W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-web-security@w3.org > February 2015

RE: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion - Gemalto contribution

From: ANDREAE Philip <P.Andreae@oberthur.com>
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2015 10:01:01 -0500
Message-ID: <2692736C9F91784D90AAE3EBE1D57DF30103414B@uschserv14.chantilly.oberthurcs.com>
To: "POTONNIEE Olivier" <Olivier.Potonniee@gemalto.com>, "Ryan Sleevi" <sleevi@google.com>
Cc: "Wendy Seltzer" <wseltzer@w3.org>, <public-webcrypto@w3.org>, "GALINDO Virginie" <Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com>, "Lu HongQian Karen" <karen.lu@gemalto.com>, "Harry Halpin" <hhalpin@w3.org>, <PHoyer@hidglobal.com>, <public-web-security@w3.org>, "Brad Hill" <hillbrad@fb.com>
I have been following these emails with interest, most confuse me and I simply assume you all will arrive at a meaningful solution.

 

In this last email one paragraph causes me to want to participate in the dialogue.

 

What we are willing to define in W3C is a hardware backed-up crypto service protected with an access control matching the sensitive nature of secure hardware tokens.

 

Please excuse my lack of technical skill What I would hope is that the following is what will be achieved.

 

We create a mechanism to open a channel (tunnel) to a Hardware device / Token e.g. ISO 7816 Smart Card reader, through say PKSC #11 from a browser.  It should be the responsibility of the 7816 component connected to that device to protect its own content.  If any web site is willing to find an application on a card inserted in that reader and use it to generate a dynamic cryptogram and by using the Trust the Issuer and payment scheme has established with that card “authenticate” the identity of the Cardholder, then why not.  

 

Am I missing something?!!!!

Philip Andreae
Tel: +1 (404) 680 9640  

 

From: POTONNIEE Olivier [mailto:Olivier.Potonniee@gemalto.com] 
Sent: Monday, February 02, 2015 8:29 AM
To: Ryan Sleevi
Cc: Wendy Seltzer; public-webcrypto@w3.org; GALINDO Virginie; Lu HongQian Karen; Harry Halpin; PHoyer@hidglobal.com; public-web-security@w3.org; Brad Hill
Subject: RE: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion - Gemalto contribution

 

Ryan,

 

What I’m saying is: WebRTC and geolocation API give access to personal information (your voice, or your position). Any origin may request access to these services, and the access control to these services is not based on *same-origin policy* but on permissions. Your same voice, and potentially your same position, may be shared with multiple origins. Both can be used to track you.

Of course the access control mechanism to a service has to be adapted to the level of privacy/risk associated to the disclosed information.  And I’m not saying the existing one is not adapted to WebRTC and geolocation API.

What we are willing to define in W3C is a hardware backed-up crypto service protected with an access control matching the sensitive nature of secure hardware tokens.

--

Olivier

 

From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi@google.com] 
Sent: lundi 2 février 2015 10:51
To: POTONNIEE Olivier
Cc: Wendy Seltzer; public-webcrypto@w3.org; GALINDO Virginie; Lu HongQian Karen; Harry Halpin; PHoyer@hidglobal.com; public-web-security@w3.org; Brad Hill
Subject: RE: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion - Gemalto contribution

 


On Feb 2, 2015 1:24 AM, "POTONNIEE Olivier" <Olivier.Potonniee@gemalto.com> wrote:
>
> Brad,
>
>  
>
> The same-origin policy does not necessarily make sense for all resources used on the web, 

Yes. It does.

> in particular those that are not web-originated, such as the tokens we’re talking about here. Just consider WebRTC, and the access it gives to the (uniquely identifying) user voice: does this means that WebRTC should be banned from the web?

Just to make sure the argument is explicit - are you making the claim that SOP is violated when a user is explicitly required to grant an origin access to their microphone, since a user's voice MAY be recognizable? And that a user's voice print, as recorded by computer microphones, is uniquely identifying?

I just want to make sure it is absolutely clear the argument being made.

> On a different aspect, is your geolocation protected by SOP?

Again, you need to elaborate on your argument, especially when making such an exciting claim that the SOP is not needed.

This can have many interpretations as to what you're asking or the argument you are implying, but one thing that is unquestionable is the restriction of location information per-origin. That is, granting good.example access to your origin does not transparently grant access to evil.example

>
> For such non web-originated resources, a specific security model applies.

And this is why it is so unacceptably security and privacy hostile to consider exposing these. When discussing bringing new and powerful capabilities to the web, it is essential to demonstrate how these capabilities can fit and work in the existing web security model, rather than necessarily argue that we ignore it.

>
> This is exactly what we want to set up with a proper access control mechanism for the hardware tokens. Without assuming a priori that “hardware will need to be adapted”, but not necessarily excluding it (although we’re actually talking about software changes here…).
>

In order to be thoughtfully and seriously considered, I think it is not at all unreasonable to suggest that proposals demonstrate how they fit in to the existing web security model. If a solution does not, then it doesn't really bear considering.

It is not an unwarranted assumption from ignorance that leads to the conclusion that changes are needed, but rather a deep understanding and familiarity with the technologies at play to know how fundamentally incompatible the existing solutions are to user's privacy and security if exposed via the Web.

To the extent it helps those arguing for the necessity of such technology understand the threat models at play, assume every piece of software using your device is either malware or infected with remote code execution, and imagine trying to design a system that still protects and preserves the privacy of users and the security guarantees of your system. In such a model, it should be painfully clear that the existing, legacy systems are full-stop unacceptable for the task at hand.

> --
>
> Olivier
>
>  
>
>  
>
> From: Brad Hill [mailto:hillbrad@fb.com] 
> Sent: dimanche 1 février 2015 22:26
> To: PHoyer@hidglobal.com
> Cc: Harry Halpin; Lu HongQian Karen; public-web-security@w3.org; public-webcrypto@w3.org; GALINDO Virginie; Wendy Seltzer
> Subject: Re: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion - Gemalto contribution
>
>  
>
> I agree entirely with (b), but I think we need to start with the Web security model as our first principle to build on, and hardware will need to be adapted to and find ways to operate within that model.  That is what, e.g. FIDO has done.
>
>  
>
> This proposal is about starting with the first principle that legacy hardware devices that were never designed for the web environment must be supported, and finding ways to shoehorn them into browser APIs, with the best excuse being that the "damage is already done" by things like ActiveX.  We've spent a long time walking back the mistakes of ActiveX, I'd not like to backtrack.
>
>  
>
> Basically I think this is a priority of constituencies issue.  It is more important that we consider the priorities of the user in having a web that isn't authenticating and cross-linking them in a cryptographically strong manner without their consent, and that whatever devices they do purchase or have provisioned to them are able to be used in an open, safe and privacy-respecting manner.  
>
>  
>
> I understand the concerns of application and service providers who want to leverage their existing investment in billions of legacy devices already in the hands of the user, but I just don't think those concerns outweigh doing what is best for users and taking security on the web forward instead of backwards.
>
>  
>
> In particular, I think if the best we can do for "privacy" for these devices is to say that it is managed on your behalf through back-room arrangements between your bank, government, handset provider and network carrier, acting in their interests first and without your consent, (I.e. GlobalPlatform / TEE solution in which your hardware token can only talk to signed applications "approved" by someone else) that isn't good enough, and goes against the entire open innovation model that's made the web a success.
>
>  
>
> -Brad
>
>  
>
> From: "PHoyer@hidglobal.com" <PHoyer@hidglobal.com>
> Date: Friday, January 30, 2015 at 10:28 AM
> To: Bradley Hill <hillbrad@fb.com>
> Cc: Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>, Lu HongQian Karen <karen.lu@gemalto.com>, "public-web-security@w3.org" <public-web-security@w3.org>, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <public-webcrypto@w3.org>, GALINDO Virginie <Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com>, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>
> Subject: Re: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion - Gemalto contribution
>
>  
>>
>> Brad,
>> one point that I made at the workshop is that currently centrally issued eIDs are being used on the web and with web applications.
>>
>> So it is not that we are talking about introducing something new that breaks privacy or security we are already in a world where this happens.
>>
>> The people in W3C and in the W3 are uniquely positioned as willing experts in the field to find a solution that is 
>>
>> a) homogenous in the approach and does not mean inexperienced web developers have to wrestle with java / activX plugins potentially putting other web apps accessed by the same browser at risk due to security lapses in the plugins
>> b) can actually improve the situation and potentially find a way to increase privacy and security of the existing solution especially as we have mindshare of the browser development community
>>
>> I completely share your view that we need to tackle this issue but is a WG not exactly the right place to do this? 
>>
>> Philip
>>
>>
>> Brad Hill ---29/01/2015 22:52:23---I would like to see details of how this kind of API would or could interact with the Same-Origin mod
>>
>> From: Brad Hill <hillbrad@fb.com>
>> To: Lu HongQian Karen <karen.lu@gemalto.com>, GALINDO Virginie <Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com>, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <public-webcrypto@w3.org>
>>
>> Cc: "public-web-security@w3.org" <public-web-security@w3.org>, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>
>> Date: 29/01/2015 22:52
>> Subject: Re: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion - Gemalto   contribution
>>
>> ________________________________
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I would like to see details of how this kind of API would or could interact with the Same-Origin model of web security, specifically:
>>
>> 1. Privacy and tracking.  How does the presence of specific crypto elements and discoverable keys which are not Origin-scoped not create privacy violations?
>>
>> 2. Origin security.  How are risks around identification of or impersonation of the server-side of a transaction, and potential abuse of a globally-scope key mitigated by  this kind of API design?
>>
>> Without a clear discussion of how this API fits into the existing Web security and threat model, I think it is inappropriate to proceed.  We can't just throw away the fundamental security model that billions of users and deployed applications depend on, and I see no evidence (at least in these few slides) that such issues have been considered by this proposal.
>>
>> Brad Hill
>>
>> From: Lu HongQian Karen <karen.lu@gemalto.com>
>> Date: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 at 10:01 AM
>> To: GALINDO Virginie <Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com>, "public-webcrypto@w3.org" <public-webcrypto@w3.org>
>> Cc: "public-web-security@w3.org" <public-web-security@w3.org>, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>
>> Subject: RE: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion - Gemalto contribution
>> Resent-From: <public-web-security@w3.org>
>> Resent-Date: Wednesday, January 28, 2015 at 10:04 AM
>>
>> Please review Gemalto’s contribution. We welcome your comments.
>>
>>  
>> Regards,
>> Karen
>>  
>> From: GALINDO Virginie [mailto:Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com] 
>> Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2015 3:48 AM
>> To: public-webcrypto@w3.org
>> Cc: public-web-security@w3.org; Wendy Seltzer; Harry Halpin
>> Subject: [W3C Web Crypto WG] Rechartering discussion
>>  
>> Dear all,
>>  
>> Web Crypto WG charter [1] will end by the end of March. We need to prepare the next charter of Web Crypto. 
>>  
>> As a reminder, the conversation has started on this page :   https://www.w3.org/Security/wiki/IG/webcryptonext_draft_charter

>> Feel free to add you ideas and suggestions on the wiki and/or expose your opinion and question on the public-webcrypto@w3.org or public-webcrypto-comment@w3.org (for non W3C Web Crypto WG members). 
>>  
>> Regards,
>> Virginie
>>  
>> [1] http://www.w3.org/2011/11/webcryptography-charter.html 
>>  
>>
>> ________________________________
>>
>> This message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressees and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized use or disclosure, either whole or partial, is prohibited.
>> E-mails are susceptible to alteration. Our company shall not be liable for the message if altered, changed or falsified. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please delete it and notify the sender.
>> Although all reasonable efforts have been made to keep this transmission free from viruses, the sender will not be liable for damages caused by a transmitted virus.
>>
>> ________________________________
>>
>> This message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressees and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized use or disclosure, either whole or partial, is prohibited.
>> E-mails are susceptible to alteration. Our company shall not be liable for the message if altered, changed or falsified. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please delete it and notify the sender.
>> Although all reasonable efforts have been made to keep this transmission free from viruses, the sender will not be liable for damages caused by a transmitted virus.
>>
>> ________________________________
>>
>> This message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressees and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized use or disclosure, either whole or partial, is prohibited.
>> E-mails are susceptible to alteration. Our company shall not be liable for the message if altered, changed or falsified. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please delete it and notify the sender.
>> Although all reasonable efforts have been made to keep this transmission free from viruses, the sender will not be liable for damages caused by a transmitted virus
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> HID Global GmbH
>> registered office: 65396 Walluf, Germany
>> municipal court: Wiesbaden, Germany
>> commercial register number: HRB 20928
>> Management board: Denis Hebert, Juergen Schnoebel, Marc Bielmann
>>
>> Confidentiality Note: 
>> This message is intended for use only by the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is privileged, confidential, and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible for delivering the message to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please contact the sender immediately and destroy the material in its entirety, whether electronic or hard copy. Thank you.
>
> ________________________________
> This message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressees and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized use or disclosure, either whole or partial, is prohibited.
> E-mails are susceptible to alteration. Our company shall not be liable for the message if altered, changed or falsified. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please delete it and notify the sender.
> Although all reasonable efforts have been made to keep this transmission free from viruses, the sender will not be liable for damages caused by a transmitted virus. 
> ________________________________
> This message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressees and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized use or disclosure, either whole or partial, is prohibited.
> E-mails are susceptible to alteration. Our company shall not be liable for the message if altered, changed or falsified. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please delete it and notify the sender.
> Although all reasonable efforts have been made to keep this transmission free from viruses, the sender will not be liable for damages caused by a transmitted virus

________________________________

This message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressees and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized use or disclosure, either whole or partial, is prohibited.
E-mails are susceptible to alteration. Our company shall not be liable for the message if altered, changed or falsified. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please delete it and notify the sender.
Although all reasonable efforts have been made to keep this transmission free from viruses, the sender will not be liable for damages caused by a transmitted virus. 

________________________________

This message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressees and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized use or disclosure, either whole or partial, is prohibited.
E-mails are susceptible to alteration. Our company shall not be liable for the message if altered, changed or falsified. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please delete it and notify the sender.
Although all reasonable efforts have been made to keep this transmission free from viruses, the sender will not be liable for damages caused by a transmitted virus

Received on Monday, 2 February 2015 15:30:03 UTC

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.1 : Monday, 2 February 2015 15:30:04 UTC