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RE: DNSSEC indicator

From: <sthomas2@ups.com>
Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2007 08:19:32 -0400
Message-ID: <609F31D8D4D98347A83DCBDE52D3EB9C0172452E@gaalpsvr02b5.us.ups.com>
To: <public-usable-authentication@w3.org>

Dick is quite right. DNSSEC could indeed provide another tool in the
toolbox to make sure that the network is doing what the user really
wants. My issue, though, is elevating the DNSSEC status to a
human-visible indication. The more indicators that are displayed to a
user, the less likely the user is to pay attention to them. Research is
already showing that users are ignoring the indications that browsers
give them today. For that reason, browser designers need to be very
parsimonious in displaying security indications and focus on showing
information that is really important. Given the relative rarity of
attacks involving improper name resolutions, a DNSSEC indication would
not seem to have enough value to justify its use.

Stephen 

-----Original Message-----
From: Dick Hardt [mailto:dick@sxip.com] 
Sent: Thursday, 26 April 2007 8:10 AM
To: Thomas Stephen (SKD8YPG)
Cc: public-usable-authentication@w3.org
Subject: Re: DNSSEC indicator


There is unlikely to be a single silver bullet that solves *all* the  
issues. It is useful to know that the client really is connected to  
www.micros0ft.com if that is what the client wants to connect to.

DNSSEC is not going to solve social phishing attacks, but it does  
enable other technology such as CardSpace etc. to have increased  
certainty on what is going on.

-- Dick
Received on Thursday, 26 April 2007 12:20:11 GMT

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