-sure Apple won't build on the ideas presented in this list,
they will rather "call" their Apple Pay wallet application from the web
which is a MUCH better idea than (which already has been said), trying to
shoehorn in legacy stuff that never was designed for the [UNTRUSTED] web:
>>
https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webcrypto-comments/2015Jan/0000.html
>>
>> Anders
>>>
>>> Brad,
>>>
>>> Great points.
>>>
>>> I believe your analysis about control exerted by carriers and device
makers on global platform (GP) hardware is absolutely true, but that is not
the complete story.
>>>
>>> Several independent GP hardware containers such as SD Cards, USB
tokens, NFC tokens, BTLE tokens support GP security through smart card
secure elements and that is not controlled by the carriers or device
makers. These solutions are becoming more common.
>>>
>>> I beleive, unless I'm mistaken, FIDO leverages such GP secure elements
in its devices. This was possible only because several companies already
built such standards (GP) based secure elements and devices, for use with
the web, even though web did not standardize its interfacing to such
hardware.
>>>
>>> These devices allow any application developer to take advantage of
hardware security, just like FIDO based application developers can.
>>>
>>> What some of us are asking for is to make sure that when web supports
hardware security, that it be generic to support further innovation and not
be limited to FIDO.
>>>
>>> I assume you do not object to this. Or is your view that all roads
shall lead only to FIDO?
>>>
>>> Siva
>>>
>>> On Feb 2, 2015 8:10 AM, "Brad Hill" <hillbrad@fb.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> It's not so much that I don't think a solution might be found.  It's
that I think the proposed solution in front of us is absolutely terrible
for users, innovators, and the future of the Web.
>>>>
>>>> The proposal on the table suggests that privacy and key scoping for
WebCrypto would be managed by the GlobalPlatform/TEE model.  This is the
model in which only specially signed code installed on your device, in a
way that is by-design exclusive and limited, could talk to end-user crypto
devices, even general-purpose ones.
>>>>
>>>> This puts your network carrier and device manufacturer are in an (even
more) privileged position to decide which applications users can access on
the Web.  Nothing you want to do involving a cryptographically strong
authentication, payment, identity, etc. could happen without a prior
business arrangement between that entity and the entities in control of
your device.
>>>>
>>>> I don't have to work hard to imagine a world in which this becomes a
powerful weapon against consumer choice and disruptive innovation because
it is already here.  Look at the mobile  payments space where a similar
model gateways installation of apps and access to handset hardware crypto.
Handset makers pay have exclusive deals only with some banks, or only with
one bank.  They retaliate against payment providers that dare to launch
features on rival platforms.  Merchants deny users the choice of payment
providers through compatible APIs because they want to launch their own
system.  Disruptive innovators like bitcoin wallets are denied access to
the platform entirely.
>>>>
>>>> The online economy soldiers on, in no small part because there is
always the Web to fall back to.  That the Web has been so powerful in
creating value for people and the global economy is in no small way
attributable to its being an open platform for innovation that has mostly
managed to avoid this kind of Balkanization.
>>>>
>>>> If the mechanism of access to W3C-standard APIs for accessing strong
cryptographic services is premised on side-channel arrangements between
powerful organizations instead of user choice, it will be a disaster for
users and for the Web.  To paraphrase an apocryphal quote by Admiral
Yamomoto, there will be rent-seeking behind every blade of grass, as my
access to banking, health care, payments, shopping, secure communications,
and more are determined not by my free choice in a competitive market (or
which URL I choose to browse to), but by which player in each industry is
willing to pay the most to my mobile network provider and/or handset
manufacturer for exclusive access to their customers.
>>>>
>>>> This is unacceptable.  And positing regulation to enforce open access
is not an acceptable answer - the technologies of the Open Web Platform
should encourage competition and innovation by default, not only with
permission and legislation.
>>>>
>>>> -Brad Hill
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> From: POTONNIEE Olivier <Olivier.Potonniee@gemalto.com>
>>>> Date: Monday, February 2, 2015 at 1:22 AM
>>>> To: Bradley Hill <hillbrad@fb.com>, "PHoyer@hidglobal.com" <
PHoyer@hidglobal.com>
>>>> Cc: Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>, Lu HongQian Karen <
karen.lu@gemalto.com>, "public-web-security@w3.org" <
public-web-security@w3.org>, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <
public-webcrypto@w3.org>, GALINDO Virginie <Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com>,
Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>
>>>> Subject: RE: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion - Gemalto
contribution
>>>>
>>>>> Brad,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The same-origin policy does not necessarily make sense for all
resources used on the web, in particular those that are not web-originated,
such as the tokens we’re talking about here. Just consider WebRTC, and the
access it gives to the (uniquely identifying) user voice: does this means
that WebRTC should be banned from the web? On a different aspect, is your
geolocation protected by SOP?
>>>>>
>>>>> For such non web-originated resources, a specific security model
applies.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is exactly what we want to set up with a proper access control
mechanism for the hardware tokens. Without assuming a priori that “hardware
will need to be adapted”, but not necessarily excluding it (although we’re
actually talking about software changes here…).
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>> Olivier
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: Brad Hill [mailto:hillbrad@fb.com]
>>>>> Sent: dimanche 1 février 2015 22:26
>>>>> To: PHoyer@hidglobal.com
>>>>> Cc: Harry Halpin; Lu HongQian Karen; public-web-security@w3.org;
public-webcrypto@w3.org; GALINDO Virginie; Wendy Seltzer
>>>>> Subject: Re: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion - Gemalto
contribution
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree entirely with (b), but I think we need to start with the Web
security model as our first principle to build on, and hardware will need
to be adapted to and find ways to operate within that model.  That is what,
e.g. FIDO has done.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This proposal is about starting with the first principle that legacy
hardware devices that were never designed for the web environment must be
supported, and finding ways to shoehorn them into browser APIs, with the
best excuse being that the "damage is already done" by things like
ActiveX.  We've spent a long time walking back the mistakes of ActiveX, I'd
not like to backtrack.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Basically I think this is a priority of constituencies issue.  It is
more important that we consider the priorities of the user in having a web
that isn't authenticating and cross-linking them in a cryptographically
strong manner without their consent, and that whatever devices they do
purchase or have provisioned to them are able to be used in an open, safe
and privacy-respecting manner.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I understand the concerns of application and service providers who
want to leverage their existing investment in billions of legacy devices
already in the hands of the user, but I just don't think those concerns
outweigh doing what is best for users and taking security on the web
forward instead of backwards.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In particular, I think if the best we can do for "privacy" for these
devices is to say that it is managed on your behalf through back-room
arrangements between your bank, government, handset provider and network
carrier, acting in their interests first and without your consent, (I.e.
GlobalPlatform / TEE solution in which your hardware token can only talk to
signed applications "approved" by someone else) that isn't good enough, and
goes against the entire open innovation model that's made the web a success.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> -Brad
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: "PHoyer@hidglobal.com" <PHoyer@hidglobal.com>
>>>>> Date: Friday, January 30, 2015 at 10:28 AM
>>>>> To: Bradley Hill <hillbrad@fb.com>
>>>>> Cc: Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>, Lu HongQian Karen <
karen.lu@gemalto.com>, "public-web-security@w3.org" <
public-web-security@w3.org>, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <
public-webcrypto@w3.org>, GALINDO Virginie <Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com>,
Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion - Gemalto
contribution
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brad,
>>>>>> one point that I made at the workshop is that currently centrally
issued eIDs are being used on the web and with web applications.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So it is not that we are talking about introducing something new
that breaks privacy or security we are already in a world where this
happens.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The people in W3C and in the W3 are uniquely positioned as willing
experts in the field to find a solution that is
>>>>>>
>>>>>> a) homogenous in the approach and does not mean inexperienced web
developers have to wrestle with java / activX plugins potentially putting
other web apps accessed by the same browser at risk due to security lapses
in the plugins
>>>>>> b) can actually improve the situation and potentially find a way to
increase privacy and security of the existing solution especially as we
have mindshare of the browser development community
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I completely share your view that we need to tackle this issue but
is a WG not exactly the right place to do this?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Philip
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brad Hill ---29/01/2015 22:52:23---I would like to see details of
how this kind of API would or could interact with the Same-Origin mod
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: Brad Hill <hillbrad@fb.com>
>>>>>> To: Lu HongQian Karen <karen.lu@gemalto.com>, GALINDO Virginie <
Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com>, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <
public-webcrypto@w3.org>
>>>>>> Cc: "public-web-security@w3.org" <public-web-security@w3.org>, Wendy
Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>
>>>>>> Date: 29/01/2015 22:52
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion - Gemalto
contribution
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ________________________________
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I would like to see details of how this kind of API would or could
interact with the Same-Origin model of web security, specifically:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. Privacy and tracking.  How does the presence of specific crypto
elements and discoverable keys which are not Origin-scoped not create
privacy violations?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2. Origin security.  How are risks around identification of or
impersonation of the server-side of a transaction, and potential abuse of a
globally-scope key mitigated by  this kind of API design?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Without a clear discussion of how this API fits into the existing
Web security and threat model, I think it is inappropriate to proceed.  We
can't just throw away the fundamental security model that billions of users
and deployed applications depend on, and I see no evidence (at least in
these few slides) that such issues have been considered by this proposal.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brad Hill
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: Lu HongQian Karen <karen.lu@gemalto.com>
>>>>>> Date: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 at 10:01 AM
>>>>>> To: GALINDO Virginie <Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com>, "
public-webcrypto@w3.org" <public-webcrypto@w3.org>
>>>>>> Cc: "public-web-security@w3.org" <public-web-security@w3.org>, Wendy
Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>
>>>>>> Subject: RE: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion - Gemalto
contribution
>>>>>> Resent-From: <public-web-security@w3.org>
>>>>>> Resent-Date: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 at 10:04 AM
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Please review Gemalto’s contribution. We welcome your comments.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>> Karen
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: GALINDO Virginie [mailto:Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com]
>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2015 3:48 AM
>>>>>> To: public-webcrypto@w3.org
>>>>>> Cc: public-web-security@w3.org; Wendy Seltzer; Harry Halpin
>>>>>> Subject: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dear all,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Web Crypto WG charter [1] will end by the end of March. We need to
prepare the next charter of Web Crypto.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As a reminder, the conversation has started on this page :
https://www.w3.org/Security/wiki/IG/webcryptonext_draft_charter
>>>>>> Feel free to add you ideas and suggestions on the wiki and/or expose
your opinion and question on the public-webcrypto@w3.org or
public-webcrypto-comment@w3.org (for non W3C Web Crypto WG members).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>> Virginie
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [1] http://www.w3.org/2011/11/webcryptography-charter.html
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
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liable for the message if altered, changed or falsified. If you are not the
intended recipient of this message, please delete it and notify the sender.
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caused by a transmitted virus.
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addressees and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized use
or disclosure, either whole or partial, is prohibited.
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liable for the message if altered, changed or falsified. If you are not the
intended recipient of this message, please delete it and notify the sender.
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Received on Monday, 2 February 2015 21:06:52 UTC

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