Re: tracking-ISSUE-150: DNT conflicts from multiple user agents [Tracking Definitions and Compliance]

It's also to note that over time, things have tended to shift, e.g. some
browsers are now blocking third party cookies by default...

On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 4:44 PM, Lauren Gelman <gelman@blurryedge.com>wrote:

>
> Of course-- but realistically, majority default DNT is not the world this
> standard will exist in.  DNT is going to be a 10% solution.
>
> Frankly, having done privacy for almost 20 years, the idea that millions
> of users are going to turn on any privacy setting such that they
> unknowingly stop sharing their data in a way that actually has any impact
> on any businesses bottom line is unrealistic at best.  (Can anyone point to
> any internet business, ever, where this has happened??) I've heard of spam,
> spyware, fishing, spear fishing, etc.  I've never heard of a massive
> pro-privacy viral campaign that worked.   There's lots of $ behind
> companies trying to get users to turn off DNT and no $ to try to get them
> to turn it on, so I think this is really orthogonal to what this group is
> working on.
>
> Lauren Gelman
> BlurryEdge Strategies
> 415-627-8512
>
> On May 30, 2012, at 4:05 PM, Ian Fette (イアンフェッティ) wrote:
>
> I think the desire though is that DNT is a representation of a user's
> explicit preference. If a browser set it by default, for instance, would a
> site be obligated to respect it?
>
> -Ian
>
> On Wed, May 30, 2012 at 3:33 PM, Lauren Gelman <gelman@blurryedge.com>wrote:
>
>>
>> I don't see the parity here. One is a user's affirmative action being
>> overruled by another entity.  The other is the user opting to change a
>> default setting.
>>
>>  Lauren Gelman
>> BlurryEdge Strategies
>> 415-627-8512
>>
>> On May 30, 2012, at 3:22 PM, Shane Wiley wrote:
>>
>> Justin,****
>> ** **
>> If companies are expected to achieve “informed and explicit” consent to
>> turn off DNT, then it is only fair that User Agents also achieve “informed
>> and explicit” consent to turn on DNT.  Do you disagree?****
>> ** **
>> - Shane****
>> ** **
>>  *From:* Justin Brookman [mailto:justin@cdt.org]
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, May 30, 2012 3:17 PM
>> *To:* public-tracking@w3.org
>> *Subject:* Re: tracking-ISSUE-150: DNT conflicts from multiple user
>> agents [Tracking Definitions and Compliance]****
>> ** **
>> What problem?  You honor the header by doing what the spec says.  There
>> is no need for you to try to discern user intent, and indeed, no way for
>> you to do so.  Ad networks cannot be and are not expected to be responsible
>> for every UI or every possible bit of misinformation someone saw in a
>> comment thread on Reddit to get them to turn on DNT in the first place.
>>
>> Today, if someone sets their browser to block third-party cookies, you
>> don't try to circumvent that on the theory that someone maybe didn't
>> understand what cookies did in the first place.  Nor do we dictate to the
>> user agents how and when to surface and describe those capabilities.
>>
>> If there are conflicting headers, that's a different issue, and Ian and
>> Jonathan are putting together draft text on that issue.
>>
>> ****
>>
>> Justin Brookman****
>>
>> Director, Consumer Privacy****
>>
>> Center for Democracy & Technology****
>>
>> 1634 I Street NW, Suite 1100****
>>
>> Washington, DC 20006****
>>
>> tel 202.407.8812****
>>
>> fax 202.637.0969****
>>
>> justin@cdt.org****
>>
>> http://www.cdt.org****
>>
>> @CenDemTech****
>>
>> @JustinBrookman****
>>
>>
>> On 5/30/2012 3:34 PM, Chris Mejia wrote:****
>> I believe new Issue-150 is closely related to open Issue-143. If the
>> user's intent in turning on/off DNT is not clear (especially in cases where
>> the user doesn't even know they are specifically sending a DNT:1 header),
>> there is no way for publishers to understand how to accurately "honor" any
>> consumer's DNT header flag— *it's a fundamental flaw with this scope of
>> this proceeding*.  I laid out the concern in some detail in my previous
>> email to the group ("In Support of Issue-143"); so I'll just give the brief
>> version here: if publishers do not understand the context of the user's DNT
>> expression (was the user properly informed about what setting does/means,
>> before it was set) how are publishers to determine what the user actually
>> intended, or if they user is even aware that a DNT flag is being sent?  If
>> any question/statement in any UI can lead to the sending of DNT:1 or DNT:0,
>> where is the integrity of the system/solution?  ****
>> ** **
>> To give just one example (there are many) of how a DNT mechanism that
>> lacks a uniform informed consent requirement might be abused, consider the
>> theoretical yet plausible scenario where an email is sent to (millions of)
>> users informing the users that they should "*click here to prevent evil
>> doers from knowing who you are*" or even worse, "*click here if you
>> think blue is a pretty color*" (replace with a variety of malware
>> tactics), the user's click leading to a programatic setting of DNT, without
>> the user's informed consent under uniform compliance rules.  When that
>> happens (some zealot decides to abuse the system), I'm sure we'll
>> eventually learn about it, after some amount of damage being done. ****
>> ** **
>> *When it becomes known that users were deceived into sending a DNT
>> expression (no uniform informed consent), here's what the end-game of
>> publishers might be: * without a way of discerning how DNT was set
>> (which program; who owns the program; being able to inspect the program),
>> and under which auspices it was set (what did the user agree to when they
>> clicked?), when learning of a set of users who were deceived into setting
>> DNT, publishers may be forced to consider if they should honor any DNT
>> header requests at all, in an effort to protect the web experience of all
>> users.  Under this scenario, publishers may be compelled to issue public
>> statements outlining the fatal flaws of this W3C DNT mechanism, citing the
>> specific abuses, and walking away from compliance on the grounds that being
>> "compliant" with such a system would be harmful to the majority of its
>> users.****
>> ** **
>> Is that really the result that this working group is looking for?  If
>> not, I strongly suggest that we all get on board with defining a system
>> where the actual intent of the user is absolutely clear— the only way I can
>> think to accomplish this is to require compliance with a uniform
>> requirement to properly educate/inform the user about their choice, at the
>> point user choice is made.  Of course I'm open to hearing other suggestions
>> for solving this problem, but I feel that "*it's out of scope/Charter
>> for this project*" is not an acceptable solution— that answer does not
>> solve the problem described here and in open Issue-143.  Please, let's
>> solve the actual problem.****
>> ** **
>> Chris Mejia, IAB/DAA****
>> ** **
>> ** **
>> On 5/30/12 1:35 PM, "Tracking Protection Working Group Issue Tracker" <
>> sysbot+tracker@w3.org> wrote:****
>> ** **
>>
>> tracking-ISSUE-150: DNT conflicts from multiple user agents [Tracking
>> Definitions and Compliance]****
>> ** **
>> http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/track/issues/150****
>> ** **
>> Raised by: Aleecia McDonald****
>> On product: Tracking Definitions and Compliance****
>> ** **
>> Due to multiple addons that support Do Not Track, there could be
>> conflicts. For example, a user could turn off DNT (not unset, actually off,
>> sending DNT:0) in Firefox, yet install Abine's "Do Not Track Plus" addon
>> (which sends DNT:1). More fun, users could have three different addons,
>> each with a different value. Do we have either best practices or
>> requirements for user agents here?****
>> ** **
>> Created from original issue-148, with actions taken by ifette and jmayer
>> to write proposals.****
>> ** **
>> ** **
>> ** **
>> ** **
>>
>>
>>
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