Re: procedure for posting comments today

Hi Peter - 

Thanks. I tried to submit my vote earlier, but it was rejected by the
system. It may have to do with the length. Nick kindly suggested that I post
it to the list, and then offer a link to my email in my response (which I
did).

Please let me know if it wasn't received.

Thanks!


From:  Peter Swire <peter@peterswire.net>
Date:  Friday, July 12, 2013 12:42 PM
To:  Alan Chapell <achapell@chapellassociates.com>, "public-tracking@w3.org"
<public-tracking@w3.org>
Cc:  Nicholas Doty <npdoty@w3.org>
Subject:  procedure for posting comments today

> Hello Alan and the group:
> 
> To make it as easy as possible to collect objections in one, viewable place,
> we are asking that you post your comments/objections to the URL below.  It
> does require logging in as a working group member:
> 
> https://www.w3.org/2002/09/wbs/49311/datahygiene/
> 
> To view all comments/objections, click here:
> 
> https://www.w3.org/2002/09/wbs/49311/datahygiene/results
> 
> If you experience any technical problems in posting, you can send email to the
> chairs and to Nick Doty, at npdoty@w3.org.  This will assure that your
> comments are considered as submitted in time.  We can then assure that your
> comments get posted.
> 
> This approach avoids duplicative emails to the list.
> 
> Thank you all,
> 
> Peter
> 
> 
> 
> Prof. Peter P. Swire
> C. William O'Neill Professor of Law
> Ohio State University
> 240.994.4142
> www.peterswire.net
> 
> Beginning August 2013:
> Nancy J. and Lawrence P. Huang Professor
> Law and Ethics Program
> Scheller College of Business
> Georgia Institute of Technology
> 
> 
> From:  Alan Chapell <achapell@chapellassociates.com>
> Date:  Friday, July 12, 2013 12:30 PM
> To:  "public-tracking@w3.org" <public-tracking@w3.org>
> Subject:  Chapell - Objection to Editor's draft
> Resent-From:  <public-tracking@w3.org>
> Resent-Date:  Friday, July 12, 2013 12:31 PM
> 
> July 12, 2013
>  
> Peter Swire
> Matthias Schunter
> World Wide Web Consortium
> 32 Vassar Street, 32-G519
> Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
>  
> Re: Tracking Protection Working Group July Vote
>  
> Dear Peter & Matthias:
>  
> I¹d like to thank the W3C and the co-chairs for the opportunity to provide
> feedback to the June W3C Draft (³Editor¹s Draft²). I recognize all of the hard
> work that has gone into the Editor¹s Draft.
>  
> However, I respectfully object to the Editor¹s Draft, and strongly encourage
> the W3C to use the industry consensus proposal (the ³DAA Proposal²) as a
> starting point for the TPWG¹s continued work.
> 
> 
>  
> The Editor¹s Draft is harmful to competition.
> The potential anti-competitive implications of this working group¹s output
> have been well documented. For example, during a recent hearing at the U.S.
> Senate Commerce Committee, several of the committee members raised concerns
> about the anti-competitive implications of DNT. Specifically, concerns were
> raised about this working group picking winners and losers (Senator Heller),
> and there were similar concerns that the W3C process may result in bolstering
> a handful of giant Internet companies and ensuring everyone else goes out of
> business (Senator McCaskill). Moreover, recent speeches by FTC Commissioner
> Commission Olhousen raised anti-competitive concerns about this process, and
> I¹ve heard similar concerns coming from regulators within the EU. It is worth
> noting that the FTC participation in this working group has focused almost
> exclusively on privacy with very little mention of the competitive impact of
> DNT. 
>  
> 
> For over two years, the approach of this working group has been to focus
> almost exclusively on third-party data collection while imposing few limits on
> larger entities. Under any implementation, data is going to be collected when
> DNT=1 so it comes down to who gets to collect data and for what purposes.
> Ceasing collection by third parties while barely curtailing first party data
> collection does not provide consumers with meaningful privacy protections
> under any objective analysis. And in light of recent events, some analysts
> have noted that concentration of information in a small number of large
> entities will have negative repercussions on personal freedoms. (See
> http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/elements/2013/06/why-monopolies-make-spy
> ing-easier.html)
>  
> 
> The Editor¹s Draft continues this trend. I continue to be surprised that so
> many working group members who hold themselves out as privacy advocates have
> accepted this approach.  The Editor¹s Draft will negatively impact competition
> in the Internet economy, without a positive net benefit to users' privacy. By
> favoring first party business models and severely curtailing third party
> players (who for the most part use pseudonymous data, rather than the PII that
> most first parties hold), it would shift marketplace incentives toward more
> first party data collection. The end result will be less competition and more
> data collected and associated with the personally identifiable information of
> consumers: a poor outcome by any objective privacy standard.
>  
> 
> Conversely, the DAA Proposal offers privacy-enhancing features (e.g., removal
> of the URL string when DNT=1) that are geared to address a core concern raised
> by advocates and regulators while minimizing the anti-competitive impact of
> DNT.
>  
> 
> Section 7 of the Editor¹s Draft is unclear and conflates Opt-out with DNT
> As noted by other WG members, section 7 of the Editor¹s Draft is confusing, as
> it is not clear to which opt-outs the text is referring (user settings for a
> specific site? Email marketing opt-outs?). Moreover, most opt-outs choices are
> recorded utilizing third-party cookies. Any attempt to include opt-out in a
> DNT spec is inappropriate without a corresponding requirement that browser
> stop blocking third-party cookies.
>  
> More importantly, industry self-regulatory opt-out mechanisms were always
> intended to function separately from DNT. DNT is intended to be a global
> standard, and the self-regulatory regimes focus on particular regions. I (and
> other WG members) have concerns about including a reference to such programs
> in a global specification where implementers may be in regions where the
> self-regulatory program has not been deployed. Some members of the working
> group have suggested that DNT should replace the industry self-regulatory
> programs. However, this notion ignores the significant time and resources
> invested in self-regulatory programs that were created in consultation with
> regulators from multiple jurisdictions. The self-regulatory programs are
> effective, while DNT is completely untested to date. Throwing out the
> self-regulatory programs in favor of DNT at this junction would be reckless
> and could harm consumer privacy interests.
>  
> 
> Finally, and as described below, the volume of non-browser, non-user activated
> DNT signals is growing at an alarming rate.  Until DNT:1 signals can be
> technically structured such that Servers have confidence they were actually
> turned on by users, then equating DNT:1 to the industry opt-out program is
> impractical.
>  
> The Editor¹s Draft does not offer any mechanism to address the proliferation
> of invalid DNT signals
> By definition, many of the DNT signals being sent today are out of compliance
> with the Editor¹s Draft. This is not meant to be a criticism of work done by
> the browsers to date. Rather, its meant as a simple observation: that a
> significant number of DNT signals were enacted in a manner that is out of
> compliance with the User Agent requirements contained the Editor¹s Draft
> (e.g., the disclosure guidelines in Section 3). In order to mitigate this
> issue, the Editor¹s Draft would need to essentially require that all
> enactments of DNT be turned off (set to DNT:unset) so that Users may reset
> them in a manner that meets the basic disclosure requirements of the current
> spec. 
>  
> 
> Perhaps more concerning, the volume of non-browser, non-user activated DNT
> signals is growing at an alarming rate.  The cost of adding DNT:1 to the
> header is very inexpensive from a technical perspective and we¹ve seen
> routers, anti-virus software, plug-ins and other tools set DNT=1 in ways that
> violate basic standards of privacy.  To use W3C co-chair Matthias Schunter's
> phrase, we're seeing a proliferation of DNT signals "spraying" into the
> ecosystem.  While many of us are still hopeful solutions can be found to
> contain the issue, the reality for the foreseeable future is that we¹ll
> continue to see DNT invalid implementations of DNT and are unlikely to
> consistently be able to distinguish between valid and invalid DNT
> implementations. 
>  
> 
> Some working group members have asserted that we should simply err on the side
> of caution and treat all DNT signals as valid. However, I strongly believe
> that this approach would violate long-standing privacy concepts such as
> notice, choice, and transparency.
>  
> 
> The Editor¹s Draft exempts browsers and other user agents from prohibitions
> against tracking
> The Editor¹s Draft does not prohibit user agents from either: a) taking URL
> string to create segments to sell to advertisers (or others) for ad targeting
> across the web, or b) enabling other entities to do so. To my eyes, that type
> of behavior would be considered tracking and should be prohibited by the spec.
> Unfortunately, it is not covered by the Editor¹s Draft. If others in the
> ecosystem are prohibited from tracking, it seems fair and appropriate that we
> ensure that similar prohibitions are placed on user agents.
>  
> 
> The Editor¹s Draft will result in a low level of adoption
> The larger goal of all W3C initiatives is voluntary adoption by implementers
> of the standard. Unfortunately, the Editor¹s Draft suffers from too many
> significant flaws that it is unlikely to be adopted by the marketplace. The
> entities primarily covered by the proposed DNT standard -- third party online
> businesses ­ are unlikely to adopt and comply with the approach in the
> Editor¹s Draft, because it is over-broad and anti-competitive, and would
> severely curtail their businesses without a commensurate privacy benefit to
> consumers. A balanced and narrowly tailored approach that solves specific
> privacy concerns while maintaining competition and a diverse internet economy
> is much more likely to gain widespread adoption, and ultimately benefit
> consumers.
>  
> Conversely, the DAA Proposal has a significantly greater chance of receiving
> widespread adoption (admittedly, with some polishing). The Editor¹s Draft has
> so many flaws and non-starters for the intended implementers it's not a useful
> baseline for continuing discussion, especially in light of the DAA's proposal
> which is ostensibly much, much closer to a form that would actually be
> accepted by intended implementers. Hence, the DAA Proposal has a significantly
> greater chance of receiving widespread adoption.
>  
> For the above reasons, I object to the Editor¹s Draft and encourage the chairs
> to move forward with the DAA Proposal.
>  
> Respectfully,
>  
> Alan Chapell 
> Chapell & Associates
> 
>