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RE: ACTION-255: Work on financial reporting text as alternative to legal requirements

From: Mike Zaneis <mike@iab.net>
Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2012 14:04:06 +0000
To: Chris Mejia <chris.mejia@iab.net>, mike O'Neill <michael.oneill@baycloud.com>
CC: "public-tracking@w3.org" <public-tracking@w3.org>
Message-ID: <9FF2724793CE3843BF5E46A70AA609A5B7079A0D@IAB-NYC-EX1.IAB.local>
Actually, if people want to work on data security breach and government access to data, I'd point them to the fantastic work that CDT has done on these issues in the past.  They have lead efforts to reform ECPA here in the U.S. for years and there is significant overlap in industry/advocate positions.  

But again, this has nothing to do with DNT.

Mike Zaneis
SVP & General Counsel
Interactive Advertising Bureau
(202) 253-1466

Follow me on Twitter @mikezaneis



-----Original Message-----
From: Chris Mejia [mailto:chris.mejia@iab.net] 
Sent: Tuesday, October 02, 2012 9:31 AM
To: mike O'Neill
Cc: public-tracking@w3.org
Subject: Re: ACTION-255: Work on financial reporting text as alternative to legal requirements

Mike, please read my earlier email in this thread with regards to conspiracy theory-- I'm afraid that's what your argument below sounds like.  Industry is here to work on real problems.  Respectfully, the idea that government might access this data for oppressive purposes is outside of the scope of what industry is willing to work on (because we don't have any evidence of this practice).  We are here to work on real world problems, if they exist.  We already spend a tremendous amount of time and money to ensure that such problems don't exist, but if you have documented proof that they do exist, let's discuss that.  Such a discussion would be productive, and may actually lead to some positive changes, if they are warranted.

Kindly,

Chris Mejia, IAB & DAA


On Oct 2, 2012, at 10:56 AM, "\mike O'Neill" <michael.oneill@baycloud.com> wrote:

> 
> Alan,
> 
> I don't know if this amounts to a smoking gun.
> 
> If everybody's online behaviour can be recorded and stored without 
> consent, without knowledge in most cases, then the data will be very 
> valuable to oppressive governments & criminals  and they will find ways to access it.
> 
> Criminals could get to it though corrupt insiders and potentially 
> oppressive government through law,
> 
> For example the Draft Communications Data bill in the UK would allow 
> the security services to demand access to behavioural data from anyone 
> who gathered it, not just the ISPs.
> 
> If this could happen in the UK it is not hard to imagine how it could 
> in less democratic countries.
> 
> 
> 
> Mike
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Alan Chapell [mailto:achapell@chapellassociates.com]
> Sent: 02 October 2012 01:50
> To: Rigo Wenning
> Cc: Mike Zaneis; David Wainberg; Nicholas Doty; 
> public-tracking@w3.org; Dobbs, Brooks
> Subject: Re: ACTION-255: Work on financial reporting text as 
> alternative to legal requirements
> 
> The only thing you and I agree upon here is that you can't provide the 
> smoking gun. (:
> 
> 
> More belowİ
> 
> 
> On 10/1/12 7:01 PM, "Rigo Wenning" <rigo@w3.org> wrote:
> 
>> Alan,
>> 
>> On Monday 01 October 2012 16:51:45 Alan Chapell wrote:
>>> I appreciate your taking the time - and the willingness to engage in 
>>> dialog. However, you really did not directly answer my questions. 
>>> You are providing high level examples of privacy issues - most of 
>>> which will not be addressed by DNT unless we radically change our approach.
>> 
>> If DNT would not address some of those issues, you wouldn't see me 
>> engaged. :)
> 
>> But this IMHO. I also know that I can't provide the smoking gun. I 
>> guess, Ninja and Rob could. W3C as a community is a pretty good 
>> indication whether something is going on. People are afraid. This can 
>> kill the entire market. That's why we are discussing here.
>> 
>> more inline
>> 
>>> On 10/1/12 4:27 PM, "Rigo Wenning" <rigo@w3.org> wrote:
>>>> blocking tools. I can show you how easy it is. If this is still an 
>>>> issue in 5 years, this may even be more damaging to the industry 
>>>> than DNT ever could be.
>>> 
>>> How is DNT going to stop this practice? If I'm buying my tickets via 
>>> Delta.com, Delta is a 1st party and would not be subject to a DNT 
>>> signal for these purposes.
>> 
>> Oh, Airline XYZ can only do so because they have bought the profile 
>> that tells them I can afford the higher price... - just as an example 
>> - That we do not address first parties is irrelevant for the EU and a 
>> sign of careful nudging of the US community.
> 
> In my experience, it would be unlikely (at best) that airline XYZ.com 
> would operate in the way that you're suggesting. We need to 
> distinguish what is POSSIBLE in theory from what is PRACTICAL. Going back to your initial hypo:
> you explained that a) you went to XYZ.com in the afternoon and got one 
> price and b) you re-visited that site later in the evening and got a 
> different price. And you believe that XYZ.com had purchased a profile 
> between your afternoon and evening visits to XYZ.com resulted in your 
> seat price increasing???? A MUCH more likely scenario is that the 
> airline has booked some additional seats on that flight and is now 
> charging more for each incremental seat. Or perhaps the airline just 
> charges more for flights at night than during the day.
> 
> So if this is your example of harm, you may want to keep looking (:
> 
> 
> 
>>> 
>>>> 2/ Democratic values
>>>> In confirmation of Godwin's law let me tell you that I think that 
>>>> totalitarianism doesn't need computers. But it makes life easier 
>>>> for them. The concentration of high amounts of personal data in few 
>>>> hands is a risk in the power balance.
>>> 
>>> I agree - concentration of data in a small number of players is 
>>> problematic. How do you see DNT addressing this issue? In fact, I 
>>> think one can make a plausible argument that DNT will concentrate 
>>> data in a smaller number of entities. I believe that's a horrible 
>>> outcome that many in this group may be missing and/or choosing to 
>>> ignore.
>> 
>> You fail to give an argument for your assertion. While one can make a 
>> plausible argument, you'll have to make that argument to contradict me.
>> Why should the number of players be smaller if I can refuse collection? 
>> Note: a first party -by definition- can't collect cross site. Leaves 
>> you the 2-3 big fish. Those have a different
>> incentive: They are targets.
>>> 
>> [...]
> 
> If you put the third party intermediaries out of business - by 
> definition the marketplace will be smaller.
> 
> 
>>> My point - There are going to be legitimate exceptions for the use 
>>> of data. And each exception should be weighed on the merits - 
>>> benefit to creating the exception vs risks of keeping the exception. 
>>> My issue with your approach is that you aren't really explaining 
>>> what you think the harm is to allowing my specific exception.
>> 
>> Because there is a fundamental transatlantic divide. We have that 
>> even internally. While the eastern part believes that the 
>> availability of organized personal data is very prone to abuse, the 
>> western part believes that it is all about use limitations. Give the 
>> data to the junkie but say: "do not use!". Some believe, some don't.
>> Note that those legitimate exceptions are law in EU. Self regulation 
>> has to re-invent those. For the unregulated, this is a test whether 
>> we can find a reasonable compromise without the formal democratic process.
> 
> I have no idea what you mean hereİ But while we're on the subject of 
> providing arguments for your assertions, I'd invite you to provide a 
> specific argument of harm that addresses the request for exemptions. 
> If the XYZ.com is the best you can do, well...
> 
>> 
>>> 
>>>> It is therefore essential that somebody can just indicate to the 
>>>> system not to be recorded. And that the system just does not 
>>>> record, or at least throws away after a very short time. So DNT is 
>>>> just a tiny tool, a little aspect in this overall picture.
>>>> But it could be a useful tool. Now you may understand that 
>>>> recording the same information for accounting or PCMCP (a pure use 
>>>> limitation that is) is not sufficient for most people.
>>> 
>>> What are these people you cite? Are you representing the interests 
>>> of consumers in the same way that Jeff and John are?
>> 
>> People just meant my grandma. I neither represent consumers nor 
>> industry nor W3C Team. Because the answer given here are not 
>> coordinated with the W3C Team. I'm just talking to you from my ivory 
>> tower of 15 years of privacy research. This is my second exercise 
>> after P3P, XACML privacy extensions and the like... But I see the 
>> polls that indicate that over 56% of Europeans erase _all_ their 
>> cookies at least once a month. 25% weekly (from the top of my head, 
>> search for eurobarometer).
>> 
>> 2002, the industry thought: "danger banned, no privacy provisions in 
>> the US, move on". And the browsers thought: "we manage cookies by 
>> blocking tools". Ten years after, we are back to the core semantic
>> problem: "Can I trust your assertions?". What does that tell me?
>> Everybody has to optimize in some direction. That's what this effort 
>> is all about. I have to optimize in the direction of excellence...
>> And putting in question the bases of the effort for financial 
>> reporting is against my optimization target. And there, your wording 
>> was much better (and stronger) than mine.
> 
> Thank you. Its interesting that you reference P3P. Do you believe that 
> P3P was a success?
> 
>> 
>> Rigo
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
Received on Tuesday, 2 October 2012 14:05:14 UTC

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