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Re: Identity providers as first parties

From: Rob van Eijk <rob@blaeu.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2012 00:52:18 +0200
Message-ID: <4FDA6B22.4030606@blaeu.com>
To: Kimon Zorbas <vp@iabeurope.eu>
CC: "ifette@google.com" <ifette@google.com>, Tamir Israel <tisrael@cippic.ca>, "JC Cannon (Microsoft)" <jccannon@microsoft.com>, "public-tracking@w3.org Group WG" <public-tracking@w3.org>
We are talking about the same scenario. JC gave the use case a bit more 
context: "There may be cases where the identity provider supplies 
ongoing profile or configuration information on behalf of the user. (...)"

My point is that I disagree that the general terms & conditions, 
suffices when it comes to seeing the phenomena in a DNT context. I would 
rather see normative text on use limitations IF you wanted to bring this 
use case into the scope of DNT=1.

Personally I think it fits in the DNT scope nicely. Identity providers 
have an important role on the Web, and having normative text in the 
standard that reassures trust makes sense to me. I

On 15-6-2012 0:25, Kimon Zorbas wrote:
> Apologies if I miss the point or get the wrong context here.
> Are we not speaking about the scenario, where I log-in on website X 
> with my –e.g.- Facebook credentials? If Facebook uses or not the data 
> from the log-in (subsequent data collection on website X) depends on 
> whether I agreed to it in the general terms & conditions / privacy 
> notice with Facebook. (Let aside that users probably think Facebook 
> shares "a lot of data" with website X). [And in Europe that need to be 
> in line with the law (which structured properly,it does).]
> I am not sure what we are trying to achieve in terms of bringing such 
> uses into the scope of DNT. Please enlighten me.
> Kimon
> From: Rob van Eijk <rob@blaeu.com <mailto:rob@blaeu.com>>
> Reply-To: "rob@blaeu.com <mailto:rob@blaeu.com>" <rob@blaeu.com 
> <mailto:rob@blaeu.com>>
> Date: Friday 15 June 2012 00:08
> To: "ifette@google.com <mailto:ifette@google.com>" <ifette@google.com 
> <mailto:ifette@google.com>>
> Cc: Tamir Israel <tisrael@cippic.ca <mailto:tisrael@cippic.ca>>, JC 
> Cannon <jccannon@microsoft.com <mailto:jccannon@microsoft.com>>, 
> "public-tracking@w3.org <mailto:public-tracking@w3.org> Group WG" 
> <public-tracking@w3.org <mailto:public-tracking@w3.org>>
> Subject: Re: Identity providers as first parties
> Resent-From: <public-tracking@w3.org <mailto:public-tracking@w3.org>>
> Resent-Date: Friday 15 June 2012 00:09
> I am not proclaiming data silo-ing. Normative text addressing the fact 
> that data must only be used for the purpose intended is useful in my 
> opinion. Purpose limitation doesn't necessarily imply technical 
> safeguards. If a party claims to be compliant with DNT, such normative 
> text can put limits. The carve out you might be looking for is 
> legitimate business interests, under which I see security, in this 
> specific context. So I think it can fly with tailwind:
> Identity providers must not use user data beyond the purpose of 
> identification and authentication unless this user data is needed for 
> a legitimate business interest like for example fraudulent login 
> attempts across multiple third party sites.
> On 14-6-2012 23:48, Ian Fette (イアンフェッティ) wrote:
>> Define "help" :-)
>> I can tell you that as an identity provider, there is no way I would 
>> silo this data as that would cause huge problems, e.g. I detect 
>> someone trying to compromise your account via one access mechanism 
>> and there's nothing I can do because it's siloed off? Or I can't rate 
>> limit authentication attempts because each third party is separate? 
>> Not going to fly.
>> In other words, define what you mean by "those extra things."
>> On Thursday, June 14, 2012, Rob van Eijk wrote:
>>     identification and authentication is far from our starting point,
>>     however an interesting use case.
>>     If identity providers are in the business of using the knowledge
>>     for different purposes then what the user intended (ie logging
>>     into a service), then for those extra things, the identity
>>     providers should be submitted to the DNT preference signal. Would
>>     that help?
>>     Rob
>>     On 14-6-2012 19:46, Ian Fette (イアンフェッティ) wrote:
>>>     I think this would probably be ok. I want to be clear though
>>>     that I would not expect data siloing here. E.g. We are going to
>>>     watch for fraudulent login attempts across multiple third party
>>>     sites yada yada yada.
>>>     On Thursday, June 14, 2012, Tamir Israel wrote:
>>>         Would this be workable?
>>>         Treat the IdP as first party for the authentication process
>>>         itself on the basis of substantial interaction, but leave
>>>         significant downstream personalization to out-of-band
>>>         consent (I think this can be acquired as part of the
>>>         authentication process in those cases where it is envisions
>>>         a need to do so).
>>>         On 6/14/2012 11:36 AM, JC Cannon wrote:
>>>>         No, that’s a different scenario. The identity provider is
>>>>         supplying the first-party site information on behalf of the
>>>>         user to simplify transfer of data.
>>>>         JC
>>>>         *From:*Tamir Israel [mailto:tisrael@cippic.ca]
>>>>         *Sent:* Thursday, June 14, 2012 6:35 AM
>>>>         *To:* JC Cannon
>>>>         *Cc:* ifette@google.com; public-tracking@w3.org Group WG
>>>>         *Subject:* Re: Identity providers as first parties
>>>>         Ok.
>>>>         Could/should some of this fall under Jonathan's outsourcing
>>>>         scenario?
>>>>         / Outsourcing
>>>>         A first party MAY outsource website functionality to a
>>>>         third party, in which case the third party may act as the
>>>>         first party under this standard with the following
>>>>         additional restrictions./
>>>>         With accompanying conditions?
>>>>         On 6/13/2012 10:29 AM, JC Cannon wrote:
>>>>         There may be cases where the identity provider supplies ongoing profile or configuration information on behalf of the user.
>>>>         JC
>>>>         -----Original Message-----
>>>>         From: Tamir Israel [mailto:tisrael@cippic.ca]
>>>>         Sent: Wednesday, June 13, 2012 7:25 AM
>>>>         To:ifette@google.com
>>>>         Cc:public-tracking@w3.org  Group WG
>>>>         Subject: Re: Identity providers as first parties
>>>>         Hi Ian,
>>>>         I'm not certain this is as clear as you imply. The entire concept of a federated identity system, for example, is to segregate the identity provider from any processing tasks beyond identity authentication. I would not expect an OpenID identity provider, for example, to suddenly become a 1st party simply because I used it to sign in). The role of that provider should be completed once my identity has been authenticated.
>>>>         Best,
>>>>         Tamir
>>>>         On 6/13/2012 10:13 AM, Ian Fette (イアンフェッティ) wrote:
>>>>             This email is intended to satisfy ACTION-187 and ISSUE-99
>>>>             I propose adding to the compliance spec the following:
>>>>             "If a site offers users the choice to log in with an identity
>>>>             provider, via means such as OpenID, OAuth, or other conceptually
>>>>             similar mechanisms, the identity provider is considered a first party
>>>>             for the current transactions and subsequent transactions for which the
>>>>             user remains authenticated to the site via the identity
Received on Thursday, 14 June 2012 22:53:02 UTC

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