Re: Remove profiling prohibition for frequency capping (ISSUE-236)

On Sep 11, 2014, at 9:45 , Mike O'Neill <michael.oneill@baycloud.com> wrote:

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> In vast majority of cases IP addresses need extra bits e.g. canvas fingerprinting to identify a particular device on a NAT router, and even then the external IP changes after a few days so is useless for commercial tracking.
> 
> That is why it is all cookie based and will be for the foreseeable. IPv6 might be different if everybody uses MAC based autoconf but hopefully that won't happen.
> 
> Tracking is done with cookies and it is relatively easy to detect persistent high-entropy ones. It does not matter what the cookie is called.
> 
> This is the weakness of the tunnel vision approach, which otherwise has the advantage of elegance. To solve that we are going to have to say something about UIDs.

I am sorry, DNT basically says “don’t remember information in your database that tracks me”.  Tunnel Vision has a different definition of what ‘tracks me’ is than others, but I don’t see any link to cookies.

Tunnel vision has two ‘issues’: if you are a privacy advocate, you might not like that it allows sites to remember the fact they have interacted with you;  if you are an industry advocate, you might not like the very clear line is draws (you identify the user with a context not your own, you’re in violation, very simple).  I guess the first is troubling you, but it’s nothing to do with cookies per se.

> 
> Mike
> 
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: David (Standards) Singer [mailto:singer@apple.com]
>> Sent: 11 September 2014 17:33
>> To: Mike O'Neill
>> Cc: Justin Brookman; Jeffrey Chester; public-tracking@w3.org
>> Subject: Re: Remove profiling prohibition for frequency capping (ISSUE-236)
>> 
>> 
>> On Sep 11, 2014, at 9:25 , Mike O'Neill <michael.oneill@baycloud.com> wrote:
>> 
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>>> You are not off base, but it shows up the transparency/machine visibility issue.
>> If a third-party uses a cookie (or gets a 1st party cookies placed and uses that) to
>> recognise the user in multiple transactions for in-context frequency counting
>> how can the UA/extension/regulator/user tell if tracking is going on? They
>> would have to rely on trust that "administrative procedures" or tunnel vision
>> glasses were being used.
>> 
>> Mike
>> 
>> the achilles’ heel of DNT is that we can often not tell from the outside if tracking
>> is going on or not. We’re making an ask about a database that, if all goes well,
>> we never get to see. Now, that “if all goes well” is why we make the ask,
>> because sometimes it goes very badly (cite notorious cases of repressive
>> governments, leaks, and so on).
>> 
>> If the site chooses to use fingerprint technology rather than cookies, e.g. uses
>> my IP address and OS and Browser info, and keys a whole database off that
>> about me, I am none the wiser.  Pushing back against cookies is, I think,
>> sometimes counter-productive: at least I can see cookies flowing, and if one is
>> set labelled ‘user-id’ my eyebrows might go up if DNT is on.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Mike
>>> 
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: David (Standards) Singer [mailto:singer@apple.com]
>>>> Sent: 11 September 2014 17:12
>>>> To: Justin Brookman
>>>> Cc: Jeffrey Chester; public-tracking@w3.org (public-tracking@w3.org)
>>>> Subject: Re: Remove profiling prohibition for frequency capping (ISSUE-236)
>>>> 
>>>> Unless I misunderstand the definition of tracking, we might not need a
>> permitted
>>>> use at all. It just works.
>>>> 
>>>> If an ad site remembers what ads IT has served to ME only, it’s not tracking
>> me
>>>> across contexts.  This is something I pointed out when I first floated ‘tunnel
>>>> vision’ — that neither first nor third parties need special language to handle
>> their
>>>> interactions directly with me.
>>>> 
>>>> In fact, the first/third distinction is not needed in tunnel vision, as I see it.  I
>> think
>>>> Roy may have been saying the same thing.
>>>> 
>>>> Now, the site may be able to remember “I served this dishwasher ad to Dave
>>>> thrice up to now, ’tis sufficient”, but it cannot remember “it was on
>> Sears.com
>>>> that I first served that ad, and on HomeDepot.com the second, but lo! or the
>>>> third I cannot recall who asked it of me”. That’s remembering data across
>>>> contexts.
>>>> 
>>>> Or am I off base?
>>>> 
>>>> On Sep 11, 2014, at 7:15 , Justin Brookman <jbrookman@cdt.org> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> We are not reopening a discussion on whether there will be a permitted use
>>>> for frequency capping. That has been stable in the TCS for years. Anyone who
>>>> wanted to remove such a permitted use could have opened an issue on this at
>>>> any time up to October of last year; no one did.
>>>>> 
>>>>> This issue raised by Jack is an editorial one. The frequency capping rules are
>>>> already subject to the Data Minimization and No Personalization language in
>>>> Sections 3.3.1.3 and 3.3.1.4; Jack has made the argument that the last
>> sentence
>>>> in the frequency capping paragraph is thus superfluous.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Companies retaining data for frequency capping alone can only collect and
>> use
>>>> the data minimally necessary for that purpose, and cannot use that data for
>>>> secondary purposes. There is no basis for retaining web browsing history for
>>>> frequency capping (unless a cap is tied to showing a number of ads on a
>>>> particular site), and companies will not be able to target ads based on the
>> nature
>>>> of frequently shown ads. However, keep in mind that companies are likely to
>>>> retain web browsing history despite a DNT:1 setting for other purposes,
>>>> including attribution and fraud prevention. Of the permitted uses, I would
>> think
>>>> frequency capping would be the least concerning to advocates.
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Sep 11, 2014, at 9:58 AM, Jeffrey Chester <jeff@democraticmedia.org>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Thanks for reminding me that in-flight and associated ad changes are
>> labeled
>>>> as OBA/data driven targeting.  I believe this debate is a useful one, because
>>>> frequency capping needs to be vetted taking into consideration EU and other
>>>> data protection policies.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Jeffrey Chester
>>>>>> Center for Digital Democracy
>>>>>> 1621 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 550
>>>>>> Washington, DC 20009
>>>>>> www.democraticmedia.org
>>>>>> www.digitalads.org
>>>>>> 202-986-2220
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Sep 11, 2014, at 6:53 AM, Shane M Wiley <wileys@yahoo-inc.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Jeff,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> We agreed as a group that any "in flight" changes were deemed
>> behavioral
>>>> targeting, not frequency capping, so we already removed that use case from
>>>> consideration (such as sequential ads) at the Oct 2013 Sunnyvale meeting.
>> The
>>>> use case here is the most simple one imaginable -- not showing the same user
>>>> the same ad more than X times in a Y given time frame - nothing more.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> - Shane
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>> From: Jeffrey Chester [mailto:jeff@democraticmedia.org]
>>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2014 3:50 AM
>>>>>>> To: Shane M Wiley
>>>>>>> Cc: Walter van Holst; public-tracking@w3.org
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: Remove profiling prohibition for frequency capping (ISSUE-
>> 236)
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Walter is correct. In addition, Frequency capping is now also connected
>> to
>>>> real-time "in-flight" changes to targeted personalized campaigns. In-flight is
>> ad
>>>> biz term for such ad technique changes done during a campaign, which can
>> also
>>>> involve "creative versioning," that is new campaign dynamic elements that
>>>> reflect how a person is responding. Capping connected to these and similar
>>>> changes to a users experience should not be permitted under DNT:1
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Jeff
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Jeff Chester
>>>>>>> Center for Digital Democracy
>>>>>>> Washington DC
>>>>>>> www.democraticmedia.org
>>>>>>> Jeff@democraticmedia.org
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Sep 11, 2014, at 6:38 AM, Shane M Wiley <wileys@yahoo-inc.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Walter,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Then we disagree on the merits here.  Removing frequency-capping will
>>>> have fairly negative repercussions on users seeing the same ads over-and-
>> over-
>>>> and-over driving them to turn off DNT.  The group on both sides agreed to
>> this
>>>> carve-out long ago due to the perverse disincentives created in this scenario
>> (I
>>>> believe only 2 or 3 people out of ~70 ever had an issue here).  Your technical
>>>> solution is simply unworkable.  Looking forward to the Call for Objections.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> - Shane
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>> From: Walter van Holst [mailto:walter.van.holst@xs4all.nl]
>>>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, September 11, 2014 3:30 AM
>>>>>>>> To: public-tracking@w3.org
>>>>>>>> Subject: RE: Remove profiling prohibition for frequency capping
>>>>>>>> (ISSUE-236)
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On 2014-09-11 12:18, Shane M Wiley wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> We've always agreed the frequency-capping would be a permitted use
>> in
>>>>>>>>> situations where a DNT=1 is received.  Are you suggesting we now
>>>>>>>>> remove that permitted use or are you simply commenting on this
>>>>>>>>> specific language?
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I am perfectly fine with frequency-capping, as long as it doesn't
>>>>>>>> require profiling at an individual level. It cannot result in
>>>>>>>> collection of data by a third-party if the UA is setting a DNT:1 flag.
>>>>>>>> The mere fact that this particular purpose of tracking is beneficial
>>>>>>>> both to the user and the advertiser does not justify in itself an
>>>>>>>> override of a
>>>>>>>> DNT:1 preference. And I can think of several methods to prevent
>>>> saturation of a particular user with a particular ad, for example progressively
>>>> dropping least-significant bits of IP-addresses to mask out groups of users
>> that
>>>> an ad should not be shown to.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> I do not recall a broad consensus about this particular permitted use.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Walter
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> David Singer
>>>> Manager, Software Standards, Apple Inc.
>>>> 
>>> 
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>> 
>> David Singer
>> Manager, Software Standards, Apple Inc.
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David Singer
Manager, Software Standards, Apple Inc.

Received on Thursday, 11 September 2014 18:41:49 UTC