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Re: Signed Javascript

From: Paul Lambert <paul@marvell.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2013 14:49:12 -0800
To: Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>, "Hill, Brad" <bhill@paypal.com>, Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>
CC: "public-web-security@w3.org" <public-web-security@w3.org>
Message-ID: <CED61210.2A97F%paul@marvell.com>


On 12/17/13, 2:23 PM, "Harry Halpin" <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:

>On 12/17/2013 10:50 PM, Hill, Brad wrote:
>> We're appointing Editors on the new sub-resource integrity spec on
>>today's WebAppSec call, and I expect we'll have a strawman available
>>soon in the new year.
>>
>> For the moment we plan to simply provide a way to identify a remote
>>resource of any type by hash.  To deal with upgrade/fragility issues, a
>>mismatch will cause some policy-defined response which, in addition to
>>failure to load, might include a fallback to an alternate https resource
>>or simply generation of a CSP-style report. (presuming we can find an
>>acceptable position on cross-domain information leakage with such, such
>>as requiring a Access-Control-Allow-Origin header)
>>
>> We have deliberately avoided for now the idea of "signing" because the
>>questions of identity and authenticity are indeed so thorny.
X.509 PKI makes it thorny. Symmetric key Œfederationš makes it thorny.
There are simpler models that should be considered.

Specifically - using a hash of a public key as a primary identity creates
simpler models.  Complete interesting systems can be built.  TUF is in
this category of key centric systems.

>> My feeling is to take this one step at a time.  If we get traction with
>>hashes, we can think about signatures after.
>
>I agree with that take on it, but I'm putting forward signing as a
>problem in the long-term for Web Security.

Too bad. 

Paul


>> -Brad Hill
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Richard Barnes [mailto:rbarnes@bbn.com]
>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 17, 2013 1:39 PM
>>> To: Harry Halpin
>>> Cc: public-web-security@w3.org
>>> Subject: Re: Signed Javascript
>>>
>>>
>>> On Dec 17, 2013, at 4:31 PM, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 12/17/2013 10:28 PM, Richard Barnes wrote:
>>>>> On the one hand, this is a "turtles all the way down" problem.  If
>>>>>you're going
>>> to verify JS with WebCrypto, you need to have JS to do the
>>>verification, and how
>>> does that get verified.
>>>>> On the other hand, if you do have clean verification JS, it seems
>>>>>like you
>>> could do this with JWS / WebCrypto very simply.
>>>>> var jws = {
>>>>>      "unprotected": { "alg": "RS256", "jwk": { ... } },
>>>>>      "payload": "... base64-encoded JavaScript ...",
>>>>>      "signature": "..."
>>>>> };
>>>>>
>>>>> var valid = jose.verify(jws);
>>>>> /* Check that the key is one you trust */
>>>> It's exactly how we determine "what key is one we trust" in that
>>>>comment
>>> where we need work :)
>>>
>>> Really?  I thought that would just be something like "in a cert that
>>>chains to a
>>> trust anchor".
>>>
>>> In any case, if you load your scripts over HTTPS, there's no
>>>additional security
>>> here.  Either way, you're assured that you got the script from the guy
>>>on the
>>> other end of the connection.  What WebAppSec is doing (IIRC), is
>>>providing the
>>> web app loading the library a *countersignature*, which is directly
>>>opposed to
>>> the idea of upgradeability (since the countersignature won't validate
>>>on the
>>> upgraded library).
>>>
>>> --Richard
>>>
>>>
>>>>> eval(atob(jws.payload));
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Dec 17, 2013, at 4:17 PM, Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> I think some sort of signed Javascript solution could be very
>>>>>>useful.
>>> Currently, on the Web we have a pretty straightforward same origin
>>>policy that
>>> assumes complete trust in the server. yet with the proliferation of
>>>third-party JS
>>> apps and the possibility of server being compromised, how do you know
>>>if the
>>> server has served the right JS?
>>>>>> I think some approach involving signatures and repos of JS
>>>>>>libraries (similar
>>> to repos in *nix) would help, along with some sort of network
>>>perspectives or
>>> trust anchor in the browser to double-check and verify the JS served
>>>by the
>>> server.
>>>>>> I believe WebAppSec WG is working on something in this space. I'm
>>> personally a fan of the TUF/Thandy approach of Tor, and wonder if such
>>>an
>>> approach could be adopted to JS. Installing trusted code is a hard
>>>problem, and
>>> applies just as equally in JS as it does in any other language.
>>>Despite all the harm
>>> of XSS, the advantage of downloading the JS code (and forcing new code
>>>into
>>> the cache when necessary), JS does allow easy upgrade to avoid 0 days,
>>>but I'd
>>> like to see if we can increase the trust in JS even more.
>>>>>>    cheers,
>>>>>>     harry
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>
>
Received on Tuesday, 17 December 2013 22:49:45 UTC

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